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7.  Project Description  
      (extracted from the project proposal) 
 
Goal: To sustain and improve the livelihoods of the rural poor who depend on 
fisheries for their employment, income and food security along the rivers of the Lake 
Chad and Zambezi basins. 
 
Purpose: To strengthen the capacity of national and regional decision-making to 
develop and implement improved governance and policy mechanisms that sustain 
river fisheries and enhance their contribution to poverty alleviation and national food 
security. 
 
Outputs: The primary output (1) from the project will be a set of policy 
recommendations to governments, river basin institutions, development assistance 
agencies, NGOs, and the wider development community on the development and 
management of governance arrangements that enhance the contribution of river 
fisheries to poverty alleviation and food security. This primary output will be informed 
and supported by four technical outputs for each basin: (2) a review of governance 
arrangements for river fisheries; (3) a review of the current fisheries policy processes 
at national and regional levels; (4) an ex-ante assessment of the impact of improved 
governance and valuation information on fisher livelihoods; (5) a comprehensive 
valuation of the contribution of river fisheries to rural and urban livelihoods. These will 
in turn be supported by a series of other outputs including (6) a set of robust valua-
tion methods for developing countries river fisheries; (7) a technical ‘Guide on 
Economic Valuation of River Fisheries in Developing Countries’ for Policy-makers 
and Planners; (8) the development and strengthening of professional networks 
between the NARS partners within and between the two basins; (9) up to 16 African 
professionals trained in economic valuation techniques and governance and policy 




8.  Major Research findings  
 
This project was essentially a ‘policy-oriented’ project. The main scientific outputs 
achieved through this project were: 
 
  A set of policy recommendations on the development and management of 
governance arrangements that enhance the contribution of river fisheries to 
poverty alleviation and food security. This corresponds to output No.1 as listed 
above in section 7. The document is presented in Appendix 1. 
  New research methodology on governance analysis in small-scale inland 
fisheries, and improved understanding of the current governance issues in the 
sector in relation to decentralization reforms and co-management in sub-Sahara 
Africa. This corresponds to output No.2 of the original project proposal. The 
document is presented in Appendix 2. 
  Improved understanding of the current policy context, processes, and 
opportunities in small-scale inland fisheries in the Lake Chad Basin and Zambezi 
River Basin and beyond -in sub-Sahara Africa. This corresponds to output No.3 
of the original project proposal. The document is presented in Appendix 3. 
  New research methodology on socio-economic valuations of small-scale inland 
fisheries (Appendix 4), and improved understanding of the role of these small-
scale fisheries in the livelihoods of rural populations in sub-Sahara Africa. This 
corresponds to outputs No.5 and 6 of the original project proposal. Various 3 
 
journal articles and working papers illustrate these outputs. The journal articles 
are presented in Appendix 5.  
 
 
8.1. Policy analysis  
This section presents a brief summary of the improved understanding of the current 
policy context, processes, and opportunities for small-scale inland fisheries in sub-
Sahara Africa that were achieved through the project (output No.3) 
 
This component of the research was undertaken as part of the first major phase of 
the project. The overall objective of this part of the project was to establish a better 
understanding of the national policy processes in the countries of the Lake Chad 
Basin (LCB) and Zambezi River Basin (ZRB) where the project was directly 
implemented. For this the analysis drew upon four national reviews that were 
completed in Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Malawi. The main findings of these 
national reviews can be synthesized under five key themes as follows: 
 
8.1.1. Policy narratives 
A wide range of policy narratives relating to national development and natural 
resources have emerged (and persist and overlap) over the past 50 years. The initial 
emphasis focused on production increases, technological development and large 
scale investment, plus government control. More recently, there has been an 
increased interest in local (community) level management and activity, and good 
governance (accountable democracy, subsidiarity principle and rights). The national 
studies reveal how government policies in the LCB and ZRB countries have evolved, 
using the narratives to varying degrees, and culminating in the most recent Poverty 
Reduction Strategies Papers (PRSPs). However, despite this progression in policy, 
there are concerns including the difficulties of attempting to integrate and then 
operationalise different narratives (economic growth vs. local level development), the 
possibility that livelihoods relationships with natural resources management (NRM) 
are not being fully taken into account (lack of knowledge, understanding) and the 
danger that new narratives (decentralisation, co-management) are perceived as a 
panacea for past policy failures.  
 
8.1.2. Coherence 
The extent to which policy coherence is achieved has a major impact on policy 
performance overall. The national policy studies reveal many examples of the 
difficulties of evolving new policies, and trying to integrate them within existing policy 
arrangements. In Malawi, for example, decentralisation policy, local government 
reforms and national fisheries policy, have not achieved a high degree of coherence, 
largely because they appeared at different times and did not refer to existing 
legislation. All the studies show the importance of policy coherence with reference to 
objectives and implementation approaches, and the need to ensure that there is 
harmonisation between relevant institutions. The national PRSPs encapsulate some 
of the major policy coherence challenges which all the countries must face, but 
unless the coherence issue is addressed the anticipated development potential of the 
sector will be compromised. 
 
8.1.3. Actors 
The national policy studies reveal the importance of a wide range of actors in the 
policy process – in both policy formation and implementation. There are two 
emergent and important issues for the future – the number of actors is increasing (for 
example, as decentralization policy demands new ways of operating, and also, as 
new economic opportunities arise within expanding economies), and the roles and 4 
 
responsibilities for both new and existing actors will have to be carefully defined and 
formalised if policy implementation is to be successful. 
 
8.1.4. Spaces and opportunities 
The apparent success of policy development and reform in some natural resource 
sectors (e.g. Forestry policy in Ghana) is related to the ability to make ‘policy space’ 
for implementation at local and regional levels. There are at least five important 
issues – the ability of government to support a transfer of real power (to local level), 
to back this up with appropriate institutional capacity-building, to adapt policy 
declarations at national level into operational management systems at local level, to 
capitalise on incentives for participation and in making NRM work effectively (e.g. 
securing rights to long-term resource use), and for government in general to support 
the overall process of policy development and implementation over an extended 
period of time (it can be argued that ‘quick wins’ tend to be rare). It is likely also that 
‘policy spaces’ will open up over time and offer opportunities for positive interventions 
involving government, civil society actors and international partners (donors). 
Although the current PRSPs place emphasis on the role of government and the 
private sector, other actors (principally civil society organizations) are not considered. 
New policy approaches will need to be inclusive of all actors, even if some threaten 
the existing governance arrangements of certain countries. 
 
8.1.5. Understanding the performance of decentralized NRM policies   
Policy assessment and evaluation is often problematic. In the case of 
‘decentralisation’, this broad term can include a wide range of scales and processes 
(see section 8.2. on governance below), which are often country specific. However, 
there is no doubt that policy implementation, which has often been weak and 
unpredictable, needs to be underpinned by a greater understanding of the factors 
likely to affect it. Through more knowledge and feedback, both policy formation and 
implementation can be improved over time. Three important lessons for improved 
‘decentralisation’ – but which can be generalised - include (a) the need for stepwise 
and coordinated implementation strategy, (b) the fundamental need to address 
governance weaknesses and (c) the advantages of making the policy implementation 
process a ‘dynamic’ one which can respond to local opportunities and challenges 




8.2. Governance analysis 
This section presents a brief summary of the research methodology on governance 
analysis, and the improved understanding of the current governance issues in the 
sector that were achieved through the project (output no.2) 
 
Like the policy analysis above, the governance component was undertaken as part of 
the first phase of the project. The objective was to evaluate the governance situation 
in the fisheries sector in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and Zambezi River Basin (ZRB) 
with a particular attention paid to co-management reforms. For this the analysis drew 
upon five national reviews that were completed by the partners in Cameroon, Niger, 
Nigeria, Malawi, and Zambia. The main findings of these national reviews can be 
synthesized as follows: 
 
8.2.1. Promote better integration of SSF sectoral devolution into decentralization  
The country reviews evidenced how poorly integrated small-scale fisheries and co-
management are in the decentralization process being implemented in the rest of the 
economy of these countries. Inland fisheries are often overlooked by national and 
local decision-makers and considered as remnants of a stagnant, informal and 5 
 
useless sector that is meant to disappear through the normal economic development 
process. This view certainly contributes to the predatory behavior adopted by 
national and local government agencies whereby small-scale fisheries are often 
heavily taxed but notoriously neglected in terms of redistribution.  
 
Local governments’ reliance on fisheries-generated income should in contrary be 
seen as the evidence that a more balanced relationship could benefit all parties. 
Better supported, small-scale fisheries would contribute more effectively to local 
economic development, thus strengthening local governments through the 
generation of direct revenue (taxes) and indirectly through the welfare functions 
generally provided by small-scale fisheries -employment for unskilled population 
(labor buffer, safety net), contribution to food security and economic empowerment of 
remote rural groups including women. This better integration of fisheries into the local 
planning process could (or should) be facilitated by the fact that local levels of 
decision are known to be more effective in ensuring integrated planning than higher 
(national) levels. As such the territorial decentralized institutions created through 
parallel decentralization process (e.g. Districts Assemblies in Malawi, District 
Councils and District or Provincial Development Committees in Zambia, Collectivités 
Territoriales in Niger and Cameroon) should be in a much better position to integrate 
and account for the aspirations and needs of the small-scale fisherfolks than national 
planners operating from central Ministries’ bureaus. It is therefore the responsibility of 
the fisheries stakeholders (starting with the DoFs) to work closer with the 
decentralized governments’ agencies in order to ensure a better integration of small-
scale fisheries into the process of decentralized development, for the greater benefit 
of the resource, the local economy and the fisherfolks.   
 
8.2.2. Recognize the complexity of the local political game 
One of the main observations of the reviews was that co-management reforms have 
complexified the already hybrid and composite local governance system prevalent in 
Africa. While decentralization, in principle signifies increased procedural 
homogenization and transparency at the local level, in practice its implementation 
has led instead to greater fragmentation of the political arenas and greater 
complexity (de jure and de facto). Co-management has in particular increased the 
number of modern, as well as traditional, political and institutional local actors who 
are now competing, conflicting or colluding to capture part of the power and revenues 
that the control over fisheries resources can generate.  
 
The recognition of this situation calls for greater coordination and more resources 
made available for building capacity of actors at local level while strengthening the 
central government capacities for coordinating policy guidance and setting the 
appropriate policy environment. Donor and international development agencies need 
to realize that decentralization (and co-management) reforms certainly require more 
financial and human resources (and certainly not less) and sit rather uncomfortably in 
a reduction of public services expenses agenda. 
 
8.2.3. Account for the critical influence of traditional leaders 
Although not an exclusivity of Africa -as many Pacific fisheries are in the same 
situation- African small-scale inland fisheries are for their majority still under the 
strong influence of local traditional leaders. While co-management projects could 
have been one way to reduce this influence, the analysis revealed a totally different 
outcome. Because co-management projects were poorly prepared to face this issue, 
these traditional leaders have usually been one of the groups which almost 
systematically managed to strengthen their local power during the establishment of 
co-management reform. This situation means that a large part of the success (or 6 
 
failure) of these programs depends on these traditional leaders’ willingness to 
collaborate.  
 
This “resurgence of the traditional chieftaincies” through the decentralization process 
is not, however, necessarily systematically negative. In effect several cases 
demonstrate that they can be one of the key-players ensuring the success of co-
management projects. When this happens, however, it is essentially the result of 
their own integrity and commitment, and frequently depends on the extent to which 
the co-management process has actively engaged with them. 
 
These observations suggest that governments should recognize and define much 
more precisely the roles and responsibilities of traditional authorities in the 
decentralization process, and in particular in relation to natural resources 
management, being aware of the potential issues observed under the current 
decentralization experiences. In particular those existing mixed experiences 
underline the importance of establishing mechanisms of downward accountability. 
Until a minimum level of downward accountability is effectively embedded into the 
procedures, co-management projects will always depend on the personal 
commitment and capacities of few key actors, leaving the overall projects’ fate –and 
its impact on the whole community- entirely in the hand of these actors.  
 
8.2.4. Focus on implementation issues 
Co-management –and more broadly governance reforms- are high in the agenda of 
most African countries. It would therefore be misleading to present the failure of co-
management reforms as a consequence of lack of official political will. Co-
management problems come essentially from an inability to support all the processes 
needed to allow genuine devolution (democratic decentralization). There is therefore 
an urgent need for academics to turn their attention toward the ‘nitty-gritty’, ‘on-the-
ground’, and context-specific aspects of co-management implementation. While this 
has been highlighted many times, there is no ‘one size fits all’ and the success (or 
failure) of co-management programmes will essentially depend on local details: the 
integrity of the DoF local staff, the ‘ethic’ of the traditional leaders, the balance 
between the different groups of fishers (allochtone versus autochtone), the presence 
of local NGO, and in particular the pre-reform relationship between all these different 
groups and individuals.  
 
These observations clearly call for policies and interventions which would aim at 
strengthening the organizational and institutional capacity of identified stakeholders, 
based on local situations, to enable them carry out their new institutional roles and 
responsibilities while ensuring effective coordination of the process. These 
interventions should include sensitization and training of stakeholders on resource 
and environmental management; administrative, financial management and 
leadership skills; and funding mechanisms to generate their own revenue to support 
co-management activities.  
 
8.2.5. Promote participation, but more importantly ensure downward accountability 
Enhancing the participation of fisheries end-users and other legitimate stakeholders 
in the decision making process of fisheries is a central element in these reforms. The 
involvement of these end-users is, in particular expected, to increase their sense of 
responsibility and ownership, thus facilitating the self-enforcement of the 
management system and in principle the ‘sustainability’ and equity of the system. 
 
But ‘participation’ is not the panacea and “greater participation” will not ensure the 
success of co-management without being complemented by some forms of 
downward accountability. Since the involvement of every single fisherfolk (fishers, 7 
 
traders, fish processors, etc.) in the decision making process (that is, direct 
democracy) is not possible as it would increase ad infinitum the transaction costs of 
the political process, participation of those legitimate stakeholders in the decision 
making process can only be achieved through representative governance. This is 
indeed what has been done in the majority of co-management projects through the 
creation of community-based organizations. What our research showed however is 
that, until these representatives are downwardly accountable to the rest of the 
stakeholders, any devolution of power to these representatives is likely to become a 
source of misuse and abuse. There is therefore an urgent need for national and local 
policy makers (but also NGOs and other project implementers) to focus on this issue 
of accountability and to create the appropriate institutional and legislative conditions 
and mechanisms to ensure the establishment of a systematic downward 
accountability environment in decentralization.  
 
 
8.3. Socio-economic Analysis 
In this section are briefly summarized the results of the analyses conducted on the 
role of small-scale fisheries in the livelihoods of rural populations in sub-Sahara 
Africa (outputs No.5). 
 
The socio-economic studies were carried out in four major floodplains, two in the 
Chad Basin: Hadejia-Nguru (HN) Wetlands in North-East Nigeria and the Yaéres 
floodplain along the Logone river in North Cameroon; and two in the Zambezi Basin: 
the Kafue floodplain in central Zambia and the Lower Shire (LS) floodplain along the 
Shire river in South Malawi. The outcomes of these studies reveal some important 
similarities and differences in the socio-economic role of fisheries, analysis of which 
helps to understand the factors that determine their role in the livelihood of 
households and the policy direction that should be taken to improve these 
livelihoods. 
 
8.3.1. Fishing contribution to household income 
The four case studies illustrate the wide varieties of ways fishing contributes to the 
livelihood of households. In all four study areas, full time professional fishers are very 
few. In effect, the majority of households in HN, Yaéres and LS are primarily farmers 
who do fishing as a complementary activity. In Kafue, livestock rearing is the main 
activity for the majority of the households. In all areas, the probability of fishing is 
influenced by proximity to water-bodies, and is inversely related to amount of land in 
LS.  
 
Overall, the studies indicate that fishing make a significant contribution to the total 
income of the households in all four areas, ranging from 16 – 29% of their total 
income. In three of the four study areas (Yaéres, Kafue and LS) this represents the 
second most important activity in terms of income. Off farm activities are minor in 
most areas, except in HN where they play the second role.  A similar proportion of 
households engage in fishing in all four study areas (53- 66%). Fishing is however 
part of a highly seasonal and diversified portfolio of activities the organization of 
which is closely determined by the natural flood cycle.  
 
8.3.2. Fishing as a risk management strategy 
In HN and Yaéres, more in-depth econometric analyses suggest that fishing is done 
primarily for its income smoothing effect rather than its overall income effect. In fact 
households recognize that farming activity yields greater but highly volatile income 
(due in particular to large inter-annual variability) as opposed to fishing which yield 
lower but more continuous and predictable revenues. In Kafue, fishing is carried out 
by disenfranchised people who have migrated to the area in search of livelihood 8 
 
opportunity, and is not traditionally carried out by the original inhabitants who are 
pastoralists. In sum, fishing acts as a risk-spreading (income-smoothing) strategy in 
Yaéres, LS and NH, whereas in the Kafue floodplain it plays more of a safety-net role 
for households originating from beyond the area. 
 
8.3.3. Role of fishing in poverty alleviation 
Comparisons with national poverty prevalence statistics reveal that households living 
in HN, Yaéres and Kafue floodplain are relatively better off than those in surrounding 
areas, probably because of a combination of cropping, livestock and fishery benefits 
provided by flooding. Within each area, fishing households are less poor than non-
fishing households in HN, Yaéres and LS, but are poorer in Kafue. Nevertheless, all 
studies show that fishing reduces the incidence of poverty, and further analysis in HN 
and Yaéres suggests this particularly pertains to a reduction in chronic poverty.   
 
From these various findings a series of lessons and recommendations can be drawn, 
that would help strengthening the contribution of the sector to the livelihood of rural 
populations. 
 
8.3.4. Policy recommendations 
Take a holistic, multi-sectoral approach to poverty alleviation and resource 
management. The four valuation studies reveal that poverty is prevalent in all the 
floodplains and households engage in diverse livelihoods strategies to reduce it. 
Many dimensions to poverty are prevalent in these areas (e.g. health, 
marginalization, gender etc.), besides income-related poverty. This finding has direct 
implications on how rural development programs should be designed for poverty 
reduction. Rather than focusing on a single sector such as fisheries alone, 
meaningful poverty reduction can only be realized with a multi-sectoral approach. 
There is therefore a greater need for fisheries department to engage in effective 
coordination with other sectors.   
Define fishery objectives. When access to fisheries resource is de facto open access, 
fisheries can perform an important safety-net function, such as in the Kafue 
floodplain. In contrast when access is restricted, as it is the case in the Yaéres and 
Lower Shire floodplains, fisheries may generate greater economic returns for those 
who are entitled to access the resource. Households from the surroundings areas 
who may expect to rely on these fisheries as a safety net option when they 
experience shocks (e.g., harvest failure due to drought or pest outbreak) will however 
not be able to do so, and may have to migrate to other areas in search of opportunity 
(e.g. as it was observed in the Yaéres). There is therefore a trade-off between 
maximizing the aggregate revenues derived from fisheries through more restricted 
access and enabling use of the fishery as a safety net for vulnerable households 
through more permeable access arrangements. National policy needs to understand 
the need for this welfare function (the alternative being other forms of social welfare 
provision).  
 
The choice of objective influences the general policy actions required. If one opts for 
a social objective, (to maximise distributional benefits and opportunity to perform 
welfare roles) it is necessary to recognise that people may enter the fishery as a 
copying strategy, and this situation needs to be accompanied by mechanisms to help 
people out of that situation. On the other hand, if one opts for an efficiency objective 
(to maximise the revenue of the fishery) it is necessary to encourage alternative 
livelihoods in order to provide other options for those who do not have access to the 
restricted fishery. In both cases (welfare versus maximization) interventions 9 
 
supporting alternative livelihoods outside the sector are also necessary to reduce the 
pressure on the resource and conserve the stocks. 
 
Support the accumulation of household non-fishing assets to encourage livelihoods 
diversification.  In small-scale fishing communities, most households are poor 
because they possess few productive assets, which limits their ability to diversify 
their livelihoods and to generate enough income to escape chronic or even transient 
poverty. For example, in Kafue, many fishers who migrated to the area some years 
ago are still highly dependent on fishing, essentially because accumulation of land 
and livestock takes decades and requires social integration with indigenous 
communities. In other floodplains, livelihoods are already diverse, but lack of assets 
limits productivity. It is therefore recommended that rural development policies should 
aim at facilitating productive non-fishing asset accumulation by households. Policy 
measures could for instance, include increased access to credit, such as micro-
lending systems. In countries or areas where communal land use right systems have 
led to inequitable access, such as in HN, such policies could include interventions 
aiming at increasing access to land by the poor and ensuring that existing land 
reform programmes reach the floodplain communities. The diversification of 
livelihoods can also be facilitated by promoting other income generating opportunities 
(see below). 
Support fishing-related activities to add value.  In areas where fresh fish fetches 
higher prices than dried or smoked fish, such as Logone, fishers in remote 
communities cannot realize the full potential value of their catches. To add value to 
the fisheries in such areas, and thus to improve the wellbeing of the population, there 
is need to raise the ability of fishers to market fresh fish. This could be achieved by: 
  Improving the infrastructure (thus significantly decrease travel costs and time) 
  Introducing more effective refrigeration techniques (e.g. supplying of ice boxes by 
traders) 
 
In the vast majority of floodplains in Africa (including those in this research), access 
to electricity however is still limited. In those areas fish sun-drying and smoking are 
the only alternatives to conserve the highly perishable product that is fish. Processing 
facilities and techniques are however frequently inadequate or ineffective and often 
involve the application of pesticides (against insect attacks). Interventions aiming at 
improving these processing techniques and reducing pesticide are required would 
not only increase the value added of the fish commodity (and thus the income of the 
fishers/traders), but also help tackling food safety and health issues of primary 
importance in these areas.  
Strengthen non-fishing livelihoods.  Although floodplain households display diverse 
livelihood strategies, there is generally still high reliance on primary natural resource-
based incomes, which puts households at considerable risk of environmental shocks. 
For example households rely primarily on farming in HN, L and LS, and livestock or 
fishing in Kafue. Although fishing households are better off in some areas, if access 
is limited or resources over-stretched there may be limited opportunity for fisheries to 
improve the lot of non-fishing households. Moreover, in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly in the Sudano-Sahelian zone, climate conditions (mainly rainfall) have 
covariate effects on cropping, livestock and fishing: period of drought affects all these 
activities negatively. Hence, fisheries cannot adequately solve the intra-annual 
farming income variability problem. Inter-temporal management of financial and 
physical (non-fishing) capital is therefore a very central issue when dealing with 
dynamic welfare and risk analysis in these regions. Most households rely on 
liquidation of assets such as livestock to counterbalance the inter-annual variation in 10 
 
crop production. This copying strategy leads however usually to substantial drop in 
the local (or even sometimes regional) livestock price, exacerbating the distress of 
these local populations. 
 
Policy interventions should therefore aim to reduce the likelihood of crop failure in 
drought years through, for example, improved soil and water management, small-
scale irrigation projects, or through the adoption or drought-resistant, early-maturing 
millet and sorghum varieties. These types of actions should be complemented by 
interventions that aim at offsetting or reducing the deflation of livestock prices during 
famine periods. In addition, alternative activities should be promoted to complement 
the seasonal and/or inter-annual income patterns of farming and fishing, in order to 
reduce the pressure on the resource, smooth income variation and increase income. 
These could include: 
 
  Non-agricultural employment. Increased returns to off-farm activities have been 
shown to reduce fishing effort and hence may help to alleviate the pressure on 
the exploited fish stocks 
  Introduction of aquaculture initiatives which may significantly improve the food 
security situation and reduce the inter-temporal variation in income through 
constant supply of fish, independent of the inter-annual variation in precipitation 
and hence the water level in the water bodies. 
Improve understanding of socio-ecological systems. Overall, the four socio-economic 
studies implemented in the project have improved substantially our understanding of 
the socio-ecological functioning of floodplain systems, but it also highlighted that 
there are still major gaps in information and understanding. These gaps include 
understanding of long term patterns and inter-annual variability and risks, and 
linkages between socio-economic systems, ecosystem functioning and management 
systems. A great deal of research is still necessary to reach a full understanding 
about the sustainability (and resilience) of these socio-ecological systems. Efforts 
should be made to monitor people’s livelihoods and wellbeing as well as the resource 
dynamics and its use. This should be done as a collaborative effort between fisheries 




8.4. Auto-evaluation  
Nine out of the 10 outputs that were listed in the initial proposal were completed and 
delivered in time. The results of 6 of them have been summarized in the paragraphs 
above (outputs No.1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7). The 4 others are outputs No.4, 8, 9, and 10. 
 
Output No.8 (strengthening of professional network between the NARS partners 
within and between the two basins) has been also achieved successfully, essentially 
through the series of 7 meetings, workshops and communication exchanges that 
took places during the project. Similarly, outputs No.9 (16 African professionals 
trained in economic valuation techniques and governance and policy processes 
analysis) was completed (the target number was actually exceeded, as evidenced by 
the list of participants to the two training workshops that were organised -see 
Appendix 6). 
 
Output No.10 (at least 3 articles submitted to international peer-reviewed journals) 
has been also largely exceeded since 10 articles have been published and/or 
submitted (cf. section 15 and Appendix 5). Some of these articles were submitted to 11 
 
high ranked journals such as Journal of Development Studies, World Development or 
Food Policy.   
 
The only initial output that was not delivered is the output No.4 “ex-ante assessment 
of the impact of improved governance and valuation information on fisher 
livelihoods”. The main reason for this was the heavy workload that was already 
imposed on the partners at the time this outputs was supposed to be delivered. 
Realistically this additional analysis could not have been conducted without 
potentially jeopardizing the successful completion to the field work. As the delivery of 
output No.4 was not critical to the rest of the project, it was dropped out.  
 
Overall, the implementation of the project is regarded by the partners and the project 
coordinator as highly positive and successful. All the reports, outputs and 
deliverables were completed in time, in line with the timeframe agreed initially by the 
team. The 6-month non-cost extension that has been requested in January 2009 was 
used by the partners –and in particular the PhD students and their supervisors- to 
invest more quality time in the analysis of the data. Overall the scientific outputs 
generated by the project are of high quality, as evidenced by the top journals where 
the main scientific articles synthesizing the project findings have been submitted or 
accepted.   
 
Three national-level feed-back meetings (which were not included in the initial 
workplan), were organized respectively in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Malawi during the 
last few weeks of the project. The decision (by the NARS) to organize these meeting 
is to be seen as an additional evidence of the satisfaction of the partners with the 
project results and their willingness to share and disseminate as widely as possible 
the main conclusions of the project within their countries.     
  
 
9.  Implications of Research findings  
 
The outputs of the project have been designed, articulated, and written to be 
specifically pertinent to policy-makers, planners, scientists and international 
development agencies concerned with fisheries, natural resources management, 
poverty reduction, rural development and food security in the two basins (Lake Chad 
Basin and Zambezi River Basin).  
 
At the level of the research institutes involved in the project (CG-center, ARIs, 
collaborating NARS and German partners), the different results are of high relevance 
for some of their current research agenda. The importance of documenting the 
various roles and functions that small-scale fisheries play in relation to the livelihood 
of rural population is for instance a high priority for the WorldFish Center, in particular 
in the context of the current restructuration of the CGIAR, but more globally for any 
research institution (national and/or international) or non-governmental organization 
concerned by issues related to these small-scale fisheries. One of the major current 
limitations in this sector is indeed the lack of data and information.  
 
The socio-economic data collected through the field work in North-East Nigeria, 
North Cameroon, central Zambia and South Malawi will be critical to illustrate and 
document more rigorously the functions that small-scale fisheries play in the 
household economy of these regions. This improved documentation and enhanced 
understanding of the role of small-scale fisheries is expected to help researchers 
(both at national and international level) to raise the profile of small-scale fisheries in 
the current academic debates on water management, poverty reduction strategies 12 
 
and, more generally, rural development from which they have been so far largely 
excluded.  
 
In combination with this improved understanding of the importance of small-scale 
fisheries in the livelihood of the local households, the in-depth analysis of fisheries 
policy processes in relation to co-management and within the wider context of 
decentralization is also expected to help local and national decision-makers to 
improve the way the fishery sector is integrated (or at least accounted for) in other 
sectors such as agriculture and/or rural development planning.   
 
 
10. Knowledge Transfer  
 
Given the lack of recognition of small-scale fisheries in the academic spheres, one of 
the priorities of the project was to generate quality research outputs through, in 
particular, scientific publications. The reason for this strategy was the recognition that 
publication in top (development or agriculture economics) journals is a very powerful 
way to bring to the front issues that will then be ‘picked up’ by other academics, and 
progressively included in important debates such as poverty reduction, rural 
development or decentralization.  
 
Overall, 10 articles have been submitted to peer-reviewed journals at this stage and 
one book chapter published. It is expected than other articles will be submitted in the 
coming months. As mentioned earlier some of the journals which were targeted are 
high profile, international, journals. 
 
In addition to quality publication, the project also paid close attention to maximize the 
dissemination of the scientific work through other channels. Every major scientific 
output derived from research activities (methodological or analytical work) was turned 
into a project report. Thus the project produced a series of 27 reports and working 
papers, and 10 papers presented at various international conferences. All these 
materials have further been made available to through a websites specifically created 






From the planning stage, training and capacity building had been identified as key 
outputs of the project and a specific output (output No.9) had been associated with 
this capacity building objective. This was the training of NARS partners and other 
relevant actors to economic valuation techniques. Two technical workshops were 
organized, one in Nigeria (with NARS participants from both Nigeria and Cameroon), 
and one in Malawi with NARS participants from Malawi. In total 27 researchers 
and/or fisheries managers benefited from these two training workshops which 
focused on techniques of economic valuation in the specific context of small-scale 
fisheries (see Appendix 5).    
 
Three PhD students were funded by the project and completed their field work and 
data analysis as part of the project’s socio-economic component. Two of them have 
already successfully defended their thesis while the third one is expected to defend it 
in the coming months. Two of these PhD students are from Africa. 
 
The NARS partners were closely involved in the stakeholder, policy and governance 
analyses, both in the field (survey) and in the subsequent analysis and writing steps. 13 
 
Their involvement in the research allows them to greatly increase their analytical 
skills and knowledge on these different domains. It also offered them the possibility to 
assess their own country’s national policy system and by so doing provided them 
with stronger ability and information to engage in future debates related to fisheries 
policy issues. They were encouraged to value their own research works through 
individual publication (Ovie et al, 2007; Njaya 2008; Njaya et al., submitted).  
 
Finally the local staff of the NARS were closely involved in the PhD students’ 
research, in particular in Nigeria and Cameroon where they contributed to the 
preparation and completion of the household questionnaires and the subsequent 
socio-economic analysis. This ‘on-the-job’ training offered them the opportunity to 
gain more experience in these important domains.  
 
 
12. Lessons learned 
 
The lessons learned from an academic/research point of view have been 
summarized in section 8 of this report. They are presented in a more elaborated 
discussion in the Policy Recommendation document (Output No.1).  
 
Scientifically the project has been positive. All the objectives have been achieved or 
exceeded and positive feedbacks have been received from the NARS partners 
during the wrap-up meeting. The work has been highly collaborative as evidenced by 
the number of scientific papers co-authored by ARIS and NARS.  
 
From a project management point of view as well, the project has been assessed 
positively (by the different partners). All milestones have been completed in time and 
no major issues have impeded the smooth running of the project.  
 
Three non-cost extensions have been however requested in the course of the project 
implementation time:  
 
  one at the very beginning of the project as the project activities effectively started 
in January 2006 (i.e. 6 months after the official starting date) due essentially to 
the delay induced by the signatures of the MoUs between all partners and 
WorldFish; 
  one in the last year of the project (2009), when the partners and in particular the 
ARIs supervising the PhDs realized that the PhD students could greatly benefit 
from additional time to fully analyse the data; and   
  one last one-month extension at the end of the project as the NARS partners 
expressed the willingness to organise national feedback meetings. As these had 
to take place after the final wrap up meeting, the project partners requested an 
additional period of one month to plan and implemented these feedback 
meetings. 
 
All these non-cost extensions were accepted by BMZ after due justification from the 
project partners. This ‘flexibility’ greatly facilitated the smooth implementation of the 
project and certainly contributed to the successful and high quality of the overall 
outcome. 
 
From an ‘internal’ management point of view (i.e. relations between partners), the 
only modification which perhaps could have been considered relates to the budget of 
the PhD students’ fieldwork. In the original organization of the budget, the sums 
allocated to cover the PhDs’ fieldwork activities were transferred through the NARS 14 
 
budgets. This decision sounded initially ‘logical’ as these activities were to take place 
with the NARS cooperation in their countries (Cameroon, Nigeria, Malawi and 
Zambia). An indirect consequence of this, however, has been that the PhD students 
became rapidly almost entirely dependent from the NARS, since the money to cover 
their field work was to be disbursed through these NARS’ budget. No major issue 
emerged as the collaborations between the NARS partners and the PhD students 
were harmonious, but it could have led to difficulties or delay in the implementation of 
the PhD students’ work. In our case this situation put extra stress on both parties and 
in particular the NARS collaborators who had to do their best to ensure a timely 
release of the fieldwork budget despite their low administrative and financial 
capacities/resources.  
 
An alternative strategy would have been to allocate the PhDs’ field fieldwork budget 
to the ARI universities were the PhD students are enrolled. This would have led 
however to a smaller NARS’s share of the overall budget.   
 
 
13. Future Research Needs  
 
Although the project was successful in ‘probing’ into the question of the contribution 
of small-scale fisheries to the livelihoods of households who engage in the sector, the 
research completed here reveals only the ‘top of the iceberg’. It does confirm some of 
the conclusions reached by the (too few) other quantitative socio-economic analyses 
implemented in the small-scale fisheries sector in developing countries. It shows in 
particular the critical role that small-scale fisheries can play as a source of cash in 
household economy, even for those who would define themselves as farmers. But 
these answers are incomplete and patchy. To take one example, results in section 
8.3.2 above revealed how fishing can acts as a risk-spreading (income-smoothing) 
strategy –such as in the Yaéres, or the Lower Shire areas-, whereas in some other 
places -such as the Kafue- it seems instead to play more of a safety-net role for 
households. What factors make the same activity play different role within the 
economy of households is yet to be understood? Similarly, our research highlights 
the importance of distinguishing between chronic poverty and transient poverty, but 
does not bring any definite answer on this question and in particular on the role that 
small-scale fisheries could play in these dynamics.  
 
In sum, there are therefore still many questions that remained answered and the 
research completed in this project only ‘scratched the surface of the problem’.     
 
 
14. Summary  
 
Policy assessment and evaluation is often problematic. In the case of 
decentralisation reform, this broad term can include a wide range of scales and 
processes which are often country specific. In our case, the policy analyses reveal 
that in the countries of the Lake Chad Basin and Zambezi River Basin, fisheries 
national policies have been shaped by different narratives, culminating with the 
Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers (PRSPs). Despite this progression, there are 
still difficulties in integrating and operationalising relevant objectives. In general the 
analysis reveals the lack of policy coherence with reference to objectives and 
implementation approaches, and the need to ensure a greater degree of 
harmonisation between relevant institutions. As a consequence, the analysis also 




In a parallel approach, the governance analysis evidenced how poorly integrated 
small-scale fisheries and co-management reforms are in the general decentralization 
process. Inland fisheries are often overlooked by national and local decision-makers, 
resulting in the marginalization of fishing communities. The analysis also shows that 
co-management reforms have complexified the already hybrid and composite local 
governance system prevalent in Africa. Co-management has in particular increased 
the number of modern, as well as traditional local actors who are now competing, 
conflicting or colluding to capture part of the power and revenues generated by 
fisheries resources.  
 
Enhancing the participation of fisheries end-users and other legitimate stakeholders 
in the decision making process of fisheries is a central objective of co-management 
reforms. The project analysis confirms however that participation is not the panacea 
and “greater participation” will not ensure the success of co-management without 
being complemented by some forms of downward accountability. There is therefore a 
need for national and local policy makers to create the appropriate conditions and 
mechanisms to ensure the establishment of a systematic downward accountability in 
decentralization and co-management reforms. 
 
The socio-economic studies reveal that poverty level is high in all the floodplains 
included in the project and that households engage in diverse livelihoods strategies 
in an attempt to reduce its impact. Many dimensions to poverty are prevalent in these 
areas (e.g. health, marginalization, gender etc.), besides income-related poverty.  
 
Comparisons with national poverty prevalence statistics reveal however that 
households living in three of the four areas surveyed (Hadejia-Nguru wetlands, 
Yaéres and Kafue floodplain) are relatively better off than those in surrounding areas, 
probably because of a combination of cropping, livestock and fishery benefits 
provided by flooding. Within each area, fishing households are less poor than non-
fishing households in the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands, Yaéres and Lower Shire, but are 
poorer in Kafue. Nevertheless, all studies show that fishing reduces the incidence of 
poverty, and further analysis in Hadejia-Nguru wetlands and Yaéres suggests this 
particularly pertains to a reduction in chronic poverty.   
 
Amid this poverty and destitution, the analyses also illustrate the wide varieties of 
ways fishing contributes to the livelihood of households. Fishing is in fact part of a 
highly seasonal and diversified portfolio of activities the organization of which is 
closely determined by the natural flood cycle. Overall, the studies indicate that fishing 
make a significant contribution to the households’ total income in the four areas 
surveyed. In three of these areas fishing represents the second most important 
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1. Introduction and background 
 
Today, 56 million people (amongst which 54% are women) are directly involved in 
inland small-scale fisheries in the developing world. For these people, fishing and 
related post-harvest activities (i.e. fish processing and fish trading) can contribute in a 
critical way to their livelihood. Widely dispersed and easily accessible to marginal 
communities, inland fisheries provide in particular a vital source of income and 
nutrition to a large part of the rural population living in the vicinities of freshwater-
bodies (lakes and reservoirs, rivers, seasonal and/or perennial ponds, floodplains and 
wetlands). In addition, small-scale inland fisheries have also been shown to be an 
essential component of the informal welfare mechanisms still widely functioning in 
African rural societies. When other local economic activities are collapsing or have 
been eroded by the general macro-economic context, small scale fisheries often 
provide a livelihood safety-net for the most vulnerable households. Finally, fish are 
aLSFo vital for the nutritional and food security of the low income households, as 
staples such as rice, wheat, maize and cassava, which constitute most of the food 
consumed by these low-income people, lack such nutrients as iron, iodine, zinc, 
calcium and vitamins A and B. 
 
Despite these crucial roles in relation to such central issues as rural development, 
poverty alleviation, or food security, inland fisheries in Africa are largely neglected 
by existing government decision-making processes. This marginalization is especially 
acute for river fisheries for two main reasons: First, the lack of information regarding 
these fisheries, and in particular, data on their comprehensive socio-economic values; 
second, the geographical and political isolation that affect the majority of the rural 
communities living along Africa’s rivers. In effect, all too often the majority of these 
communities are totally excluded from any involvement in policy-making processes 
or planning.  
 
The main objective of the project “Food security and poverty alleviation through 
improved valuation and governance of river fisheries in Africa” was to address those 
key issues in two important regions of sub-Saharan African inland fisheries: the Lake 
Chad Basin and the Zambezi River Basin. The overall purpose of the project was to 
strengthen the capacity of local and national decision-makers in these regions to 
develop and implement improved governance and policy reforms that sustain river 
fisheries and enhance their contribution to poverty alleviation and national food 
security. Within this framework a particular theme of the project was to understand 
and assess how improved valuation information could contribute to this purpose. To 
reflect these objectives, the project was articulated around three main components:  
 
•  A  socio-economic component, the objective of which was to document and 
quantify the various socio-economic roles that small-scale inland fisheries can 
play in the livelihood of rural local populations engaged in the activity.    
 
•  A policy analysis component, where the main objective was to review and assess 
the current national fisheries policy processes in the countries of the Lake Chad 




•  A governance analysis component, where the main objective was to explore and 
assess the changes that have been taking place in the recent years in fisheries 
governance, as a consequence of the implementation of increasing numbers of 
fisheries co-management and decentralization reforms.  
 
 
2. Purpose and structure of the document 
 
For each of these 3 components, the main findings and lessons have been documented 
and presented in various project documents and/or scientific articles. The purpose of 
the present report is to draw upon these different findings and to propose a set of 
concrete policy recommendations in line with the general objective of the project: 
reduce poverty in small-scale inland fisheries dependent communities.  
 
These recommendations have been articulated in two parts; the first part presents both 
the main findings of the socio-economic analysis and the subsequent policy 
recommendations that are derived from these main findings. By the nature of the 
issues they address and the research from which they emerge, these recommendations 
concern policies directly relevant for household-level interventions (e.g., interventions 
aiming at reducing household vulnerability). The second section draws together the 
conclusions of the project’s policy and governance research components, and offers a 
set of recommendations which are mainly relevant at a ‘higher’ level (i.e. 
communities, district, provincial, national, or sectoral and/or cross-sectoral).   
 
The targeted audience for this policy recommendation report are government agencies 
and line-ministries involved in the decision-making process and planning of small-
scale fisheries sectors at national, provincial and/or district/local leveLSF; national 
and international research organizations, universities, practitioners and non-
governmental organizations engaged in interventions and/or research related to small-
scale inland fisheries, but aLSFo more widely to rural development and poverty 
alleviation.   
 
3. Socio-economic analysis 
3.1. Background of the study and main results 
 
The socio-economic studies were carried out in four major floodplains, two in the 
Lake Chad Basin: the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands (HNWW) in North-East Nigeria and 
the Yaéres floodplain along the Logone river in North Cameroon; and two in the 
Zambezi River Basin: the Kafue floodplain in southern province of Zambia and the 
Lower Shire floodplain (LSFF) along the Shire river in southern region of Malawi. 
The outcomes of these studies reveal some important similarities and differences in 
the socio-economic role of fisheries, analysis of which helps to understand the factors 
that determine their role in the livelihood of households and the policy direction that 
should be taken to improve these livelihoods. 
 
Fishing contribution to household income 
The four case studies illustrate the wide varieties of ways in which fishing contributes 
to the livelihood of households. In all four study areas, full time professional fishers 
are only one group linked to fisheries. In effect, the majority of households in HNW, 26 
 
Yaéres and LSF are primarily farmers who do fishing as a complementary activity 
whereas in Kafue, livestock rearing complements fishing activity. In all areas, the 
probability of fishing is influenced by proximity to water-bodies, and is inversely 
related to amount of land and livestock in Kafue and LSF.  
 
Overall, the studies indicate that fishing makes a significant contribution to the total 
income of the households in all four areas, ranging from 16 – 29% of their total 
income. In Kafue, it contributes as much as 50% to total household income per month 
and is the main source of household income. In two of the four study areas (Yaéres 
and LSF) fishing represents the second most important activity in terms of income. 
Off farm activities are minor in most areas, except in HNW where they play the 
second most important role.   
 
Fishing as a risk management strategy 
A similar proportion of households engage in fishing in all four study areas (53- 
66%). Fishing is however part of a highly seasonal and diversified portfolio of 
activities the organization of which is closely determined by the natural flood cycle.  
 
In HNW and Yaéres, more in-depth analyses suggest that fishing is done primarily for 
its income smoothing effect rather than its overall income effect. In fact households 
recognize that farming activity yields greater but highly volatile income (in particular 
due to large inter-annual variability) as opposed to fishing which yields lower but 
more continuous and predictable revenues. In Kafue, fishing is mainly carried out by 
disenfranchised people who have migrated to the area in search of livelihood 
opportunity, and is not traditionally carried out by the original inhabitants who are 
mainly pastoralists. In sum, fishing acts as a risk-spreading (income-smoothing) 
strategy in Yaéres, LSF and NH, whereas in Kafue it plays more of a safety-net role 
for households originating from beyond the area. 
 
Role of fishing in poverty alleviation 
Comparisons with national poverty prevalence statistics reveal that households living 
in HNW, Yaéres and Kafue floodplain are relatively better off than those in 
surrounding areas, probably because of a combination of cropping, livestock and 
fishery benefits provided by flooding. Within each area, fishing households are less 
poor than non-fishing households in HNW, Yaéres and LSF, but are poorer in Kafue. 
Nevertheless, all studies show that fishing reduces the incidence of poverty, and 
further analysis in HNW and Yaéres suggests that this particularly pertains to a 
reduction in chronic poverty.   
 
3.2. Policy recommendations  
 
From these various findings a series of lessons and recommendations have been 
drawn, that could help strengthening the contribution of the sector to the livelihood of 
rural populations. 
Take a holistic, multi-sectoral approach to poverty alleviation and resource 
management. The four valuation studies reveal that poverty is high in all the 4 areas 
considered and that households engage in diverse livelihoods strategies to reduce their 
exposure to it. Many dimensions to poverty are prevalent in these areas (e.g. health, 
marginalization, gender etc.), besides income-related poverty. This finding has direct 27 
 
implications on how rural development programs should be designed for poverty 
reduction. Rather than focusing on a single sector such as fisheries alone, meaningful 
poverty reduction can only be realized with a multi-sectoral approach. There is 
therefore a greater need for fisheries departments to engage in effective coordination 
with other sectors.   
Define fishery objectives. When access to fisheries resource is de facto open access, 
fisheries can perform an important safety-net function, such as in the Kafue 
floodplain. In contrast when access is restricted, as it is the case in the Yaéres, 
fisheries may generate greater economic returns for those who are entitled to access 
the resource. Households from the surroundings areas who may expect to rely on 
these fisheries as a safety net option when they experience shocks (e.g., harvest failure 
due to drought or pest outbreak) will however not be able to do so, and may have to 
migrate to other areas in search of opportunities (e.g. as it was observed in the 
Yaéres). There is therefore a trade-off between maximizing the aggregate revenues 
derived from fisheries through more restricted access and enabling use of the fishery 
as a safety net for vulnerable households through more permeable access 
arrangements. National policy needs to understand the need for this welfare function 
(the alternative being other forms of social welfare provision).  
The choice of the fisheries management objective influences the general policy 
actions required. If one opts for a social objective, (to maximise distributional benefits 
and opportunity to perform welfare roles) it is necessary to recognise that people may 
enter the fishery as a coping strategy, and this situation needs to be accompanied by 
mechanisms to help people out of that situation. On the other hand, if one opts for an 
efficiency objective (to maximise the revenue of the fishery) it is necessary to 
encourage alternative livelihoods in order to provide other options for those who do 
not have access to the restricted fishery. In both cases (welfare versus maximization) 
interventions supporting alternative livelihoods outside the sector are also necessary 
to reduce the pressure on the resource and conserve the stocks. 
Support the accumulation of households’ non-fishing assets to encourage 
livelihoods diversification. In small-scale fishing communities, most households are 
poor because they possess few productive assets, which limits their ability to diversify 
their livelihoods and to generate enough income to escape poverty. For example, in 
Kafue, many fishers who migrated to the area some years ago are still highly 
dependent on fishing, essentially because accumulation of land and livestock takes 
decades and requires social integration with indigenous communities. In other 
floodplains, livelihoods are already diverse, but lack of assets limits productivity. It is 
therefore recommended that rural development policies should aim at facilitating 
productive non-fishing asset accumulation by fishing households. Policy measures 
could for instance, include increased access to credit, such as micro-lending systems. 
In countries or areas where communal land use right systems have led to inequitable 
access, such as in HNW, such policies could include interventions aiming at 
increasing access to land by the poor and ensuring that existing land reform 
programmes reach the floodplain communities. The diversification of livelihoods can 
also be facilitated by promoting other income generating opportunities (see below). 
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Support fishing-related activities to add value. In areas where fresh fish fetches 
higher prices than dried or smoked fish, such as the Logone river area, fishers in 
remote communities cannot realize the full potential value of their catches. To add 
value to the fisheries in such areas, and thus to improve the wellbeing of the 
population, there is need to raise the ability of fishers to market fresh fish. This could 
be achieved by: 
  Improving the infrastructure (thus significantly decrease travel costs and time) 
  Introducing post-harvest losses technologies, for example more effective 
refrigeration techniques (e.g. supplying of ice boxes by traders). 
 
In the vast majority of floodplains in Africa (including those in this research), access 
to electricity however is still limited. In those areas fish sun-drying and smoking are 
the only alternatives to conserve this highly perishable product. Processing facilities 
and techniques are however frequently inadequate or ineffective and often involve the 
application of pesticides (against insect attacks). Interventions aiming at improving 
these processing techniques and reducing pesticides are required and would not only 
increase the value added of the fish commodity (and thus the income of the 
fishers/traders), but also help tackling food safety and health issues in these areas.  
Strengthen non-fishing livelihoods. Although floodplain households display diverse 
livelihood strategies, there is still a high reliance on primary natural resource-based 
incomes, which puts households at considerable risk of environmental shocks. For 
example households rely primarily on farming in HNW and LSF, and livestock or 
fishing in Kafue. Although fishing households are better off in some areas, if access is 
limited or resources over-stretched there may be limited opportunity for fisheries to 
improve the lot of non-fishing households. Moreover, in sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly in the Sudano-Sahelian zone, climate conditions (mainly rainfall) have 
covariate effects on cropping, livestock and fishing: period of drought affects all these 
activities negatively. Hence, fisheries cannot adequately solve the intra-annual 
farming income variability problem. Inter-temporal management of financial and 
physical (non-fishing) capital is therefore a very central issue when dealing with 
dynamic welfare and risk analysis in these regions. Most households rely on 
liquidation of assets such as livestock to counterbalance the inter-annual variation in 
crop production. This coping strategy leads however usually to a substantial drop in 
the local (or even sometimes regional) livestock price, exacerbating the distress of 
these local populations. Policy interventions should therefore aim to reduce the 
likelihood of crop failure in drought years through, for example, improved soil and 
water management, small-scale irrigation projects, or through the adoption of 
drought-resistant, early-maturing staple food crop varieties. These types of actions 
should be complemented by interventions that aim at offsetting or reducing the 
deflation of livestock prices during famine periods. In addition, alternative activities 
should be promoted to complement the seasonal and/or inter-annual income patterns 
of farming and fishing, in order to reduce the pressure on the resource, smooth 
income variation and increase income. These could include: 
  Non-agricultural employment. Increased returns to off-farm activities have been 
shown to reduce fishing effort and hence may help to alleviate the pressure on the 
exploited fish stocks; 
  Introduction of aquaculture initiatives which may significantly improve the food 
security situation and reduce the inter-temporal variation in income through 29 
 
constant supply of fish, independent of the inter-annual variation in precipitation 
and hence the water level in the water bodies. 
 
Improve understanding of socio-ecological systems. Overall, the four socio-
economic studies implemented in the project have improved substantially our 
understanding of the socio-ecological functioning of floodplain systems, but it also 
highlighted that there are still major gaps in information and understanding. These 
gaps include understanding of long term patterns and inter-annual variability and 
risks, and linkages between socio-economic systems, ecosystem functioning and 
management systems. A great deal of research is still necessary to reach a full 
understanding about the sustainability (and resilience) of these socio-ecological 
systems. Efforts should be made to monitor people’s livelihoods and wellbeing as well 
as the resource dynamics and its use. This should be done as a collaborative effort 
between fisheries and agricultural departments and statistical and planning offices 
that deal with welfare.  
 
4. Policy and Governance analyses 
 
4.1. Background of the studies 
 
The policy analysis and the governance analysis were both conducted in five countries 
across the two basins: Niger, Niger and Cameroon in the Lake Chad Basin, and 
Malawi and Zambia in the Zambezi River Basin. Although the two activities were 
conducted independently using two different analytical approaches, both policy and 
governance analyses eventually appear remarkably complementary and reveal in 
particular important similarities in their conclusions. Before moving on the detail of 
the policy implications of these results, two important preliminary clarifications need 
to be made. 
 
Why decentralization in small-scale fisheries? 
The whole project was conceived on the premise that ‘decentralization’ (taken in a 
broad, generic, sense) and sectoral co-management reforms are the way forward in 
small-scale fisheries if one wants these fisheries to contribute their full potential in 
terms of poverty alleviation and economic development in developing countries. 
However, the project also recognized that the rhetoric surrounding ‘decentralization’ 
reform has often disserved the initial genuine objective of these reforms. 
Decentralization has too often been advocated as the ‘magic bullet’ which would 
solve instantaneously and simultaneously poverty, environmental degradation, social 
and economic inequity. As the series of recommendation below will demonstrate, this 
assumption turns out to be painfully erroneous.    
 
Decentralization in the fisheries, decentralization outside the fisheries 
The process of devolving power and responsibility away from central authorities and 
ministries offices (decentralization) has been taking place both in the fisheries sector 
(often referred as co-management reform) and outside the fisheries, in other economic 
sectors such as education, health, public transport, other natural resource sectors e.g. 
forestry, etc. These different reforms have been implemented at different paces in 
different countries over the last 20 years. In Malawi for example, different sectors, 
including fisheries, are been decentralised slowly since the 1990s, creating a relatively 30 
 
complex and ever-evolving institutional landscape. In Cameroon the constitutional 
amendment of 1996 made explicit reference to the principle of decentralization but 
the implementation process is effectively just starting. In Nigeria no formal 
decentralization policies have yet been considered in the fisheries sector except 
through donor-driven interventions supporting co-management projects. 
 
One key element in the analytical framework adopted in the project was therefore the 
recognition of these various waves of ‘overlapping’ decentralization reforms in and 
outside the fisheries sector. This point represented a major breakthrough in the 
fisheries literature, where co-management reforms are usually analyzed in complete 
isolation from the wider political/governance environment. To make these distinctions 
between decentralizations inside and outside fisheries more explicit, we distinguished 
3 major ‘types’ of governance reform: 
 
  Devolution (devolutive decentralization) refers to the transfer of parts, or totality, 
of the rights and responsibilities from the Department of Fisheries to 
representatives of user groups at the local level, usually (fishers) organizations. In 
the more conventional natural resource management jargon, this is usually 
referred to as community-based and/or co-management arrangements. 
 
  Deconcentration (administrative decentralization) in fisheries refers to governance 
reforms in which decision-making authority is transferred to provincial or district 
levels of the Department of Fisheries (DoF). 
 
  Territorial decentralization refers to transfers of decision-making authority and 
financial responsibilities to decentralized territorial entities (District Assemblies, 
Provincial or District Development Committees, or ‘Collectivités Territoriales’ in 
francophone countries)). Four of the five countries considered in this review 
(Cameroon, Niger, Malawi, and Zambia) have been engaged in extensive 
decentralization reforms for several decades.  
 
 
4.2. Policy recommendations 
 
Improve policy coherence. The five national policy studies implemented in the 
project reveal that in countries where these different types of governance reforms are 
taking place, many challenges still remain both at the design and implementation 
level. In particular, issues of policy incoherence are common. The studies highlight 
many examples illustrating the difficulties of evolving new policies, and trying to 
integrate them within existing policy arrangements. In Malawi, for instance, 
decentralisation policy, local government reforms and national fisheries policy have 
not achieved a high degree of coherence, largely because they appeared at different 
times and did not refer to existing legislation.  
 
Institutional coherence is a key factor and it extends beyond the issue of 
harmonization between government institutions. Policy and policy implementers such 
as technical line ministries should be clear about the role that these institutions have to 
play. Additionally, forming multi-sectoral working groups to develop and/or review 
decentralization policies should be encouraged.  
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Promote better integration of SSF sectoral devolution into decentralization. The 
country reviews evidenced how poorly integrated small-scale fisheries and co-
management are in the decentralization process that are being implemented in parallel 
in the rest of the economy. The fishery sector (in particularly inland one) is often 
considered as the rest of a stagnant, informal and useless sector meant to disappear 
over the course of the normal economic development process. This view certainly 
contributes to the predatory behavior adopted by national and local government 
agencies whereby small-scale fisheries are often heavily taxed but notoriously 
neglected in terms of redistribution.  
 
Local governments’ reliance on fisheries-generated income should in contrary be seen 
as the evidence that a more balanced relationship could benefit all parties. Better 
supported, small-scale fisheries would contribute more effectively to local economic 
development, thus strengthening local governments through the generation of direct 
revenue (taxes) and indirectly through the welfare functions provided by small-scale 
fisheries such as employment for unskilled population (labor buffer, safety net), 
contribution to food security and economic empowerment of remote rural groups 
including women. This better integration of fisheries into the local planning process 
could (or should) be facilitated by the fact that local level of decision are known to be 
more effective in ensuring integrated planning than higher (national) levels. As such, 
the territorial decentralized institutions created through parallel decentralization 
processes (e.g. Districts Assemblies in Malawi, District Councils and District or 
Provincial Development Committees in Zambia, Collectivités Territoriales in Niger 
and Cameroon) should be in a much better position to integrate and account for the 
aspirations and needs of the small-scale fisherfolks than national planners operating 
from central Ministries’ bureaus. It is therefore the responsibility of the fisheries 
stakeholders (starting with the DoFs) to work closer with the decentralized 
governments’ agencies in order to ensure a better integration of small-scale fisheries 
into the process of decentralized development, for the greater benefit of the resource, 
the local economy and the fisherfolks.   
 
Accounting for an increasing number of actors. The policy case studies reveal the 
importance of a wide range of actors in the policy process - in both policy formation 
and implementation. The number of actors involved in fisheries and other related 
policy is however likely to increase further in the future because: (1) national policy is 
intending to develop inclusive forms of government with suitable fora or “platforms 
for negotiation” at different levels, and (2) new interests are emerging (the private 
sector, civil society organizations, issues based coalitions, new local government 
structures etc.). 
 
National decentralization policies in Niger and Cameroon are setting out to establish 
partnerships with new local and regional institutions such as civil society 
organizations and producers’ organizations. In Malawi, relevant institutions such as 
Local Fisheries Management Authorities already exist but our analysis suggests that 
these bodies will need support and guidance in setting their geographic boundaries 
and level of authority. In Nigeria, the policy process has been very centralized but 
government has acknowledged new roles may be required of research institutes, 
producers’ organizations and regional agencies. 
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Recognize the complexity of the local political game. One of the main observations 
of the reviews was that co-management reforms have complexified the already hybrid 
and composite local governance system prevalent in Africa. While decentralization in 
principle signifies increased procedural homogenization and transparency at the local 
level, in practice its implementation has led instead to greater fragmentation of the 
political arenas and greater complexity (de jure and de facto). Co-management has in 
particular increased the number of newly created, as well as traditional, political and 
institutional local actors who are now competing, conflicting or colluding to capture 
part of the power and revenues that fisheries resources can generate. This 
fragmentation and complexification of the local political game has led to the 
‘accumulation’ of several layers of powers with no clear legitimacy and no longer any 
central institution capable of imposing its law and norms. This greatly reduces the 
clarity of the political processes and its chance to achieve its democratic promises. 
 
The recognition of this situation calls for greater coordination and more resources 
made available for building capacity of actors at local level while strengthening the 
central government capacities for coordinating policy guidance and setting the 
appropriate policy environment. Donor and international development agencies need 
to realize that decentralization (and co-management) reforms require usually more 
financial and human resources (and certainly not less). In this sense decentralization 
conflicts directly with the agenda of reduction of public services expenses generally 
adopted by governments. 
   
Account for the critical influence of traditional leaders. Although not an 
exclusivity of Africa -as many Pacific fisheries are in the same situation- small-scale 
inland fisheries in Africa are for their majority still under the strong influence of local 
traditional leaders. While co-management projects could have been one way to reduce 
this influence, the analysis revealed a totally different outcome. Because co-
management projects were poorly prepared to face this issue, these traditional leaders 
have usually been one of the groups which almost systematically managed to 
strengthen their local power during the establishment of co-management reform. This 
situation means that a large part of the success (or failure) of these programs depends 
on these traditional leaders’ willingness to collaborate. In particular, trying to by-pass 
these local leaders would almost systematically trigger direct or indirect opposition 
from these powerful actors.  
 
This resurgence of the traditional chieftaincies through the decentralization process is 
not, however, necessarily systematically negative. In effect several cases demonstrate 
that they can be one of the key-players ensuring the success of co-management 
projects. When this happens, however, it is essentially the result of their own integrity 
and commitment, and frequently depends on the extent to which the co-management 
process has actively engaged with them. 
 
These observations suggest that governments should recognize and define much more 
precisely the roles and responsibilities of traditional authorities in the 
decentralization process, and in particular in relation to natural resources 
management, being aware of the potential issues observed under the current 
decentralization experiences. In particular those existing mixed experiences underline 
the importance of establishing mechanisms of downward accountability. Until a 
minimum level of downward accountability is effectively embedded into the 33 
 
procedures, co-management projects will always depend on the personal commitment 
and capacities of few key actors, leaving the overall projects’ fate –and its impact on 
the whole community- entirely in the hand of these actors.  
 
Recognize the political economy of co-management reforms. In direct relation to 
the point above, it is crucial to recognize that decentralization is never introduced in a 
power vacuum at a local level. The socio-institutional landscape where governance 
reforms in general and co-management in particular are implemented is in fact the 
result of a constantly evolving political landscape which reflects the current 
distribution of power between different local actors and their struggle to control the 
natural, institutional, financial and political resources. In this context, the introduction 
of co-management often turns out to be a catalyst for political conflict and to intensify 
the battle for power among local people. In this continuous (open or more subtle) 
battle, the poorest and most marginalized of the fishing community have generally 
been the losers. 
 
The recognition of this political economy dimension has strong implications on the 
way co-management should be planned and implemented. In particular it means that a 
good understanding of the current political ‘landscape’ and of the current power 
configuration between the different groups susceptible to be directly or indirectly 
involved (or rejected) by the establishment of co-management is essential before the 
first step of the reform is actually initiated. This preliminary ex-ante analysis should 
help in predicting the changes in the power landscape that are likely to occur as a 
result of the reform, and thus provide appropriate guidance and recommendations on 
how to limit the ‘unexpected’ negative outcomes.  
 
Focus on implementation issues. Co-management –and more broadly governance 
reforms- are high in the agenda of most African countries. It would therefore be 
misleading to present the failure of co-management reforms as a consequence of lack 
of official political will. Co-management problems come essentially from an inability 
to support all the processes needed to allow genuine devolution (democratic 
decentralization). There is therefore an urgent need for academics to turn their 
attention toward the ‘nitty-gritty’, ‘on-the-ground’, and context-specific aspects of co-
management implementation. While this has been highlighted many times, there is no 
‘one size fits all’, and the success (or failure) of co-management programmes will 
essentially depend on local details: the integrity of the DoF local staff, the ‘ethic’ of 
the traditional leaders, the balance between the different groups of fishers (allochtone 
versus autochtone), the presence of local NGOs, and in particular the power 
relationship between all these different groups and individuals.  
 
These observations clearly call for policies and interventions which would aim at 
strengthening the organizational and institutional capacity of identified stakeholders, 
based on local situations, to enable them carry out their new institutional roles and 
responsibilities while ensuring effective coordination of the process. These 
interventions should include sensitization and training of stakeholders on resource and 
environmental management; administrative, financial management and leadership 
skills; and funding mechanisms to generate their own revenue to support co-
management activities.  
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Promote participation, but more importantly ensure downward accountability. 
Enhancing the participation of fisheries end-users and other legitimate stakeholders in 
the decision making process of fisheries is a central element in these reforms. The 
involvement of these end-users is, in particular expected to increase their sense of 
responsibility and ownership, thus facilitating the self-enforcement of the 
management system and in principle the ‘sustainability’ and equity of the system. 
 
But ‘participation’ is not the panacea and ‘greater participation’ will not ensure the 
success of co-management without being complemented by some forms of downward 
accountability. Since the involvement of every single fisherfolk (fishers, traders, fish 
processors, etc.) in the decision making process (that is, direct democracy) is not 
possible as it would increase ad infinitum the transaction costs of the political process, 
participation of those legitimate stakeholders in the decision making process can only 
be achieved through representative governance. This is indeed what has been done in 
the majority of co-management projects through the creation of community-based 
organizations. What our research showed however is that, until these representatives 
are downwardly accountable to the rest of the stakeholders, any devolution of power 
to these representatives is likely to become a source of misuse and abuse. There is 
therefore an urgent need for national and local policy makers (but also NGOs and 
other project implementers) to focus on this issue of accountability and to create the 
appropriate institutional and legislative conditions and mechanisms to ensure the 
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Introduction and background 
 
Decentralized governance is now the overarching paradigm in development and 
public policy arenas (Piriou-Sall 1998, Litvack and Seddon, 1999, OECD 2003). 
Decentralization and community-involvement are in particular presented as necessary 
conditions for effective development (Rondinelli et al. 1989; Aiyar et al. 1995; 
Rahman and Westley 2001). As a consequence a large number of programmes and 
policy reforms, supported by international development agencies and NGOs, have 
been carried out recently in many developing countries with the explicit objective of 
decentralization. Applied to a wide range of situations and economic sectors, these 
reforms have also been described or labelled under a wide range of terms, such as 
democratic decentralization, participatory development, devolution, indigenous 
management, user-participation, co-management, etc. 
 
Arguments in favour of participation and decentralization are not simply grounded on 
the basis of economic and administration efficiency. They are often associated with 
potential improvements in public accountability, environmental sustainability and 
empowerment of poor and vulnerable groups (Bass and Rouse 1997; World Bank 
2002). Decentralization is therefore perceived as one possible solution for the 
improvement of rural population livelihoods and even as a means for poverty 
alleviation. The most common argument is that decentralization is by definition a 
mechanism of ‘inclusion’ and ‘empowerment’ (Piriou-Sall 1998; World Bank 2000). 
Because it involves bringing government closer to the governed, in both the spatial 
and institutional senses, it is argued that local governments will be more 
knowledgeable about, and hence more responsive to, the needs of the poorest and 
marginalized people. This mechanism of inclusion is, in particular, expected to lead to 
empowerment and pro-poor policies and outcomes (Crook and Sverrisson 1999). 
 
In small-scale inland fisheries, after several decades of a strongly-centralized 
management approach, ‘decentralization’ has also become the new paradigm (Berkes 
1995; Pomeroy 2001, Viswanathan et al. 2003, Allison and Badjeck 2004). Following 
the view of influential scholars who advocated for governance reform, the policy 
consensus in favour of fisheries management decentralization (either as co-
management or community-based fisheries management –CBFM) reforms is now 
prevalent in the policy discourse Norman et al. 1998; Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb 
2005). Hardly any country in the developing world does not explicitly include co-
management or CBFM as one of its main fisheries national policy objectives. 
 
As part of the research project “Food security and poverty alleviation through 
improved valuation and governance of river fisheries in Africa”, the objective of this 
paper is to explore and assess the changes in governance that these co-management 
and CBFM reforms induced in Sub-Sahara Africa inland fisheries. To do so, we draw 
upon the experiences of five countries: Cameroon, Malawi, Niger, Niger, and Zambia 
as documented in 5 country-level review documents commissioned by the project 
(Belal and Baba, 2007, Makadassou et al. 2006, Malasha 2007, Njaya 2007, Ovie and 




The need for a new analytical framework 
The conventional approach: a plea for more participation 
 
In the fisheries literature, the most frequently quoted framework used to analyze co-
management is the framework proposed by McCay (1993) and Berkes (1994). The 
core idea of the framework is that co-management is defined by various partnership 
arrangements distinguished from one another by the degrees of information-sharing 
between 2 entities: the local fishing community and the centralized management 
authority –see Fig.1. Depending on this degree of information sharing and power 
devolution, five major generic types of co-management arrangements can be 
identified: Intrusive, Consultative, Cooperative, Advisory, and Informative.  
 
 
One can argue, however, that this framework assumes that the degree of power 
devolved is the key factor, with the likely conclusion that co-management failure(s) 
will then be systematically ‘explained’ by “too little devolution/participation”. 
Following this interpretation, the solution clearly lies in more participation
1. 
                                                 
1 Review of the literature reveals that indeed, most co-management studies argue that there is generally 
not enough participation in fisheries reforms and that too little responsibility has been passed down to 
the community. Pomeroy, for instance, asserts, “The devolution of fishery management authority from 
the central government to local level governments and organizations is an issue that is not easily 
resolved. .… Many attempts at decentralization have not delivered a real sharing of resource 
management power” (Pomeroy 2001, p.135). One reason for this perceived failure is that “Fisheries 
administrators may be reluctant to relinquish their authority, or portions of it, and governments are 
often opposed to decentralization” (Pomeroy 1993, p.14-15). Pomeroy is echoed by Sverdrup-Jensen 
and Nielsen, who comment, “Under the present management arrangements situation [in Africa], user 
groups will often be patronized in possible disputes with government. The latter seems generally 
reluctant to devolve power and bestow legal rights and authority in fisheries management to user 
groups” (Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 1998, p.11). This is also the opinion of Jul-Larsen and his co-
authors (2003), who conclude, “Generally speaking, management of freshwater fisheries [in Southern 
Africa] is still very much in control of governments, and the negotiating position of user groups versus 
that of governments is consequently comparatively low”. As Chirwa (1998, p.69) points out, “The 
FD’s [Fisheries Department’s] position of patronage means that the local user communities are the 




The level of devolution is, however, only one dimension to consider within the 
process of participation per se. As emphasized by Cohen and Uphoff more than 20 
years ago, many other important criteria should also be considered when evaluating a 
project, e.g. the kind of participation (participation in decision-making; in 
implementation; in benefits, in evaluation) or how the process occurs (the basis of 
participation, its form, its extent, its effects) (Cohen and Uphoff 1980). In other 
words, assessing the participation process – and in the present case the fisheries co-
management process – through the degree of participation or the level of devolution is 
not sufficient.  
 
Conceptually, the problem arises from the fact that the McCay-Berkes framework 
attempts to characterize co-management mainly through the level of power devolution 
– i.e. the degree of stakeholder participation. In that case, the reference criterion is the 
gradient of power-sharing, running from one extremity (the central government) to the 
other (the community) –see Fig.1. This ‘mono-dimensional conceptualization’ of the 
process reduces governance reform to the degree of participation and does not 
necessarily capture the main factor(s) explaining the degree of success or failure of 
decentralization reforms. 
 
This point was confirmed empirically by Neiland and Béné (2003). These authors 
conducted a review of 50 case-studies of fisheries across 39 countries. Using the 
information provided by the literature, they analysed the management systems of 
these fisheries and assessed in particular the performances of each of the 50 fisheries, 
using three criteria: economic efficiency, ecological sustainability, and social equity. 
At the same time, they categorized these fisheries by the degree of participation of 
their stakeholders in the decision-making process, using the seven categories of 
power-sharing as defined by McCay and Berkes –see Fig.1 above. They analysis 
shows that there is no tangible correlation between the level of devolution of the 
responsibility in the fishery and the actual performance of the fishery. In other words, 
the degrees of participation did not explain the performance of the fisheries: in 
particular, some fisheries characterized by highly centralized management system 
were doing well, while other, more participatory, fisheries were not necessarily able 
to generate good management outcomes –and vice versa. 
 
Focusing on the level of participation as the key element of success in co-
management presents other potential issues. First, it tends to suggest that the stronger 
the participation, the more efficient and the more likely the co-management reform is 
to succeed (see footnote 1). However, as clearly demonstrated in the literature, strong 
participation is not without its limitations and dangers, especially in the context of 
natural resource management (Ribot 2001, Campbell and Shackleton 2002; Mearns 
and Bruce 2002, Dupar and Badenoch 2002). As Brett notes, “Maximum participation 
may not always be possible or efficient” (Brett 2000, p.1). In effect, as pointed out by 
Adams (1996), and confirmed by Neiland and Béné’s review, each fishery in each 
society has its own ‘balance point’ on the scale of management intervention. “Some 
fisheries are more effectively managed by governments or intergovernmental bodies 
and some are more effectively managed by local communities and non-government 
                                                                                                                                            
recipients rather than the initiators of decisions. They, themselves, are managed, together with their 
resources, by the Fisheries Department.” (quoted in Jul-Larsen et al. 2003, p.92). 6 
 
bodies, with various mixtures in between” (Adams, 1996, p.339). Thus, advocating 
for a systematic strong participation by the fishery community may not be the correct 
approach. In other words, the issue of how much power is shared may be the wrong 
question. Instead, issues of how this power is shared and through which accountability 
mechanisms may be more important. 
 
Back to basics 
 
From a political science perspective, a governance reform may take several forms, 
involve various agents and induce changes of different intensities at different levels. 
Broadly speaking, 3 main types of reforms are relevant to the discussion of co-
management and governance reforms in fisheries: devolution, deconcentration and 
decentralization.  
 
Applied to the fisheries context, each of these types of reforms leads to different 
patterns of empowerment over fisheries resources.  Devolution reform in fisheries 
refers to the transfer of rights and responsibilities from the government to 
representatives of user groups at the local level (fisher organizations or alike) –see 
Fig.2. In contrast, deconcentration reform involves changes in governance where 
decision-making authorities are transferred to lower-level units of government line 
agency (i.e., provincial and/or district level of the Department of Fisheries). Finally 
decentralization of fisheries induces transfers of decision-making authority and 
Fig.2. Governance reforms in fisheries as a combination of devolution, deconcentration and 
decentralization. Each of these types of reforms leads to different patterns of empowerment over 
natural resources 
from central DoF to local end-users 
(e.g. Beach Village Committee) 
from central to local governments 
(e.g. District Assemblies) 
from central to lower administrative levels 







financial capacities related to fisheries to lower (provincial, district or communal) 
levels of government bodies
2.  
 
In many instances such artificial distinctions may not reflect the empirical reality as 
fisheries governance reforms –as we will see below- appear often to be a combination 
of these 3 types of reform
3. Overall, however, the distinction between these 3 types of 
governance reforms is useful as it provides a relevant analytical framework to 
‘unfold’ some of the critical changes that are currently induced by fisheries 
governance reforms. In particular, it draws attention to the following key-question: 
which actors are empowered with natural resource uses and management decisions? 
As recalled by James Ribot, this question is critical since experience suggests that 
“whether the transfer of natural resource power within or into the local institution 
landscape promotes or undermines representative, accountable and equitable 
processes depends on which local actors are being entrusted with discretionary 
powers over natural resources” (Ribot 2003, p.55, emphasis is ours). 
 
The three key issues to analyze governance 
 
Using these 3 types of governance reforms as the background of our analysis, we now 
propose to look more specifically at the following three key-issues. 
 
Nature and degrees of governance reforms  
Do co-management and CBFM, as they are being implemented in Sub-Sahara Africa, 
fall under one of the 3 distinct categories of governance reforms commonly identified 
in the political science literature, or do they include some combination of 2 or even all 
of these different governance reforms? In other terms, is co-management mainly a 
devolutionary process as it is usually assumed to be –by which direct end-users (the 
fisherfolk) are empowered- or is it in reality more often a deconcentration process 
where power and decision-making processes are transferred down to lower levels 
(provinces, district) of the administration in charge of fisheries management? Or is it a 
combination of both? Where do the local governments stand in this process? Are 
provincial and/or local decentralized bodies (such as ‘district assemblies’ or the likes) 
involved in co-management? One particular issue in this series of questions is the role 
of the traditional leaders. Have these traditional leaders been involved in these co-
management or CBFM reforms? Should they be? If they are, do they effectively 
                                                 
2 From this distinction we see clearly that although devolution is sometimes called “democratic 
decentralization”, devolution and decentralization differ in two essential but related aspects. First as 
highlighted in the discussion above the direct recipients of the newly-devolved power are not the same 
under both reforms. In the case of devolution, these recipients are the end-users –i.e. the fishing 
communities-, either directly or more often through the fisheries associations or committees. In contrast 
the direct recipient of a decentralization reform is the local government. Secondly, a devolution is an 
intra-sectoral governance reform, while a ‘decentralization reform in fisheries’ would induce some 
transfer of responsibilities from institutions inside the sector (e.g. DoF) to institutions outside the sector 
(local government).  
3 For instance, direct users (fisher representative and/or local DoF) may be invited to lead the new 
management commission created by the local government as part of the newly-decentralized 
management of the fisheries.    8 
 
contribute to the ultimate objectives of these reforms (that is empowerment of the 
local community)?  
 
Downward accountability and participation 
Political science scholars agree that representation and accountability are critical if 
devolved power is to serve local needs efficiently and equitably (Brett 2000, Agrawal 
2001, Ribot 2003). While the ‘participatory dimension’ of co-management or CBFM 
has been widely promoted, the concept of downward accountability has, so far, 
remained largely ignored by fisheries scholars. Political scientists, however, insist that 
participation alone will not ensure the success of the reform and that accountability, 
and in particular downward accountability is critical in this process (Ribot 1999, 
Francis and James 2003, Brett 2003, Devas and Grant 2003). Agrawal and Ribot, for 
instance, concluded that “the presumed benefits of decentralization become available 
to local populations only when empowered local actors are downward accountable” 
(1999, p.473 emphasis is ours). If this is the case, then an important question is to 
what extent the newly empowered local fisheries actors –whoever they are- are 
downward accountable to the people they represent (the fishing communities and 
more broadly the local populations).  
 
Implementing governance reforms in small-scale fisheries in Africa: agenda 
setting or implementation issues?  
Experience in developing countries has shown that in other sectors than fisheries, the 
problem is often not related to the policy content or its legislative support, but to the 
implementation process. For instance many developing countries have very 
comprehensive and adequate public sector ‘decentralisation’ policies but they lack the 
institutional, financial and/or organizational capacities at all levels to implement and 
reinforce these policies. Is this the case for co-management and CBFM reforms in 
fisheries? Or is there still an ‘agenda issue’ in the sense that ‘decentralization in 
fisheries is not yet well embedded in developing countries’ national fisheries policy 
frameworks? If implementation issues arise, are there some commonalities in these 
issues amongst the countries reviewed here and to what extent are these issues 
specific to small-scale fisheries –as opposed to other sectors where decentralization is 
also taking place?    
 
By answering the questions above we are hoping to provide important new insights 
into the ‘decentralization’ process as it is currently taking place in Sub-Saharan small-




Nature and degrees of governance reforms  
Devolution to end-users 
 
When one looks at devolution processes in fisheries, the analysis of the 5 country 
reviews included in this project reveals some mixed results. While devolution to 
fishery end-users has been explicitly identified and pursued in national policies in 
some of these countries in recent years, devolution is still not on the fisheries policy 
agenda in others. For instance, no tangible evidence of any formal or apparent transfer 9 
 
of authorities and/or responsibilities to fishing communities or professional groups 
was reported in Nigeria (Ovie and Radji 2007). Likewise, even in countries where 
multi-sectoral decentralization reforms have been implemented, fisheries is not 
necessarily included in these processes and very little devolution to direct end-users 
(fishers) is observed. Makadassou et al (2007) describe this situation in the case of 
Niger where, due to a lack of capacity and resources in the commune- and district-
level governments, “[i]n the [Niger’s part of the] Lake Chad Basin, fishery planning is 
essentially the result of the central administration … The view of the direct actors is 
rarely taken into accounted.”  
 
Devolution in fisheries has been more actively pursued in other countries, however 
mainly on a project basis. In Cameroon for instance, participatory management has 
been promoted since 1991 through the Fisheries Master Plan, and then implemented 
since 2000 through three local projects supported by the DFID-FAO Sustainable 
Fisheries Livelihood Programme (SFLP). As a consequence, the establishment of 
formal management committees to ensure the sharing of the responsibilities between 
the fisheries administration (Département des Pêches) and the fishing communities is 
being administratively endorsed and the primary remaining need, legislative support 
for co-management, is reportedly in the process of being drafted (Belal and Baba, 
2007).  
 
Attempts at de facto devolution in fisheries in Zambia have also taken place, 
essentially through the implementation of various donor-funded projects. In Lake 
Kariba for instance Zonal Management Committees (ZMCs) were created with the 
objective of transferring management responsibilities of the fishery from the DoF to 
these ZMCs (Malasha 2007). Similar efforts were pursued in other major fisheries of 
the country (e.g. Luapula province). Conjointly, in an attempt to improve governance 
in the sector, in 1995 the Zambia fisheries administration had approached the FAO, 
seeking assistance with revisions to its national Fisheries Act. The draft Bill sought to 
‘decentralize’ and devolve fishery management responsibilities from the Department 
of Fisheries to local communities in order to facilitate the participation of local 
fisherfolks in the formulation and enforcement of fishery management regulations
4. In 
1998 a draft was presented to parliament. However it was never ratified (Malasha 
2007).  Instead, a different set of amendments to the Fishery Bill were passed into law 
in September 2007 that completely reversed this initial move toward devolution of 
powers to fisherfolk: these amendments will result in the creation of Fishery 
Management Committees whose membership will be appointed by the minister 
responsible for fisheries, and whose powers will be limited to enforcement of pre-
determined fisheries regulations.   
 
In Malawi the 1997 Fisheries Conservation and Management Act provided the 
fisheries department (DoF) with a legal mandate to delegate fisheries management 
responsibilities to end-users. As a consequence a relatively large number of Beach 
Villages Committees (BVCs) and Fisheries Associations (FAs) were created in many 
water-bodies (Lake Malawi, Lake Chiuta, Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River, 
Lake Chilwa, etc., Njaya 2007). However, the creation of these entities did not 
systematically ensure the success of the devolution process as national policies failed 
                                                 
4 Note, however that this was the government’s objectives – not necessarily the communities’ ones. 
Communities are usually motivated by health, theft, conflicts resolution issues. 10 
 
to address a variety of issues related to implementation. Many of these problems are 
discussed by Russell, Dobson et al (2007, p.x), and are exemplified below in the case 
of the Lake Malombe chambo fisheries: 
 
  Unrepresentative/undemocratic BVCs: Some In several cases it has been reported 
that the monetary benefits of membership might have led the chiefs and Extension 
workers to select BVC members themselves, instead of using democratic 
mechanisms (e.g. elections). 
  Conflicts between chiefs and BVCs
5: In some cases, the BVCs were dominated by 
chiefs, and in other cases, the BVCs represented a threat to the authority and 
incomes of the chiefs, and were therefore resented and undermined by chiefs. 
  Poor sense of stewardship/ownership:  Much participation in the BVCs was 
motivated by the financial benefits associated with membership rather than a 
sense of local ownership.  The high level of involvement of (European) donor 
agency personnel and the ability of the DoF to make appointments and unilaterally 
impose local management plans may also have diminished the sense of local 
ownership over the resource. 
  Poor DoF commitment to participatory management: Although the DoF and donor 
agencies spoke in the language of participation, the fishing communities generally 
felt that the DoF rarely responded to their concerns. Worse yet, some BVCs were 
actively undermined by DoF staff when they attempted to enforce regulations 
(Dobson and Lynch 2003). This lack of democratic values in the field staff was 
modeled on the hierarchical bureaucracy in which they worked, and the DoF’s 
short-term program goal orientation that defined the field staffs’ interactions with 
the BVCs. 
Deconcentration    
 
The country-level review documents reveal that in terms of deconcentration, the 
overall situation portrays a mosaic of mixed outcomes. In Niger, three levels of 
deconcentration have been legislatively defined: region, province, and district
6. But 
the deconcentration –which appears to be closely linked to the decentralization 
process (see decentralization section below)- concerns essentially the political and 
public administration mechanisms and not the technical services related to natural 
resources management. In practice, due to a lack of capacity at the deconcentrated 
levels of the DoF, and the central treasury’s attempts to resist decentralization of 
control over scarce funds, the decentralized agencies have very little financial and 
decision-making autonomy, and are drastically limited in their capacity to engage 
with local users (Makadassou et al. 2007).  
 
In Cameroon, deconcentration of the different administrations has been implemented 
since 1972, involving also three administrative levels: region, province (department), 
and district (commune), similar to the Niger model. The country review document 
reveals however, that the agents in charge of the deconcentrated fisheries offices 
receive only delegated power from the central authority and do not have much 
                                                 
5 As the traditional arbiters in village conflicts, chiefs were able to fine community members and keep 
the money or goods (paid in the form of cash or goods) collected for personal use. As the BVCs were 
now assigned the roles of fining offenders, the chiefs lost out financially and in prestige. 
6 Translated from French. The exact terminologies of those three levels are “région”, “département”, et 
“arrondissements”. 11 
 
autonomy of decision-making (Belal and Baba, 2007). Perhaps more problematically, 
they appear to also be primarily accountable to their direct hierarchy (Gouverneurs, 
Prefets, sous-Prefets) but not downwardly accountable to the direct users (see below).  
In Zambia, there are severe constraints in terms of coordination within the DoF that 
are partly due to budgetary and personnel cut-backs imposed by the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP’s). Additionally, where other agencies’ (such as the 
Zambia Wildlife Authority) actions impact fisherfolk, the Fisheries Department has 
little legal basis for challenging them, and overall has poor communication with them 
(Petersen 2006). A somewhat similar situation is reported in Malawi where little of 
the capacity building that was pursued as part of an overall willingness to 
deconcentrate the DoF has focused on the DoF field staff in their remote living and 
working locations (Russell et al 2007). Although the District Fisheries Officers are 
supposed to transfer knowledge gathered at workshops to their field staff, due to 
financial constraints and a lack of administrative oversight, little training has been 
effectively conducted. This parallels the overall reforms in the Malawian government 
where several authors have documented the increasing gap between senior 
management and junior/local staff, whose access to workshops, promotions, and job-
security is dependent on in-house patron-client relationships, a situation which has led 
to widespread misappropriation and abuse of government resources (Anders 2002; 
Chinsinga 2002, Englund 2002). 
 
In Nigeria, the Federal Department of Fisheries (the apex Fisheries Policy-making 
body) and the States’ Departments of Fisheries are empowered de jure (by law) to 
make management decisions regarding fisheries. The key informants in the field 
(officials of the DoF, Directors of fisheries of the three most important States where 
the survey was conducted i.e. Jigawa, Kano and Yobe) reported however, that little 
devolution, deconcentration or decentralisation of the fisheries decision-making 
functions takes place (Ovie and Raji 2007). The DoF has, or is expected to have, 
zonal offices in all the States of the federation while the States are also expected to 
have local staff at the local government areas with some level of deconcentrated 
powers. In reality, however, all of them lack logistics and independent authority. 
Rather they take directives from, and are accountable to, mainly the Director of 
Fisheries at the Federal agency. Most States’ zonal offices at the local government 




The country review documents reveal that Cameroon, Niger, Malawi, and Zambia 
have all embarked on wide-ranging decentralization reform policies outside the 
fishery sector
7. The country review documents, however, failed to identify any real 
                                                 
7 In Niger, for instance decentralization is as old as the independence itself as it was part of the 
governance changes that were introduced following the 1961 independence declaration. In Cameroon 
decentralization exists in the constitution since 1996 and in the legislation since 2004. Malawi has also 
engaged in the path of decentralization during the late 1990s as part of its process toward 
democratization and as an element of its strategy for poverty reduction (ref). In Zambia, most of the 
key benchmark documents that directed the country toward decentralization such as the Local 
Administration Act of 1980, the 1991 Local Government Act or the 1995 Cabinet Circular, were issued 
in the mid 1980s and 1990s. All these countries have therefore implemented decentralization reforms 
outside the fisheries sector, sometimes for decades. 12 
 
inclusion of the small-scale fisheries sector in these decentralization processes. In 
Nigeria, decentralization has not at all entered into the political arena.  
 
In Niger, one of the specificities of the decentralization is that traditional authorities 
have  de jure been included in the decentralization process and hold positions in 
commune-level governments.  From the country review, it appears that this 
development has the potential to further bolster an already powerful chieftaincy, 
thereby further marginalizing the fisherfolk themselves. In Cameroon, decentralizing 
reforms were applied to varying degrees under both British and French colonial 
administrations, as well as in the post-independence period.  Political and 
administrative decentralization are explicitly included in the 1996 constitution and 
have been promoted through successive series of new legislations and laws. However, 
it is not clear from the country review document how and to what extent the 
aspirations, needs and conditions of the fishing communities or the constraints 
affecting the aquatic resources, are effectively integrated into the planning and actions 
led by the local decentralized entities (‘collectivités territoriales’)  
 
Similar comments hold for Zambia and Malawi where decentralization has been 
influencing the politic landscape of these countries through the establishment of local 
level decentralized bodies (District Assemblies in Malawi and District Councils and 
District and Provincial Development Committees in Zambia). However, in a number 
of major Zambian water bodies (Lake Kariba, Mweru-Luapula, Lake Bangweulu), 
local governments’ engagement with the fisherfolk appear to be primarily motivated 
by a desire to collect rents from the fishery, and providing few services in return.  
Future decentralisation will be pursued under the National Decentralisation Policy 
(NDP) of 2002, the aim of which is to improve participation, improve accountability 
and also lead to the design of locally specified plans for development purposes 
(Republic of Zambia, 2002:1-27). While this process of has not yet been initiated, it is 
expected that district councils will, among other functions, be responsible for the 
management and conservation of natural and wildlife resources. Under the NDP, 
however, the central government will retain core functions over essential national 
matters. The NDP is also silent on some of the initiatives such as those on Lake 
Kariba which have already led to a de facto devolution of some of the Department of 
Fisheries functions to the Zonal Management Committees.   
 
In Malawi, devolution of fisheries management to Beach Village Committees 
preceded the passage of the decentralization legislation. As a consequence the Beach 
Village Committees appear to be poorly integrated into the various decentralised 
structures (Area Development Committees, Village Development Committees and 
District Assembly).  Similarly, while the Fisheries Department is supposed to be 
decentralized, reporting directly to District Assemblies, these changes have not yet 
been implemented, and all decision making is done at the national level (Njaya 2007, 
Russell 2007). This situation is further complicates as the decentralization policy is 
effectively on hold at present, as the District Assemblies have not held elections for 
two years and are therefore lack a legal mandate. However, for the brief period that 
they were in session (2000-2005), there were indications of nascent conflicts between 
those District Assemblies and the DoF in particular in relation to the collection of 
license fees, and between the traditional authorities (who play key roles in the Area 
Development Committees and the Village Development Committees) and the BVCs 
(Russell et al, 2007, Njaya p.x).   13 
 
 
While Nigeria has no formal decentralization process, the country review document 
indicates a significant de facto reliance by national and state agencies on the 
Traditional Authorities for the implementation of fisheries regulations and 
adjudication of conflicts in their local areas (Ovie and Raji 2007, see also Ita 1993).  
Miles (1994) has describes how these traditional authorities (TAs) attempt to refer to 
their hierarchy to resolve issues to the greatest extent possible, and Ovie and Raji 
(2007) indicate that they primarily bring issues to the state when their scale is beyond 
their jurisdiction. This practice is not new, but rather is an extension of British 
colonial policies in which the TAs were granted these powers (Miles 1987, 1994, 
Crowder 1964).  Therefore, one might regard this as a highly decentralized fisheries 
management regime, but in a de facto sense. 
 
The specific role of traditional authorities 
 
In many countries in Africa, despite the recurrent effort made over the years by some
8 
central authorities to erode the sphere of influence of traditional authorities (TAs), 
these TAs are still very well established, and their influence on access and control of 
natural resources still effective through the role of key-personages such as village 
chief or village head-fishermen. Their spheres of influence and their interactions with 
devolved bodies or the government agencies are significantly defined by local and 
national institutional histories (see Russell draft for a review), however, they extend 
essentially to the local level.     
 
Niger is a vivid example of the strong influence that TAs can have on local fisheries 
management and governance. Their roles are supported by several mechanisms. First 
as mentioned above, although their legitimacy was undermined during much of the 
colonial and post-colonial periods, TAs have now been included de jure in the 
decentralization process and are members of the different decision-making organs of 
the ‘collectivités territoriales’ at the local level in particular with important 
consultative roles (Makadassou et al. 2007 p.xx). Second, it has been reported that, in 
the absence of any real interaction between the deconcentrated DoF staff and the local 
fishing communities, the only cultural and institutional references for local fishers are 
these TAs, through, in particular, the ‘master of fishers’ (chef des pêcheurs). These 
authorities are thereby also reportedly able to monopolize access to training or 
educational opportunities. Third, despite the long history of decentralized 
administration in Niger, it turns out that only the lowest of the 3 levels of 
decentralization (the “commune”) is actually effective (where these traditional leaders 
are most influential)
9. Therefore, the combination of empowering TAs who may lack 
in local legitimacy, receding central government roles, and weak regional 
governments, creates a context where these traditional leaders often become the 
primary interlocutor between the decentralized entities and the fishers, generating real 
risk of abuse and elite capture (Makadassou et al. 2007 p.xx)     
 
                                                 
8 Note the government’s reliance on the de facto empowerment of TAs in Nigeria, and the recent de 
jure empowerment of TAs in Niger. 
9 In their geographical configuration the communes (cluster of villages) are often simply the 
contemporary heritage of what used to be the spatial distribution of the pre-independence TAs 
‘territories’, thus reinforcing –or at least maintaining- the influence of the traditional leaders. 14 
 
This risk of elite capture is also present in Cameroon where the role of the TAs has 
been institutionalized through their position as “administration auxiliaries” 
(Auxiliaires de l’Administration) in the decentralized systems. The role of these TAs 
in the local development has thus been increased –as compared to what it was just 
after the independence-, but not necessarily their power. This point is illustrated by 
the fact that this particular position as administration auxiliary gives them new 
responsibilities in the decision making processes at the local level (e.g. in conflict 
resolution), but also makes them essentially accountable to the administrative 
authorities (Gouverneurs, Prefets, sous-Prefets and Chef de districts).  However, the 
TAs, by their own estimation, remain largely unaccountable to the local population 
(Belal and Baba 2007)
10.  
 
In Zambia, the situation seems relatively mixed. Some of the fisheries reviewed 
through this research have included significant involvement of TAs in the 
mobilization of fisherfolk (Kariba, Bangweulu), and in some these TAs are described 
as dominating the decentralized bodies (Mweru, Kariba).  In others, the chiefs have 
intentionally been marginalized leading some to resist fisheries management 
initiatives (e.g. Bangweulu), while the Kafue fisherfolk have been able to prevent the 
chiefs from dominating the decentralised bodies through the use of secret ballots for 
committee elections, while retaining their support by giving them honorary roles of 
“patron”.  This last experience echoes an approach used by Community Resource 
Boards (CRB) –the decentralized entities in charge of wildlife management at the 
local level- which seems to reduce the risk of elite capture by chiefs. While the village 
chiefs are also part of these CRBs, their status within them is that of ‘patron’, not 
chair. This status may help reduce abuses by chiefs’ in local level decision-making 
concerning wildlife management and the distribution of its benefits (Malasha 2007).  
 
Russell et al’s (2007) documentation of fisheries co-management case studies in 
Malawi illustrates the array of roles that TAs can play with respect to fisheries 
governance.  Some of the main factors that they highlight include:  the TA 
personality, local institutional histories, the extent to which the Department of 
Fisheries’ BVC development program sensitized the chiefs as to the roles that they 
could play in supporting BVCs, and the extent to which the DoF encouraged dialogue 
between the BVCs and TAs. These leaders generally appear positively inclined to 
support the empowerment of local populations when their patronage of BVCs 
enhances their social standing and when they feel that their concerns over the need for 
sensitivity to local livelihoods are incorporated into BVC regulations.  However, other 
case studies clearly show that where chiefs are excluded from this new devolution 
process, and where they feel that their traditional roles as “owners” of the village are 
being undermined (ex. by no longer being paid tribute by visiting fisherfolk) they 
almost systematically become highly disruptive.  
 
The Nigeria review confirms the central role that TAs can play in fisheries 
governance. While there are no formal policies of devolution of management 
authority to traditional institutions by the central government, they are generally 
recognized by the Fisheries Departments as the de facto managers.  At the fishing 
community levels, the “Head Fishers” (or Sarki Ruwas) are empowered by custom to 
                                                 
10 As illustrated by the fact that the election of new traditional leaders very often follows the preference 
of the administration. 15 
 
manage fisheries resources, and they are accountable to the community chiefs (or 
Bulama/Wakili). The influence of these traditional authorities does not seem to have 
been impacted in any apparent way by the absence of this formal mandate, and are the 
products of a legacy of British colonial policies of Indirect Rule and a strong pre-
existing chieftaincy. The current powers and authorities of these traditional 
institutions are described by the Director of Fisheries of Jigawa State: 
  
“The institutional position and influence of the Bulama (District Head) or the Sarkin Ruwa (Head 
fishermen) is very strong and is dictated by existing traditional norms, culture and values. Existing 
informal local management system allows the Bulama or the Sarkin Ruwa to determine when 
(closed season) and where (closed area) to fish and when to stop fishing as well as the type of 
equipment (gear restriction) to use. While these powers are formally vested with the federal 
minister or the State Commissioner by existing laws, I cannot send my staff to any water body for 
any official work without first writing to or informing the Bulama or Sarki Ruwa in charge of the 
area” (Ovie and Raji 2007, p.x). 
 
Participation and downward accountability  
Participation 
 
The degree of participation of end-users and stakeholders in the decision-making 
process and implementation of fisheries management should closely reflect the degree 
of devolution sought through co-management or CBFM programmes. However, as 
highlighted earlier in this document, while devolution to fishery end-users has been 
explicitly identified and pursued in national policies in most of the countries included 
in this research (except Nigeria), effective devolution leading to true empowerment of 
the legitimate fisheries stakeholders is yet to be achieved in most of these countries.  
 
In Cameroon the term ‘participatory management (“gestion participative”) has 
indisputably become one of the official ‘corner-stones’ of the DoF agenda. As a 
consequence, representatives of the primary stakeholders have been invited to 
contribute to the planning and decision making process at several occasions (e.g. 
elaboration of the 1991 Fisheries Master Plan, elaboration of the MINEPIA Sectoral 
Strategy). Overall, however the country review document reveals that this 
participation remains mainly bound temporally or spatially to co-management 
projects such as these initiated by the SFLP in Maga and Mape lakes and Garoua 
markets.  
 
The agenda-setting role of donor-agency sponsored projects is not specific to 
Cameroon and is also observed in many other places. In Lake Kariba or Mweru-
Luapula projects (Zambia) for instance, donor-sponsored projects spurred the actively 
engagement of end-users in the management process through the creation of local 
management committees such as Zonal Management Committees (ZMCs) at the sub-
district level, or Integrated Village Management Committees (IVMCs) at the village 
level. Similarly, though not as successfully, GTZ funded and provided significant 
guidance to the establishment of the first government-led co-management projects in 
Malawi (Lakes Malombe and Chilwa). The ‘inclusiveness policy’ of these 
programmes can be accepted as genuine in intent.  However, the situation on the 
ground is more ambiguous as is illustrated in the following example from the Kariba 
fisheries co-management programme in Zambia:  16 
 
 
The institutional framework created by the co-management was limited to a number of actors. 
These included the DoF, the local authorities, and the TAs. The fishers, especially immigrants, 
[were] participants by virtue of the fact that the whole process was designed to control their 
operations. As a result of this set-up, participation in ZMC and IVMC meetings was usually 
dominated by TAs, the semi-commercial fishermen and DoF officials. For instance, a meeting 
called to discuss the modalities of the new co-management arrangements in 1994 attracted 56 
participants. These consisted of Tonga chiefs and headmen, staff from DoF, representatives of 
government and local authorities along the lake shore. Out of a total of more than 2000 fishers who 
were active in the fishery at the time only 10 were invited. (Malasha 2007, p.x) 
 
Even where the participation of legitimate groups of end-users seems to have been 
more effectively achieved, a more thorough analysis reveals however that the level of 
participation is often reduced to an ‘instrument for implementation’ rather than an 
effective and empowering involvement of those end-users in the decision making 
process. The situation on the Mweru-Luapula fishery in Zambia is one example. 
There Malasha (2007, p.x) observes that the ZMC’s and IVMC’s have been given 
responsibilities, but no decision-making powers. In essence, the deconcentration 
process might have improved the participation of fishers and others in management –
through their involvement in the ZMCs and IVMCs- but the process is still very much 
embedded under the umbrella of the Fisheries Act of 1974 which gives ultimate 
responsibility to DoF. It appears that this situation will remain the same even under 
the new amendments that have been made to the Fisheries Act. 
 
In other fisheries the overall level of participation may also be reduced to its minimal 
dimension where fishers are simply invited to contribute to the management tasks. In 
Niger for instance, Makadassou et al. (2007) report that fishers may be called to 
participate in the removal of water hyacinth or sometimes contribute to the collection 
of fishery statistics (e.g. landings), but that this system is in effect based on in-kind or 
cash incentives, or even donation of fishing equipment. Otherwise, they have no 
influence on how fisheries are to be managed, and have no recourse to any formal 
institution in order to question or challenge the government’s and traditional 
authorities’ actions. 
 
This phenomenon has led several authors to make use of the concept of ‘instrumental 
co-management’ as defined by Viswanatahn et al. (2003, p.8) –as opposed to 
‘empowering co-management’ or ‘transformational’ co-management- to describe 
these situations. Chinsinga (2002) argues in the case of Malawi that despite the 
official devolution discourse widely publicized, the paradigm of centralized 
management remains deeply entrenched in the DoF mentality.  This has made the 
whole governance reform tend toward instrumentally participatory programs (i.e. in 
which local communities participate in projects that are predefined by the government 
or donors) rather than transformational governance reforms (in which the 
communities’ priorities define the development projects), thereby diminishing any 
local empowerment objectives (Njaya, p.x, Russell et al. 2007, p.35).   
 
Finally in countries where participatory management has not been introduced to the 
general fisheries policy agenda (e.g. Nigeria), one is not surprised to observe a low 
level of participation in fisheries management, especially from those in the primary 
and secondary stakeholder groups (Table 1). From Table 1, it is evident that the DoF 
is the dominant actor in the formal agenda setting process to the exclusion of other 
stakeholders. Instead, traditional leaders maintain de facto management powers over 17 
 
the resource, and Ovie and Raji (2007) report that these traditional authorities are 
highly sensitive to community sentiment. 
 
Table 1.  Matrix of major fisheries policy development processes and stakeholder 
participation in Nigeria 
Process 
Stakeholders 










DoFs  ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + 
Fish.  Inst.  + + +- - +- - + 
NGO e.g. FISON   +  +  -  -  +  -  - 
N.P.C  - - - - - - - 
Dams  Auth.  - - - - - - - 
MFI  - - - - - - - 
Fishers  -  - +-  +- -  - - 
Processors -  -  -  -  -  - - 
Fish  traders  - - - - - - - 
Boat  builders  - - - - - - - 
Comm.  Agents - - - - - - - 
Transporters -  -  -  -  -  - - 
Ancillary  - - - - - - - 
Trad. Instn.  -  -  +  +  -  -  - 
++ = V. High participation; + = High participation; +- = Weak participation; - = No 
participation. Source: redrawn from Ovie and Raji (2007) 
 
Table 2.  Matrix of major fisheries policy development processes and stakeholder 
participation in Cameroon 












Fishers x  x  x       
Processors x  x  x       
Transporters   x  x       
Retailers     x     
Intermediaries  x  x     
Local buyers    x  x       
Women process.             
Boat  builders     x     
Outboard  mechan.       x     
Fish  porters     x     
I c e   r e s e l l e r s         
Trad. institutions    x  x       
NGOs  x  x     
MFI x  x  x       
Fish.  Admin.  x x x x x x 
Source: redrawn from Belal and Baba (2007) 
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More surprising is that in countries where ‘participation’ is now entered in the lexicon 
of fisheries policy -as in Cameroon-, the analysis does not show any fundamental 
difference in the extent of fisherfolk participation (Table 2, above). Belal and Baba 
(2007) note that this situation may be related to the low organizational capacities of 
the majority of the stakeholders at the local level and the fact that local populations 
are still considered by development agencies and NGOs as ‘beneficiaries’ rather than 




In contrast to participation, accountability is rarely mentioned in the fisheries 
literature beyond the allusion to its contribution to good governance. Yet political 
scientists and governance experts agree that accountability should be considered as 
the critical variable in social empowerment and emancipation (Agrawal and Ribot 
1999, Francis and James 2003, Brett 2003, Devas and Grant 2003). In the words of 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999, p.478):  
 
“…downward accountability of those who receive powers from the central state on the 
behalf of a constituency is the primary dimension of decentralization since it can broaden 
the participation of local populations and enhance the responsiveness of the empowered 
actors” (our emphasis).  
 
The poor attention paid to this issue of (downward) accountability seems to have 
affected the decentralization processes in the countries included in this review. In 
Cameroon for instance, Belal and Baba (2007, p.x) acknowledge that while the staff 
of the deconcentrated agencies at various levels (provincial, district, and sub-district 
levels of DoF) are accountable to their upward hierarchy, no administrative or 
legislative mechanisms have been put in place during the fisheries co-management 
reform to hold these DoF staff accountable to the fishing communities and other 
direct stakeholders. In these conditions there is no real incentive for the agents of 
these administrations to engage with the local population beyond the consultation 
stage.  
 
While some may argue that this lack of accountability from the lower level of the 
administration is actually the very reason why ‘co-management’ was introduced in the 
first place, it may be more ‘disturbing’ for these co-management advocates to realize 
that  this lack of downward accountability can also be observed in the case of the 
newly empowered local entities. In Zambia’s Luapula co-management programme for 
instance, the frameworks for co-management did not address how the various 
members of the VCMs, (Fisheries Officers, traditional leaders, representative of the 
Local Authority, FA members and other interest groups such as fish traders) were 
supposed to be accountable to their own constituencies. The frameworks merely 
spelled out the roles that these different actors should play in the new management 
arrangement. In these conditions, it is not surprising to read that these VCMs often 
fail to account for the fishers’ real aspiration (Malasha 2007). Similarly, in the case of 
the Lower Shire (Malawi), Njaya (2007, p.x) argues that  
 19 
 
“there is minimal or lack of downward accountability” of these newly empowered 
entities. Many BVCs are [led] by a few individuals who in most cases are related in one 
way or another to traditional leaders, making them accountable to the traditional leaders 
[or to the larger gear owners] and not to the fishers. At the same time, the District 
Fisheries Officers’ reports are routed to Fisheries Department Headquarters and not to 
District Commissioners or District Assembly Chairs, making the[m] accountable to their 
Director and not to the fishers or even the decentralized district assemblies (local 
governments).”  
 
The question of the accountability of TAs appears critical in this context, given the 
role that they seem to play (whether through de jure or de facto means) in the large 
majority of small-scale fisheries in Africa. These TAs suffer a relatively bad 
reputation in the rural development literature where it is argued that they are not 
necessarily the best promoters of equal, gender-balanced and pro-poor reforms 
(Devereux 1996, Johnson 1997, Moore and Putzel 1999, Leach et al., 1999, Luckham 
et al. 1999). In contrast, no real consensus seems to have emerged from the five 
country review documents considered here. In Niger the review document emphasizes 
the real risk of power abuse that exists due in particular to the pre-eminent position 
enjoyed by the TAs in the new ‘decentralized’ context (Makadassou et al. 2007). In 
contrast, in the case of Nigeria –where TAs have also been recognized to play a 
critical role in the control of access and use of natural resources and fisheries in 
particular (refs)-, Ovie and Raji (2007, p.x) argue that traditional community leaders, 
are more easily held accountable for their decisions or actions by their subjects as 
compared to formal institutions. According to these authors, unpopular informal 
policies of TAs are often resisted or rejected outright
11. In extreme cases, this form of 
accountability can result in outright dethronement and replacement of such traditional 
leaders. In Malawi, the potential for abuses of power by TAs, highlighted by Njaya 
(2007) are balanced with the analysis of a variety of fisheries co-management 
experiences by Russell et al (2007) that illustrates both how useful the support of TAs 
is for successful co-management and how the roles played by TAs appears to reflect 
significantly the manner in which co-management is introduced by the government. 
 
Implementing governance reforms in small-scale fisheries in Africa 
 
The five country reviews highlight various issues in the implementation of fishery 
governance reforms. None of those issues, however, is fundamentally new and most 
of them have already been described in the fishery co-management literature.   
 
Reluctance to alter the existing status quo  
 
There is little doubt that the political will exists and is indeed present at different 
levels in many countries to implement fisheries co-management reforms. In 
Cameroon for instance the three SFLP co-management projects launched in 2001, 
prior to the promulgation of the 2004 laws on decentralization, is the vivid evidence 
                                                 
11 For example, mismanagement or embezzlement of community funds such as those collected on 
behalf of the people for ‘communal interest projects’ attracts heavy resentment from community 
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of this political will at the highest level
12. However as pointed out by Belal and Baba 
(2007), a reluctance to fully engage in, and support, co-management reforms has also 
been observed in many instances amongst certain actors from the deconcentrated 
administration or the traditional institutions. For these local actors, co-management is 
seen as a threat to their (perceived or real) present control over the fishery sector 
resources.  
 
Similarly, in the Luapula fishery in Zambia it was reported that while some TA’s 
were supportive of the co-management initiative others made deliberate efforts to 
frustrate the VMC’s in their areas. In most of the Zambian fisheries reviewed, TA’s 
criticized and undermined the operations of VMC’s when these threatened to 
undermine fishers’ traditional practice of paying tribute to them (Kapasa, 2004).   
Similarly, however, most local governments have resisted devolution of power to 
VMCs and in both the Mweru-Luapula and Bangweulu fisheries have reneged on 
agreements to share fishing-related revenues with them. Finally, this reluctance to 
devolve power is clear in the recently (in Sept. 2007) enacted amendments to the 
Fisheries Act, that demonstrate a clear political retreat from empowerment of VMC to 
instrumental use of them. 
 
This issue of reluctance to renounce power by some of the actors previously in control 
of the fishery resource is not necessarily a new element in the analysis. It is one of the 
main reasons identified in a large number of past and recent papers to explain the 
failure of earlier co-management programmes (e.g., Berkes 1995, Pomeroy 2001, 
Hara et al. 2002). As highlighted in the first part of this report, this diagnostic is not 
surprising. By adopting the McCay-Berkes model, one has the tendency to over-
emphasize these issues of (lack of) power-sharing to the exclusion of other factors. 
 
Lack of legal recognition 
 
Another issue which is often mentioned in a relatively large number of papers on co-
management is the issue of absence of legal backing for fishery governance reforms. 
Many examples exist around the world and in particular in developing countries 
where co-management and/or CBFM reforms were missing the necessary legal 
support, at least in the first years of their implementations (Jentoft 1989, Pomeroy 
1995, Sverdrup-Jensen and Raakjaer Nielsen, 1998). While the political will within 
the fishery sector might have been genuine and sincere, it was not systematically 
supported by adequate legislative reforms that would empower the newly created 
devolved entities through a de jure framework. While this problem tends to get 
resolved in countries where co-management experiences have been implemented for 
more than 10 years, there are still situations where this is yet to be the case. Zambia, 
as the example of the Kafue floodplain fisheries by-laws confirms is one of them. In 
this fishery the by-laws drafted by the village management committees still have no 
legal recognition. As a result, these village committees do not have legal right to 
enforce these by-laws. In the cases of the Mweru-Luapula, Lake Kariba and 
                                                 
12 In fact, a revision of the national fishery law (Law 94/01) is being considered and a new law being 
developed that will include several dispositions supporting co-management and other reforms related to 
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Bangweulu fisheries, local governments use this absence of a legal framework to 
avoid sharing fishing-related revenues with VMCs (Malasha 2007).  
 
In Malawi this has similarly been an issue.  While the policy frameworks provide for 
the legal recognition of BVCs and Fisheries Associations through their registration 
with the National Registrar’s Office, the Fisheries Department has appeared hesitant 
to give the BVCs such empowerment.  Consequently, as is the case in Lake Chiuta, 
the Fisheries Associations are being challenged in courts for their lack of legal 
standing by corrupted chiefs (Russell et al. 2007).  Prior to the dissolution of the 
District Assemblies (DA) in 2005, the Mangochi DA was looking into passing by-
laws for Lake Malombe and southern Lake Malawi that would give legal recognition 
to BVCs and Fisheries Associations within this district through a by-law outlined in 
the Local Government Act. Unfortunately, it looks as if such measures will not be 
passed before the next DA elections, however, probably slated for 2009. 
 
In Cameroon, fisheries co-management in the SFLP-sponsored Mape and Maga water 
bodies have struggled due to a lack of official recognition. This was addressed 
eventually by the passage of by-laws by the local government. The legitimation of 
these co-management committees and the by-laws is scheduled for January 2008. For 
the rest of the country, however, the absence of policies that empower fisherfolk as 
that which has been given to forest- and wildlife-dependent communities remains a 
significant obstacle to real devolution.  A significant reason for this may be the 
reluctance among some deconcentrated agency and decentralized governments 
representatives to protect their own fisheries-related interests.   
 
 
Lack of capacity 
 
As the literature has shown, lack of stakeholder capacity is a limiting factor that can 
greatly affect the chances of success of any interventions (Abbraham and Platteau 
2000). Fisherfolk are particularly likely to be affected by this as fishing and fish–
related activities such as fish processing and fish trading are known to attract mainly 
unskilled labour (refs). Additionally fishing communities are often forced to live at 
least temporarily in remote, isolated areas (especially inland fisheries such as those on 
floodplains, river and/or lakes) where access to education and/or other institutional 
supports is not easy. In these conditions it is not surprising that several of the country 
reviews highlighted this issue of lack of capacity. In Niger for instance (Makadassou 
et al. 2007, p.x) and in Cameroon (Belal and Baba 2007, p.x) the lack of 
organizational capacity, illiteracy and lack of support are presented as some of the 
reasons for the poor level of effective engagement by some of the primary 
stakeholders into the new decision making process. In Niger, though legally 
empowered to manage local resources, a lack of capacity and funding are primary 
reasons for the inabilities of decentralized district agencies to manage resources, 
resulting in their dependence on the central government agencies. Similarly, in 
Zambia, district-level agencies lack the human resources and financial base to 
effectively manage fisheries, and rely heavily on central authorities. 
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Rent-seeking behaviour by Governments and Traditional Authorities  
 
More than 2 decades of governance reforms in various economic and public 
administration sectors have demonstrated that decision-making process and transfer of 
responsibilities to lower levels is not a sufficient condition to ensure the success of 
decentralization reforms (Shackleton and Campbell 2001, Ribot 2002). Ensuring the 
effective delegation of financial means to support the new decentralized system is also 
necessary. Fisheries are no exception to this rule. As they are rent-generating sectors, 
natural resource such as fisheries or forestry are in theory in better position than other 
sectors (such as, education or health) to generate these necessary financial resources. 
However, experience reveals that in practice part or the totality of these rents are often 
appropriated by the central or decentralized government(s), who regard fisheries 
primarily as a source of revenue to support their budgets (through collection of fish 
trading or landing taxes, boat or fishing gear licensing, etc.) In Cameroon for instance 
taxes extracted from the fisheries sector are collected by the tax administration at the 
local and central levels, transferred to the ministry of finance, which then redistributes 
70% of those to deconcentrated technical administrations related to MINEPIA. 
However no share is redistributed directly to the end-users
13.  
 
Zambia offers another illustration of this rent-seeking behaviour through the case of 
the Bangweulu fishery. In this fishery the local government derives most of its 
revenues from fish-levies. Soon after the launch of the co-management plan for the 
Bangweulu fishery, the newly-created VMCs started to question the manner in which 
the local authority had been utilizing the levy. In particular, the VMCs insisted that 
the local authority account for all the monies that it collected, as the fishers reportedly 
did not derive any benefits. The local authority reacted by making various efforts to 
undermine the VMCs. In 1998 the government dissolved the local authority for 
‘corruption and mismanagement’ but the new one did not perform any better either 
(Til and Banda, n.d). In particular, the new local authority did not resolve the issue of 
levies as there were no legal amendments compelling them to do so (Malasha 2007, 
p.x). 
 
This case is not an exception and similar situations occur in many other places. In 
Nigeria the bulk of the revenues (not necessarily taxes) are generated from the fishery 
sector through licensing of fishing boats. A small amount of revenue is also derived 
from fish trade but only in well-organised fish markets such as Doro-Baga on the 
Eastern side of the Nigerian shores of the Lake Chad (Ovie and Raji 2007).  While the 
collection and control of such revenues is legally vested in the offices of the Federal 
and State Departments of Fisheries (as explicitly stated in Federal and State fisheries 
laws and Edicts, respectively, the redistribution mechanisms of such revenues are not 
stipulated by the laws. Thus Ovie and Raji (2007) report numerous complaints from 
different stakeholders interviewed during their review:  
 
“All [of] our field respondents agreed that once such collected revenues are paid into government 
treasury, they can hardly be withdrawn even to facilitate the work of the government officials in 
charge of such collections” (Ovie and Raji 2007, p.x).  
 
                                                 
13 In that respect the situation in the forestry sector in Cameroon is different. In that sector, part of the 
forestry taxes (the ‘redevance’) is redistributed by the States directly to the lower level of decentralised 
political entity (the ‘commune’) as part of the institutionalised national decentralization reform.  23 
 
Additionally, the traditional authorities in Nigeria collect funds from fisherfolk for the 
purpose of financing “communal interest projects”, and a portion of this money is 
typically given to the local Imams and Emirs. 
   
In some other cases it is not the initial rent generated by the fisheries which has led 
some elites to seek control of the fisheries, rather the benefits attached to 
membership/participation to the new system. This issue applies in Malawi where it 
was reported that participation in many BVCs seemed largely motivated by the 
financial gain derived from the anticipated participation in workshops, privileged 
access to loans, and the distribution of “sitting allowances” to BVC members, (Donda 
2000, Hara 2002, Russell et al 2007). A good example is the case of the Lake Chilwa 
and Mpoto Lagoon fisheries where the BVCs and FAs are composed of chiefs and 
their appointees, most of whom were not actual fisherfolk, who also don’t live near 
the lakeshore, and who have little direct knowledge of the fishery (Wilson 2004, 
2006).  Fisherfolk are therefore highly resistant to these BVC’s regulations (Njaya, 
2007).  
 
Lack of financial independence 
 
The lack of financial resources is another central issue abundantly described in the 
literature on decentralization (Minor 1999, Lind and Cappon 2001, Dupar and 
Badenoch 2001). In NRM this shortage of revenue may not only impede the 
operational capacity of the decentralized entity, it may eventually lead the latter to 
seek to maximize the rent extracted from these NRM in order to generate revenues. 
The implications may be disastrous for the natural resources. Recent reviews of 
decentralization in forestry in Cameroon, Indonesia, and Uganda, for instance, reveal 
that transferring use rights to local bodies has resulted in overexploitation of timber, 
primarily due to the needs of local governments and local people for income (Oyono 
2002, Resosudarmo 2002). In fact, as pointed out by Ribot (2002), there is no reason 
to expect that local authorities will not try to convert natural wealth into financial 
wealth, especially where cash is in short supply and is viewed as more valuable than 
standing forests.  
 
While such an extreme situation has not been explicitly identified in any of the 5 
countries reviewed in this research, there are often tensions between national-level 
conservation agendas and local poverty reduction and food security ones.  In 
Cameroon, for example, there have been conflicts between the DoF and local 
fisherfolk over issues such as closed seasons (such as in Lake Maga, where fishing is 
closed three months of the year). In Nigeria, while local and national institutions 
agree in theory on the need for conservation efforts to sustain the fisheries, local 
fishing communities rely on the fisheries for their livelihoods and often cannot afford 
to prioritise conservation over satisfaction of their basic needs. In the Komadugu 
Yobe Basin, for example, when reminded of the harmful impact of the use of under-
sized mesh in beach seine fishing, the respondent agreed, but explained that it would 
be difficult to abandon such productive gear in order to avoid catching undersized fish 
(Ovie and Raji 2007, p.x). 
 
Several country reports also make allusions to the problem of revenue shortage faced 
by the newly created local bodies, due to either the lack of mechanisms to ensure the 24 
 
financial ‘decentralization’ or due to the reluctance of the central government to 
redistribute the revenue generated by the fisheries.   This lack of financing can create 
a further incentive to overexploit natural resources.   
 
In Zambia for instance, the new ZMCs and IVMCs were supposed to be financially 
supported through the establishment of a revolving fund. Initial contribution to this 
fund would be made by donor. The DoF would then lobby for the amendment of the 
Fisheries Act to legalise the operations of the new management plan so as to 
legitimise the contribution of 60% of the money it collected from fishing licences to 
the ZMC’s and IVMC’s. Similarly, the amendments to be made to the Fisheries Act 
would also compel the local authority to pay 40% of the money it collected from fish 
levies to these committees. However, the local authority refused to give part of the 
fish levies to the ZMC’s and IVMC’s on the grounds that these organs did not have 
legal recognition as was the requirement under the Local Government Act (Malasha, 
2003). It was only after the ZMC’s and IVMC’s had been registered as voluntary 
organizations and also after the personal intervention of the Traditional Authority in 
the area did the local authorities begin to give part of the levy to these institutions.  
 
In Cameroon, co-management activities have so far been entirely supported through 
the SFLP project. In the rest of the country, revenues generated through fishing 
licenses and fish product certification are levied by district-level tax collectors and 
‘recentralized’ at the level of the ministry of finance, which then redistribute 70% of 
these revenues to 3 deconcentrated parastatal agencies in charge of fisheries 
management
14. No redistribution is directed to the communes or to fishery 
stakeholders groups (e.g. fisheries professional organizations, local fisheries 
committees, etc.).    
 
The case of Niger raises a different –but strongly related- issue. In Niger, several 
direct and indirect taxation mechanisms coupled with State subsidies and loans have 
been set-up –at least in theory- to ensure the financial autonomy of the new 
decentralized authorities (collectivités territoriales). In practice however, the extreme 
poverty in which a large majority of the population lives (in particular in rural areas) 
raises the question of the real capacity of these populations to pay these taxes and thus 
to support the decentralized entities (Makadassou et al. 2007). Additionally, the 
central treasury actively resists any allocation of resources to these governments.  As 
a consequences, most of these ‘collectivités territoriales’ are actually not operational, 
reducing all the efforts made to set up a ‘democratic’ decentralized decision making 
process to almost nothing.  
 
Elite capture  
 
Elite capture is probably the most frequent pitfall described in decentralization reform 
literature. Both ‘grey’ and published literatures provide many examples of how local 
elite groups have captured the benefits of decentralization projects for their own use, 
thus considerably reducing the potential positive effect of the reforms for the rest of 
                                                 
14 Those are North Livestock Development Authority in Adamaoua, North and Far-North Provinces, 
the Marine Fisheries Development Authority and the North-West Livestock Development Authority for 
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the local population (Moore and Putzel 1999; Dreze and Sen 1995; Abraham and 
Platteau 2000;  Crook and Sverrisson 2001). Chiefs, headmen and other so-called 
“customary authorities” are often targeted by central governments, donors, and NGOs 
as appropriate local authorities in decentralization efforts. However, as highlighted by 
Devereux (1996), Johnson (1997), Moore and Putzel (1999) Leach et al., (1999) 
Luckham et al. (1999) and many others, customary authorities are not necessarily 
supportive of democratic principles. They often inherit their positions, and their 
degree of local accountability depends on their personalities and local social and 
political histories. Furthermore, customary authorities are notorious for entrenched 
gender inequalities and for favoring divisive, ethnic-based membership (Zufferey 
1986; Colchester 1994; Baland and Platteau 1996; Pretty and Ward 2001).  
 
TAs are not, however, the only local elites who may use their existing privileged 
status to ‘hijack’ part of the newly-devolved power and reinforce or extent their 
political, social or economic situation. In the case of Niger we have discussed that in a 
context where fishing communities are particularly isolated and lack organizational 
and institutional capacities, devolved power often ends up in the hands of the local 
agents of the deconcentralized administration, the TAs and/or their the fishermen 
chiefs. Unfortunately as recognized by Makadassou et al. (2007, p.x) “this type of 
unbalanced relationship is often a source of abuse”. These forms of elite capture are 
not unique to circumstances where literacy is an initial limitation, however.  Given a 
new opportunity to expand their influence (such as the introduction of devolution or 
decentralization), various elites motivated by short-term economic interests may 
compete to establish control over resources, and less powerful groups (due to their 
caste or classifications of “non-residency” risk being marginalized (Nijenhuis 2003). 
Such elite capture by TAs or the larger gear owners, frequently in collusion with local 
Fisheries Department or decentralized local government staff have been documented 
in Malawi (Russell et al. 2007, Njaya 2007), Zambia (Malasha 2007), Cameroon 
(Belal and Baba 2007), and Niger (Makadassou et al. 2007). 
 
Overall Assessment of co-management experiences in Africa 
 
Co-management: Mainly deconcentration, some devolution (at least on 
paper) but little decentralization.  
 
One of the initial points made in this report is that in order to improve our capacity to 
analyse governance reforms in fisheries it might be useful to go beyond the original 
distinction between levels of participation proposed by McCay and Berkes and try, 
instead, to ‘disentangle’ the different types of reforms that are usually described in the 
fisheries literature under the broad term ‘co-management’. In that respect we 
proposed to make an explicit distinction between the three main generic forms of 
governance reforms: deconcentration, devolution and decentralization
15, while 
recognizing at the same time that co-management as observed on the ground is likely 
to involve some combination of these.  
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Overall it seems that, although co-management has been presented by many as the 
way to devolve power towards the end-users, the reality is that the ‘balance’ is still in 
favour of some form of centralised government control. What the review suggests, 
however, is that this ‘centralised’ system is becoming increasingly deconcentrated, -
resulting essentially in a redistribution of power toward the local (provincial/district) 
level of the central authority- probably as a result of the continuous pressure imposed 
on the governments to show some forms of governance reforms. But accountability 
remains essentially upward, allowing the top level of the hierarchy to maintain overall 
control other the decision making process.  
 
The analysis of the country reports also shows that another type of players has 
benefited from these governance reforms. In particular, with the withdrawal of the 
central government from the rural areas, and the inability of decentralized 
governments to gain access to sufficient resources and capacities, local power 
brokers, such as the traditional local authorities are given greater freedom to pursue 
their agendas. In some cases this resulted indirectly from constitutional or legislative 
changes induced by the decentralization process that was taking place conjointly with 
the co-management reforms, which gave some traditional authorities de jure roles as 
part of the decentralization process. In other cases, they simply were freed from 
oversight to continue or expand on their pre-existing de facto local roles as 
adjudicators and resource ‘managers’ and attempted to capture part of the financial 
and/or political power that was being delegated through the co-management process.  
In many cases, the poor capacities of sector ministries and decentralized governments 
led them to depend outright on the TAs to implement their regulations.  
 
Finally the other important result that the review highlights is that although 
decentralization has been widely promoted across sectors in all of these countries 
(with the notable exception of Nigeria), there is very little evidence in the country 
reports of any positive interactions between small-scale fisheries and the local 
governments established through these decentralization. At its ‘worst’, there is little 
effective integration of small-scale fisheries in the agenda of local governments; at its 
‘best’ the only relationship is based on the decentralized government’s or sector 
deconcentrated agencies’ motivation of extracting some of the rent generated by the 
sector.  
 
Revisiting the framework presented in Fig.2 with these different conclusion 
conclusions leads to a totally different representation (Fig.3) of governance reforms as 
they have effectively been taking place in fisheries in Africa. At the present time the 
bulk of the de jure power still remains with the DoF but has been partially delegated 
to lower levels of its hierarchy. This new arrangement is beneficial for the top level of 
the administration as it has managed to transfer the load of the monitoring and 
enforcement to its lower-level representatives, but keeps the responsibility of the 
decision-making and maintains overall control through strong upward accountability 
mechanisms. The other major beneficiaries of these reforms are the traditional leaders 
and other elites at the local level who have received part of this ‘decentralized’ power 
through de jure decentralization legislation or de facto coercion or collusion with the 
local DoF staff.  The real ‘losers’ are the end-users (fisherfolk) who have only gained 
limited control over the resources, and may possibly be compelled to implement 
regulations that are poorly suited to local ecological realities or contrary to their own 






Synthesizing the findings of the five country review documents into one single 
message is difficult, as the overall outcome is rather complex and ‘patchy’. Some 
would certainly like to emphasize the few success stories that have occurred. Some 
would be tempted to underscore the other, less successful, results. They all would 
probably be correct as many different criteria could be used to ‘evaluate’ co-
management reforms. Ultimately however, the core issue is about governance and the 
central question remains the same:  
 
Have co-management projects as they have been implemented so far in Africa 
improved the governance of inland fisheries? 
 
From the information collected in the five country documents reviewed in this 
research it seems that the answer to this question is: “not necessarily”. One can hardly 
dispute that the new governance system introduced by co-management was –at least 
partially- genuinely intended to improve the governance in fisheries. The previous 
‘model’ of governance in operation in the fisheries (centralized governance) was one 
where all decisions, power and responsibilities were concentrated with the DoF top 
level’s hands. The new governance system introduced by co-management through its 
objective of devolution of some of these decision-making processes and 
responsibilities to the end-users, was therefore in principle aimed at improving this 
governance.  
Fig.3. Share of power in fisheries co-management in Africa. The bulk of the new power remains 
with the DoF but has been partially transferred to the lower levels of hierarchy. Another major 
player are the traditional authorities 
from central DoF to local end-users 
(e.g. Beach Village Committee) 
Devolution 
from central to local governments 
(e.g. District Assemblies) 
from central to lower administrative levels 
(e.g. Provincial DoF offices) 
from central to traditional leaders 
(e.g. villagechief) 
GOVERNANCE REFORMS 






In practice, however, as was outlined in several of the previous sections in this report, 
the outcome was not systematically positive. As a starting limitation, in many of the 
countries reviewed, co-management policies either, were not accompanied with 
necessary legal frameworks (Zambia, Cameroon), such legal supporting mechanisms 
were effectively blocked from being used (Malawi), and extension services were 
generally poorly sensitized, educated or empowered to design locally accountable 
devolved institutions (Malawi, Zambia, Cameroon, Niger).  Therefore, in the majority 
of the cases reviewed here the newly introduced co-management programmes failed 
to  improve governance, they simply modified the status quo by altering the 
distribution of power and responsibility amongst the main fisheries stakeholders. If 
one accepts that the 5 countries included in this review provide a reasonable 
representative ‘sub-sample’ of African inland fisheries, it seems that the (mainly-
donor funded and often top-down implemented) fisheries governance reforms in a 
large number of African countries over the past 2 decades have indeed been 
successful in challenging the previous (centralized) governance system. However, 
contrary to their intent of empowering primary resource users and local governments, 
the inabilities of local governments, deconcentrated agencies, and fisherfolk to take 
up their newfound mandates has frequently resulted in the division of influence 
among local power brokers and/or the ‘instrumentalization’ of the co-management 
process.  This result provides some complexity to the claim in the literature that DoF 
and other local or national powerful stakeholders who controlled the fisheries sector 
prior to the co-management reign have been ‘dragging their feet’ in an attempt to 
preserve the old status quo. What the reviews reveal instead is a very dynamic 
institutional landscape where poorly designed and empowered co-management 
programs have enabled a variety of actors and institutions to protect their individual 
interests.  
 
It should be recognized that the ultimate beneficiaries of these governance reforms 
have only in few occasions been the ‘genuine’ end-users of the fisheries, that is the 
small-scale (migrant and local) fishers and small-scale (usually local) fish processors. 
As evidenced through this project, the process of weakening the centralized authority 
opened an ‘window of opportunity’ for other actors (mainly at the local level) to 
reshape the institutional landscape in ways that allowed them to pursue their own 
agendas or reinforce their own socio-political or economic power, often to the 
detriment of other groups, in particular the allochtonous fishers. In essence this is not 
surprising as it simply reproduces the usual social process through which one or a 
combination of groups of actors shape the institutional landscape to create a new 





A series of recommendations emerges from this analysis. 
 
Moving beyond the co-management paradigm 
One of the most fundamental (and urgent) challenges for the academic and donor 
fisheries communities will be to move beyond the co-management narrative and to 29 
 
recognize that the existing approach (crystallized in the McCay Berkes framework) 
does not provide the adequate framework to identify and tackle the major issues 
facing the fisheries sector in its current attempt to improve governance. As we saw 
“More participation” is not the panacea and cannot be achieved through the 
introduction of new policy frameworks. Such a view tends to reduce the issues to a 
too simplistic one-dimensional problem, while governance reforms in fisheries are in 
fact a complex process related to many issues.  Over the last twenty years, academics 
engaged in the design of policies for natural resources management in the developing 
work have increasingly espoused and promoted the co-management narrative, 
gradually giving it the status of a scientific paradigm.  Adopting a critical view on the 
current paradigm has always been difficult for the scientific community and will 
definitely represent a major challenge for many of us.   
 
Participation, yes but more importantly accountability 
Ensuring or enhancing the participation of the end-users and other legitimate 
stakeholders in the decision making process is important -as correctly pointed out 
many years ago by Berkes, Pomeroy, Ostrom, and others (Berkes 1989, Ostrom 1990, 
Pomeroy 1995, 2001). The involvement of these end-users is, in particular expected, 
to increase their sense of responsibility and ownership, thus facilitating the self-
enforcement of the management system and in principle the ‘sustainability’ and 
equity of the system. 
 
But participation cannot work without accountability. As the involvement of every 
single fisherfolk in the decision making process (that is, direct democracy) is not 
possible as it would increases ad infinitum the transaction costs of the political 
process, one has to rely on the system of representatives. What recent political and 
social sciences research on ‘decentralization’ has shown however, is that unless these 
representatives are strongly accountable to the rest of the stakeholders who they are 
supposed to represent, any devolution of power to these representatives is likely to 
become a source of misuse and abuse (Ribot 2001, Campbell and Shackleton 2002; 
Mearns and Bruce 2002, Dupar and Badenoch 2002) –see also paragraph on 
traditional leaders below.  Additionally, as discussed above, there are no assurances 
that “local” elites or local governments, if not held accountable, are motivated to act 
in the common interest. 
 
Focusing on implementation issues  
Co-management –and more broadly governance reforms- are high in the agenda of 
most African countries. It would therefore be misleading to present the failure of co-
management reforms as a consequence of lack of ‘official’ political will
16. Co-
management failure comes essentially from an unwillingness and inability to support 
all the processes needed to allow its implementation. There is therefore an urgent need 
for academics to turn our attention toward the ‘nitty-gritty’, ‘on-the-ground’, and 
context-specific aspects of co-management implementation. While this has been 
highlighted many times, there is no ‘one sizes fits all’ and the success (or failure) of a 
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co-management programme will essentially depend on local details: the integrity of 
the DoF local staff, the ‘ethic’ of the traditional leaders, the balance between the 
different groups of fishers (allohchtone versus autochtone), the presence of local 
NGO, and in particular the pre-reform relationship between all these different groups 
and individuals, etc. Note that very little in these failures / successes has to do with 
the resource itself. Most of the issues are institutional.  
 
Recognizing the political economy of co-management reforms 
In direct relation to the point above, it is crucial to recognize that the socio-
institutional landscapes where governance reforms in general and co-management in 
particular are implemented are not ‘empty’. These landscapes are in fact the result of 
a constantly evolving status quo which reflects the current distribution of power 
between different actors (essentially at local level) and their control over the 
resources. The introduction of co-management have been perceived –and 
transformed- by these different actors as new opportunities for them to continue to 
shape the socio-institutional landscape in such as way that allows them to pursue or 
even increase their political, social or economic advantages. In this continuous (open 
or more subtle) struggle, the poorest and most marginalized of the fishing community 
have generally been the losers as they ‘started the game’ with some disadvantages.  
 
The recognition of this political economy dimension has strong implications in the 
way co-management should be planned and implemented. In particular it means that a 
good understanding of the current ‘landscape’ and of the current interactions between 
the different groups susceptible to be directly or indirectly involved (or rejected) by 
the co-management is essential before the first step of the reform is actually initiated. 
This preliminary analysis should help in predicting the changes in the landscape that 
are likely to occur as a result of the reform, and thus provide appropriate guidance and 
recommendations on how to limit the ‘unexpected’ / negative outcomes. 
 
The unavoidable traditional leaders 
Although this situation is not an exclusivity of Africa -as many Pacific fisheries also 
seem to be in the same case- African small-scale inland fisheries are for their majority 
still under the strong influence of the local traditional leaders. While co-management 
could have been one way to reduce this influence (if one wished to do so), these 
reports reveal that its poor implementation has in some cases actually had the opposite 
effect. Because co-management project were usually poorly prepared to face this 
issue
17, these traditional leaders have usually been one of the groups which 
systematically managed to strengthen their local power during the establishment of 
the co-management arrangement. This situation means that a large part of the success 
(or failure) of these co-management reforms depends on the bon-vouloir (good will) 
of these traditional leaders. In particular, trying to pass-by these traditional leaders 
would almost systematically be followed by direct or indirect opposition.  
 
                                                 
17 We recall that this issue of traditional leader was totally absent from the initial McCay-Berkes 
framework. Interestingly it has emerged in the African literature (see, e.g. Sverdrup Jensen and Nielsen 
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The influence of these traditional leaders is not, however, necessarily always negative. 
In effect several cases demonstrate that they can be one of the key-players ensuring 
the success of the project.  When this happens, however, it is essentially the result of 
their own integrity and commitment, and frequently depends on the extent to which 
the co-management process has actively engaged with them. Regardless, until clear 
downward accountability mechanisms are embedded into the process, co-management 
projects will always depend on the personal commitment and capacities of few key 
actors, leaving the overall projects’ fate –and its impact on the whole community- 
entirely in the hand of these few actors. 
 
Reconsidering the balance between decentralization and devolution 
As evidenced in the country level reports, but also through other literature (e.g. Satria 
and Matsida 2004, Hara 2006) co-management in fisheries has been poorly integrated 
with decentralization reforms. Several reasons may be brought forward to explain this 
situation. Historically co-management has been promoted –at least in its early 
development- independently from the decentralization narrative (Berkes 1989, 
Pinkerton 1989). The fishery literature is also known to be usually remarkably 
sectoral in its analysis and links to broader rural development issues, political or 
political ecology sciences are generally poor (Béné and Neiland 2004, Allison and 
Badjeck 2004,). On the other ‘side’ of the equation, small-scale fisheries are usually 
not considered as an important or relevant sector by national and local planners and 
decision-makers. This has certainly contributed to the predatory-behaviour adopted by 
national and local government (or their agencies) whereby small-scale fisheries are 
usually heavily taxed but receive few services in return.  
 
The collection of taxes from fisheries is not the central criticism here, however, and 
governments’ predatory dependence on fisheries-related income can be harness to 
benefit all (Ross 1999). This simply requires a more ‘equitable’ relationship where 
both parties (the fishery sector and the local government) could benefit from one 
another through a more strongly integrated approach. Better supported small-scale 
fisheries could contribute more effectively to local economic development, thus 
supporting the objective of the local government through revenue generation but also 
–perhaps more appropriately- through employment (labour buffer), food security and 
women economic empowerment. This might be supported by the fact that local levels 
of decision/planning are known to be much more favorable to integrated approaches 
than higher (national) levels and, should therefore be in a much better position to 
integrated and account for the aspirations and needs of the small scale fisherfolks than 
national planners (Ribot 2002, Satria and Matsida, 2004; Hara 2006). It is therefore 
the responsibility of the fisheries stakeholders (starting with the DoFs) to effect this 
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SUMMARY 
 
This report focuses on the policy process for natural resource management, and 
specifically fisheries management, in the countries of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and 
the Zambesi River Basin (ZRB) in Africa. It represents a contribution to the BMZ-
funded project ‘Food Security and Poverty Alleviation through Improved Valuation 
and Governance of River Fisheries in Africa’ (2006-08). 
 
There are seven main sections as follows: 
 
First, the Introduction highlights the importance of effective policy and policy-
making for sustainable development. The current report represents a synthesis of the 
policy research which was undertaken in the initial phase of the project. It represents 
one component of this project (the other major components included governance 
analysis and valuation assessments). The overall objective of the work was to 
establish a better understanding of the national policy processes in the countries of the 
two hydrological basins (LCB and ZRB), with particular reference to fisheries. The 
main thrust of the policy research would be to review the current national fisheries 
policy processes and the identification of options for change and improvements. 
 
Second, the Study Approach aimed to establish a better understanding of the policy 
process in the LCB and ZRB countries by undertaking a set of national studies. Using 
both primary and secondary data, the studies attempted to understand the link between 
sector characteristics and policy, to characterise the policy process (using co-
management / decentralisation as a case-study) and to analyse this with reference to 
five main areas: governance context, policy narratives, actor relations, policy spaces 
and options, and policy coherence. To complement the empirical analysis of the 
policy process at national level, three other studies were also undertaken – a review of 
issues relating to the policy process in a range of natural resource sectors – forestry, 
wildlife, water, rangeland and fisheries, an overview of the general development 
context in each basin, and a review of the relationship between national poverty 
reduction strategies and natural resources and fisheries.   
 
Third, under Policy Analysis and Natural Resources in Africa: Conceptual and 
Empirical Perspectives the findings of the first review study (above) are presented. 
The studies from the different sectors (forestry, wildlife, water, rangeland, fisheries) 
highlighted a series of key findings. Policy formation in recent years has been the 
result of pressure (and narrative development) from a range of different actors 
(international, national, local), often working in combination. Policy approaches were 
modified over long periods of time in an on-going process, which often lacked 
transparency. Policy performance in NR sectors is often weak and the reasons have 
roots in the past (colonial legacy). Designing and implementing new policy, coherent 
with other policies and bringing about institutional change takes time and political 
commitment. Policy related to decentralisation infers new roles for government and 
non-government stakeholders, and this requires capacity-building. Information and 
feedback is essential to create the right focus and to establish a dynamic and 
responsive process. Overall, the case-studies included in this section revealed the non-
linear character of the policy process, especially the ‘messy’ character of policy 
formation and the unexpected outcomes of implementation (or partial 
implementation). They also highlight the opportunities and problems relating to   5
policy change which present themselves, and the importance of understanding and 
developing appropriate institutions relevant to policy objectives. 
 
Fourth, in this section The Lake Chad and Zambesi Basins – Development 
Context Reviewed, the general characteristics of the national and regional settings 
were reviewed. All of the riparian States are relatively youthful (about 50 years old) 
and despite possessing a significant portfolio of natural resources, national 
development performance has been weak (resulting in small undiversified economies, 
high levels of debt and a significant level of poverty). To a large extent this can be 
explained by policy inadequacies and government mis-management. However, other 
factors are also important including – weak governance, political upheavals and war, 
highly variable climatic conditions, remoteness from international markets and limited 
trade, and high HIV incidence rates.     
 
Fifth, the section Understanding the Policy Process (Decentralisation of Fisheries 
Management) presents the results of the four national studies from Cameroon, Niger, 
Nigeria and Malawi. These studies reveal much about the history, objectives and 
performance of fisheries policy in each country. Although there is no doubt that the 
policy process (and the underlying politics) is difficult to understand in many 
situations, it is possible to identify some policy ‘spaces’ and places where ‘win-win’ 
outcomes might be achieved with reference to decentralised NRM. Of the four 
countries, only Malawi has a national policy on fisheries co-management. Niger and 
Cameroon have a general policy on decentralisation, but fisheries co-management has 
operated only though donor-funded projects. Nigeria does not have a formal policy on 
decentralisation, but there are examples of donor-funded fisheries co-management 
projects. In Cameroon, Niger and Malawi, it is intended that positive changes in 
fisheries management will occur as new roles and responsibilities are established for 
regional and local government. These policies are associated with the new national 
PRSPs and the international narratives which link inclusive local government with 
pro-poor changes. Apart from Malawi, there are no special arrangements for fisheries, 
and it is assumed that the decentralisation process will have a positive impact on all 
sectors in the long-run.  
 
Overall, the decentralisation approach and its relationship to fisheries is a new one, 
and it faces certain constraints to implementation and opportunities (policy spaces) to 
address them over time. For example, in Malawi, the different sectors, including 
fisheries, are decentralising slowly and at different rates – this could be addressed by 
ensuring that District Development Plans also include NRM; in Cameroon, there are 
concerns that new arrangements for fisheries management are not taking the views of 
all stakeholders into account, especially the poor – there is an opportunity to work 
with new civil society organisations within the context of the regional planning 
process to address this issue; in Niger, there has been some uncertainty as to the role 
of existing (traditional) authorities within new decentralised government 
arrangements – CSO have been successful in negotiating new arrangements and 
partnerships and could be further supported in this role in the future; and in Nigeria, 
the fact that senior government officials (Federal Department of Fisheries) have 
acknowledged that fisheries policy-making still overtly centralised within their 
administrations – there is an opportunity to work through new national programmes 
(e.g. NEEDS programme) to change the governance arrangements to address these 
perceived limitations to policy formation and implementation.          6
 
Sixth, the penultimate section The National Poverty Reduction Strategies, Policy 
Coherence and the Projected Role of Natural Resources and Fisheries presents 
the results of a set of national reviews. The PRSPs provide a broad overview of the 
national economy in each country and together are intended to provide a basis for 
international comparison in terms of development challenges, performance and 
strategies. For the countries of the LCB and the ZRB, they focus on agriculture, 
industry and trade, and the potential for these sectors to contribute to economic 
growth and development. The PRSPs do link poverty with environmental degradation 
and economic activities in the rural sector, but they do not consider the major 
characteristics of the production systems and their links with rural livelihoods. The 
Cameroon PRSP is the only paper of the four (Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Malawi) 
to acknowledge the close link between poverty and agro-ecological regions, implying 
that poverty and vulnerability are closely associated with economic options related to 
the natural resource base. However, the strategies outlined in all four papers place 
government agencies as sole agents of change and development, largely through 
capacity-building and enforcement. In the case of fisheries, it can be argued that the 
PRSPs are simply re-emphasising the technological/production and command and 
control narratives that have been central to government policy for nearly 50 years. 
Alternative approaches to poverty reduction, that might also be included (such as 
institutional development and livelihoods enhancement) are hardly considered. 
Finally, questions remain as to how the growth strategies in the PRSPs relate to a 
greater national commitment to participation and decentralisation and the possibilities 
for pro-poor growth. There is a risk that future policy-related investments and 
programmes (and the associated benefits) will be monopolised by the rich and 
powerful members of society, and that opportunities to build upon and enhance rural 
livelihoods for a much wider proportion of society (especially the poor) will be 
overlooked and foregone. 
 
The Seventh and final section, the Discussion and Conclusions, draws together and 
re-iterates many of the major points highlighted in earlier sections. By looking at the 
four national spolicy studies, which focused on de-centralisation, in the context of the 
complementary reviews (concepts and theory, development context, PRSPs), it is 
possible to consider the main findings under five key themes as follows: 
 
(i) Policy narratives: 
A wide range of policy narratives relating to national development and natural 
resources have emerged (and persist and overlap) over the past 50 years. The initial 
emphasis focused on production increases, technological development and large scale 
investment, plus government control. More recently, there has been an increased 
interest in local (community) level management and activity, and good governance 
(accountable democracy, subsidiarity and rights). The national studies within this 
report reveal how government policies in the LCB and ZRB countries have evolved, 
using the narratives to varying degrees, and culminating in the most recent PRSPs. 
However, despite this progression in policy, there are concerns including the 
difficulties of attempting to integrate and then operationalise different narratives 
(economic growth vs. local level development), the possibility that livelihoods 
relationships with natural resources and NRM are not being fully taken into account 
(lack of knowledge, understanding) and the danger that new narratives 
(decentralisation, co-management) are perceived as a panacea for past policy failures.    7
 
(ii) Coherence 
The extent to which policy coherence is achieved has a major impact on policy 
performance overall. The national policy studies reveal many examples of the 
difficulties of evolving new policies, and trying to integrate them within existing 
policy arrangements. In Malawi, for example, decentralisation policy, local 
government reforms and national fisheries policy, have not achieved a high degree of 
coherence, largely because they appeared at different times and did not refer to 
existing legislation. All the studies show the importance of policy coherence with 
reference to objectives and implementation approaches, and the need to ensure that 
there is harmonisation between relevant institutions. The national PRSPs encapsulate 
some of the major policy coherence challenges which all the countries must face, but 




The national policy studies reveal the importance of a wide range of actors in the 
policy process – in both policy formation and implementation. There are two 
emergent and important issues for the future – the number of actors is increasing (for 
example, as decentralisation policy demands new ways of operating, and also, as new 
economic opportunities arise within expanding economies), and the roles and 
responsibilities for both new and existing actors will have to be carefully defined and 
formalised if policy implementation is to be successful. 
 
(iv) Spaces and opportunities 
The apparent success of policy development and reform in some NR situations (e.g. 
Forestry policy in Ghana) is related to the ability to make ‘policy space’ for 
implementation at local and regional levels. There are at least five important issues 
involved also – the ability of government to support a transfer of real power (to local 
level), to back this up with appropriate institutional capacity-building, to adapt policy 
declarations at national level into operational management systems at local level, to 
capitalise on incentives for participation and in making NRM work effectively (e.g. 
securing rights to long-term resource use), and for government in general to support 
the overall process of policy development and implementation over an extended 
period of time (it can be argued that ‘quick wins’ tend to be rare). There is no doubt 
that ‘policy spaces’ will also open up over time and represent real opportunities for 
positive interventions involving government, civil society actors and international 
partners (donors). Although the current PRSPs place emphasis on the role of 
government and the private sector, other actors (principally civil society 
organisations) are not considered. New policy approaches will need to be inclusive of 
all actors, even if some threaten the existing governance arrangements of certain 
countries. 
 
(v) Understanding the performance of decentralised NRM policies   
Policy assessment and evaluation is often problematic. In the case of 
‘decentralisation’, this broad term can include a wide range of scales and processes, 
which are often country specific. However, there is no doubt that policy 
implementation, which has often been weak and unpredictable, needs to be 
underpinned by a greater understanding of the factors likely to affect it. Through more 
knowledge and feedback, both policy formation and implementation can be improved   8
over time. Three important lessons for improved ‘decentralisation’ – but which can be 
generalised - include the need for stepwise and coordinated implementation strategy, 
the fundamental need to address governance weaknesses and the advantages of 
making the policy implementation process a ‘dynamic’ one which can respond to 
local opportunities and challenges (e.g. by integrating research and information 
systems into step-wise policy implementation).   
   9
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the Zambesi River Basin (ZRB) are two of the 
major hydrological drainage basins of Africa. They are comprised of significant water 
resources (lakes, rivers, wetlands and groundwater) and associated aquatic habitats. In 
turn these provide a wide range of ecosystem goods and services – fresh water, 
agricultural land, fishing opportunities, food, fuel etc - for the countries and people 
living within their boundaries. 
 
However, despite the apparent abundance of natural resources (natural capital) in 
these two regions, which have the potential to make an important contribution to 
sustainable development, the riparian countries in each case (Table 1 below), are 
classified as ‘developing countries’ or ‘least developed countries’. In other words, 
these countries tend to be characterised by a low level of economic development and 
growth, with a large proportion of the population vulnerable to poverty.  
 
Table 1. Countries of the LCB and the ZRB compared 
  Area 
(000s sq km) 
Population 
(millions) 
 GDP  per 
capita 
Poverty 
(% below PL) 
HDI (score) 
(world rank) 
Lake Chad Basin 
CAR 623  4.3    1,200  n.a.  n.a. 
Cameroon  475 16.1    2,400  53.3  0.506  (144) 
Chad 1,284  8.6    1,500  64  0.368  (171) 
Niger  1,267 11.8    1,000  63  0.311  (177) 
Nigeria  924 136.5    1,500  43  0.448  (159) 
Total 4,573  177.3    ..  ..  .. 
Mean  ..  ..    1,520  56.1      0.408 
Zambesi River Basin 
Angola 1,247  13.5    4,500  n.a  0.439  (161) 
Botswana 582  1.7    10,900  n.a.  0.570  (131) 
DRC 2,345  53.2    700  n.a.  0.391  (167) 
Malawi  119 11    600  54  0.400  (166) 
Mozambique 802  18.8    1,500  70  0.390  (168) 
Namibia 824 2 7,500 n.a.  0.626  (125)
Zimbabwe 391  13.1    2,100  69.2  0.491  (151) 
Zambia 753  10.4    1,000  25.8  0.407  (165) 
Total 7,063  123.7    ..  ..  .. 
Mean ..  ..    3,600  54.75  0.464 
           
Other Countries 
USA 9,629  282    43,800  13  0.948  (8) 
UK 243  59    31,800  17  0.940  (18) 
India 3,166  1,016    3,800  29  0.611  (126) 
Korea 100 47 24,500 15  0.912  (26)
Malaysia 330  23    12,00  15  0.805  (61) 
S. Africa  1,221  44    13,300  50  0.653 (121) 


















There can be no doubt that for most countries, the quality of the national governance 
framework and the policy process has a great influence on national development.   11
Good governance and effective policy will underpin national development, as borne 
out by the Asian Tiger economies over the past 20 years. Conversely, without 
appropriate and effective governance and policy, the potential for growth and 
development will not be realised.  
 
For sectoral development, it is also important that governance and policy 
arrangements are strong and coherent with national arrangements. In the case of the 
countries of the LCB and ZRB, which share important water and aquatic resources, 
there will also be a need for coherent governance and policy at a regional level (basin-
wide). 
 
In this context, therefore, for the countries of the LCB and the ZRB – one of the key 
questions is how to bring about improvements in governance and policy? And 
secondly, how does this relate to the future usage of natural resources for national 
development. 
 
The BMZ Project ‘Food Security and Poverty Alleviation through Improved 
Valuation and Governance of River Fisheries in Africa’ (2006-08) will address these 
and other key questions by focusing on one particularly important sector and resource 
– river fisheries. The overall purpose will be to strengthen the capacity of national and 
regional decision-making to develop and implement improved governance and policy 
mechanisms that sustain river fisheries and enhance their contribution to poverty 
alleviation and national food security. A particular theme of the project was to 
understand and assess how improved valuation information could contribute to this 
purpose. 
 
The current report represents a synthesis of the policy research which was undertaken 
in the initial phase of the project and which represents one component of this project 
(the other major components included stakeholder analysis, governance analysis and 
valuation assessments). The overall objective of the work was to establish a better 
understanding of the national policy processes in the countries of the two hydrological 
basins (LCB and ZRB), with particular reference to fisheries. 
 
The main thrust of the policy research would be to review the current national 
fisheries policy processes and the identification of options for change and 
improvements. 
 
There are six sections of this report to follow. First, a brief outline of the study 
approach used in the policy analysis component of the project to date. Second, to 
provide some background to the subsequent work, a range of conceptual and 
empirical perspectives are provided on policy analysis and natural resources in Africa. 
Third, the development context for the policy analysis provided by the countries of 
the LCB and ZRB is reviewed. Fourth, the results of a set of detailed studies of the 
national policy process in each country, with reference to fisheries, are presented. 
Fifth, the relationship between fisheries and the national poverty reduction strategies 
in each country is analysed. Sixth, the final section presents a discussion and set of 
conclusions based on the earlier sections.    12




The study approach for the initial phase (Phase 1) of the Policy Analysis component 
of the project focused on trying to establish a better understanding of the policy 
process in the countries of the LCB and the ZRB. Initially the work was focused on 
three LCB countries – Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria, and in one ZRB country – 
Malawi. The study teams in each country agreed a common methodology and using a 
combination of both primary and secondary data. The results of the national studies 
were summarised and synthesised, subsequently, and set within a wider context 
provided by a set of conceptual and empirical perspectives on policy analysis, and 
reviews of the development status of the LCB and ZRB regions. In addition, the 





Part 1: National studies 
The methodology developed and agreed by all members of the study team is given in 
Appendix 1 (below).  
 
To summarise the methodology, there were six steps: 
Step 1: Focus on the definition of ‘policy’ and ‘policy analysis’; 
Step 2: Consideration of the importance of policy analysis for the project; 
Step 3. Review of the methodology given in the original project proposal;   
Step 4. Proposed timing and milestones; 
Step 5: Policy analysis outline and report structure; 
Step 6: Assessment of the methodology proposed. 
 
There were three key dimensions to content of the policy analysis: 
-  understanding the link between sector characteristics and operation and policy; 
-  a focus on fisheries co-management (or decentralisation) as a means of 
characterising the policy process; 
-  understanding the policy process in five main areas: governance context, 
policy narratives, relations between actors, policy spaces and options, and 
policy coherence. 
 
Part 2: Wider contextual analysis 
To inform and complement the empirical analysis of the policy process at national 
level, three other sub-studies were also undertaken: 
-  a review of conceptual and empirical perspectives on policy analysis and 
natural resources in Africa (as well as important considerations for the policy 
process in general, issues which have been identified in other sectors, other 
than fisheries, were also considered including wildlife, forestry, rangeland and 
water management); 
-  a review of the wider development context of the LCB and ZRB; 
-  an analysis of the relationship between national poverty reduction strategies 
and the projected role of natural resources and fisheries. 
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The two parts of the methodology (1+2) have been brought together in the final 
section – discussion and conclusions. 
 
2.3. Implementation  
  
The phase 1 Policy Analysis was implemented during 2006-07 by the team members, 
including both the national studies (part1) and the overview analysis (part 2). 
 
 
3. POLICY ANALYSIS AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN AFRICA: 




In this section, policy and policy analysis will be considered with reference to natural 
resources in Africa. A range of both conceptual and empirical perspectives will be 
provided. The conceptual themes presented will help to understand the nature and 
operation of the policy process. The empirical examples given from a number of 
different sectors (wildlife, forestry, water and rangeland) will further help to illustrate 
the reality of the policy process and its analysis.  
 
3.2. Policy process and policy analysis – an overview 
 
Firstly, policy can be defined as  
 
‘a course of action proposed or adopted by those with responsibility for a given area 
(in government) and expressed as formal statements or positions’.  
 
However, while the above definition presents policy as a static entity, the term “policy 
process” better represents the dynamic nature of policy formation, implementation 
and performance. “Policy analysts” recognise that policy is not formed and 
implemented in a linear manner but that it is the result of numerous stakeholders 
(policy actors) and repeated arguments (policy narratives) that change over time. As 
such, policy making tends not to follow simple and formal procedure but is influenced 
by current and past narratives and influential actors. In short, policy tends to be a 
“chaos of purposes and accidents”. 
 
Analysing policy is essential because policy outcomes dictate the potential for 
sustainable or pro-poor development and natural resource management (NRM). 
Learning from past policy and policy processes may help shape more suitable policy 
in future. Keeley (2001) has developed a systematic way to analyse and represent the 
policy process by deconstructing the “narratives” and “actors” that shape the process 
and considering the policy “spaces” that represent opportunities for change. This 
approach is used in the policy analysis studies within this project (below). 
 
•  Policy narratives - The work of government in managing the affairs of the nation is 
difficult and complex but some arguments may outlive others or dictate the 
direction of policy. Policy stakeholders are impelled to develop narratives for 
several reasons –  
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“Rural development is a genuinely uncertain activity, and one of the principal ways 
practitioners, bureaucrats and policy makers articulate and make sense of this 
uncertainty is to tell stories or scenarios that simplify this ambiguity” (Roe, 1991).  
 
These narratives can become accepted and well-used explanations of the world. In 
the case of fisheries, for instance, an earlier narrative was built around the concept 
of maximum sustainable yield with government enforcement and effort control. 
More recently, and in the light of disappointing policy performance, various 
“counter-narratives” have emerged that placed less emphasis on biological 
approaches and more on other dimensions such as economic incentives and use 
rights. As Roe (2000) says:  
 
“Story telling is the pre-eminent way people stabilise decision-making in the face of 
complexity”.  
 
Finally, according to Leach and Mearns (1996) narratives, or “received wisdom”, 
may be very resistant to change because they can be associated with established 
scientific approaches and institutions or with social and cultural perspectives that 
are simply transferred to new generations of stakeholders. 
  
•  Policy actors and actor networks - Individuals and organisations interact to shape 
the policy process. These actors include government and public stakeholders 
affected by policy, those directly involved in policy formulation and those needed 
to implement policy. Actor networks may include the policy machinery of 
government but also coalitions of actors in civil society such as issue-based 
pressure groups comprising NGOs and producer organisations, for instance. 
 
•  Policy spaces – It is possible to influence the policy process strategically. The 
“policy space” for change may open up with the emergence of professional 
producer organisations able to adopt new roles and responsibilities, for instance. Or 
local government reform may develop new opportunities for policy change by 
building local management capacity and local public demand for new sector-
specific policy. 
 
•  Policy coherence - Finally, policy analysis should review how policy is supported 
or undermined by overarching political objectives. Does a sector-specific policy 
help deliver other national objectives with respect to human development, trade and 
the environment, for instance?  
 
3.3. Ten important considerations for policy analysis 
 
In this sub-section, a range of important considerations for policy analysis will be 
outlined. The topics presented will build upon the preceding section and contribute to 
an ‘aide memoire’ of the types of issues and themes that the policy analyst should be 
routinely thinking about in undertaking a policy analysis exercise.  
 
(1) The importance of effective policy 
Policy is important. Policy influences all aspects of people’s lives by attempting to 
manage the workings of the nation state – political policy, economic policy, 
environmental policy, social policy etc. The development record shows that one of   15
the main determinants of success (e.g. nations that have shown good levels of 
economic growth and development) is the ‘quality of policy-making’ (and the 
resultant quality of policies).   
 
(2) Policies interact with other policies 
For any country, there can be a long list of policies covering a wide range of 
topics and areas, reflecting the complexity of government and societal 
interactions. As a result polices interact with one another (e.g. economic policy to 
promote efficiency in a particular sector may be counter to policies to promote 
maximum employment for social reasons in the same sector). One of the functions 
of government is to try to smooth out these interactions, and to promote coherence 
between policies. A high level of policy coherence is reflective of good 
government and good governance. Policy interactions (and the need for 
coherence) can also occur at regional and international levels (e.g. within river 
basins). 
 
(3) Policy objectives 
The stated objectives define what policy wants to achieve. This is a critical 
decision and must be decided carefully for it will lead onto courses of activity and 
investment which cannot be easily changed in the short-term and which can have 
a major impact on development performance. With hindsight, policy objectives 
can sometimes be inappropriate or conflicting or overambitious (when there are 
multiple objectives) leading to weak performance. 
(4) Policy formation  
The formation (or design) of policy often varies greatly between countries and 
between sectors or domains. Effective policies can only be achieved through an 
effective policy formation process – one which is underpinned by good 
governance principles (transparency, participation and accountability) and the 
effective use (and feedback) of relevant information and analyses. In most 
countries, however, the policy formation process tends to be dominated by 
political agenda (dominating over rational and technical assessments and choices 
based on particular policy narratives). Successful policy formation needs a 
balance and blend of the two elements. 
 
(5) Policy implementation 
The implementation of policy requires careful decisions over the implementing 
organisations, policy instruments (mechanisms) and financing. Policy may be 
implemented in phases over time.  
 
(6) Policy performance assessment  
The outcome of policy implementation will need to be assessed. A key question is 
‘has the policy objective been achieved?’ This will require relevant information to 
make this evaluation.   
 
(7) Policy evaluation 
The level of performance of a specific policy over time once established 
(assessed) should be evaluated. This will enable a better understanding of the 
reasons and factors for this outcome. In the future, the policy formation process 
will be able to use this knowledge to improve policy design.  
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(8) Policy and research 
Research can make an important contribution to policy design by providing 
relevant information, helping to focus policy narratives and also contributing to 
policy implementation. In the latter case, in some situations research can be 
integrated within the implementation process, for example, within an adaptive 
learning approach (as opposed to a more conventional role, whereby researchers 
and research systems are not directly engaged). 
 
(9) Policy change 
While it is often recognised that policy needs to be changed in order to improve 
policy performance this can be very difficult and usually depends on the political 
and governance setting. In the extreme case of a country with dictatorial rule and 
weak governance, the majority of stakeholders or actors may have very little 
opportunity (or policy space) to bring this about. In other situations, policy change 
requires working within the existing political set-up, acknowledging the 
importance of political will and support, and looking for opportunities to influence 
key actor networks and narratives. In situations of weak governance, specific 
strategies for change will need to be considered by particular stakeholders, for 
example, by using ‘champions for change’, improving information flows, consider 
actor-incentive relationships and promoting constituency formation within the 
political arena. 
 
(10)  Policy and time 
The policy process – how it works, who it effects and how it changes – will vary 
in time between countries. In general, policy changes cannot be accomplished 
very quickly and there is a need to consider how incremental changes for the 
better can be brought about over long time periods (20-30 years). 
 
 




In order to better understand the policy process in each of the study countries (LCB – 
Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria and ZRB – Malawi), the empirical research (below) has 
focused on a specific policy area – fisheries co-management and decentralisation. The 
analysis involved does not set out to review the effectiveness of co-management and 
decentralisation in fisheries management per se but rather to analyse the policy 
processes associated with them. To start, a brief overview of co-management, 
centralisation and the related issues of de-concentration and devolution are presented, 
followed by an historical perspective on natural resource management (NRM) and a 






In the 1980s there was great interest in the capacity of community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) to control the use of local resources in a rational and 
equitable manner. CPR theory was combined with empirical examples of apparently   17
sustainable traditional NRM and tenure arrangements (see for example, Dahl (1988) 
or more generally, Berkes (1989)) to make a strong case for devolution of NRM 
responsibilities to communities. The concept of co-management then emerged in the 
1990s to acknowledge that the state must play an important role in supporting 
devolved NRM and must retain some key functions and roles. Existing fisheries co-
management arrangements represent a wide range of models – from site-specific 
projects with proscribed roles for fishery stakeholders to national policies of 
decentralised fisheries management under wider programmes of rural development 




Decentralisation has become an attractive political objective, especially for 
development agencies and donors, because it infers more responsive, transparent and 
accountable government. Since the 1980s, the interest in decentralisation has moved 
beyond its possible contribution to NRM to its broader potential contribution to social 
development, rights and democratisation (Ribot, 2001). 
 
It is important to make the distinction between decentralisation and devolution. 
Decentralisation involves the dispersal of certain functions and powers to the regional 
or local level along with suitable decision-making powers. Devolution is more radical 
and involves the wholesale transfer of authority and responsibility from government 
to other organisations. Governments are less likely to do this and there are fewer 
examples of devolved NRM in the literature (Borrini-Feyeraband et al, 2004). In 
reality, many decentralisation programmes actually transfer very little authority and 
these processes are more accurately described as “deconcentration”. The process of 
deconcentration involves transfers of responsibility to local branches of government 
such as technical line ministry staff at village level (see Figure 1). In Africa, most 
countries underwent a process of deconcentration in the early colonial period to 






Figure 1. Decentralisation retains overall responsibility with the state and central government 
but cedes certain powers to the regions. 
 
3.4.3.  The historical perspective of decentralisation and NRM in Africa  
 
Since the 1980s the process of decentralisation in Africa has reflected a broad 
international narrative which promotes citizen participation, democratisation and good 
governance through subsidiarity (decision-making at the lowest possible 
administrative level). The World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
have fuelled the drive to decentralisation with the widespread support of international 
donors. In turn, African governments have viewed decentralisation as a potential 
strategy to meet donor demands and cut public spending. 
 
However, the decentralisation process threatens many actors and experience to date 
reveals variable performance with respect to institutional sustainability, participation 
Deconcentration Decentralisation Devolution 
Increasing local 
autonomy   18
and empowerment. This section briefly describes the historical context of 
decentralisation efforts.  
 
Policy is a product of multiple actors and their interests but it also has a strong 
historical dimension. Demand for more appropriate policy will reflect the 
performance of existing NRM institutions and legislation often established to meet 
political objectives that may no longer appear relevant or desirable. The formal 
structures that relate to policy like constitution, law, the structure of national and 
regional government, are largely a legacy of past political objectives.  
  
This section briefly outlines broad trends in the history of NRM policy in Africa and 
how they relate to current policy trends in decentralised NRM and co-management.  
 
It is widely recognised that NRM has an important local component that operates in 
parallel or irrespective of policy. A combination of local interests such as customary 
authority, local government and other local elites, work together to influence access to 
resources and how these resources are exploited. However, the relationship between 
the state and local forms of NRM underwent a major change with the arrival of 
colonial government. The impact of these colonial structures has had a lasting effect 
and the role of local or customary NRM has been underestimated in relation to the 
role of central government and the relevance of policy in subsequent years. However, 
over the last two decades African countries have entered into a new phase where the 
decentralisation of NRM powers and responsibility are a component of both national 
development strategies and many sector-specific policies for agricultural land, 
forestry and fisheries. The ‘actor network’ that has driven this change has been broad, 
including both international agencies and donors and national political bodies and 
civil society. 
 
In the pre-colonial era, NRM in Africa probably comprised a mixture of local, private 
and common property arrangements that operated with little or no involvement from a 
central state (although it can be argued that some ‘states’ exerted significant influence 
over its ‘citizens’ at particular periods in history e.g. Songhay state and the Sokoto 
Caliphate in West Africa). The European colonialism that followed at the end of the 
18
th century purposely set out to extend the reach and power of the state and to 
appropriate land and resources. The political structures that were established in this 
period were based on European models of authority and control
18. Government 
resource management agencies were developed with no acknowledgement of existing 
informal institutions associated with NRM such as arrangements based on territory 
and ethnicity, reciprocity or other rules of use. 
 
According to Runge (1985), these governments disrupted pre-existing and traditional 
modes of management but did not introduce alternative arrangements at the local 
level. These strongly centralised colonial states lacked the human and financial 
capacity to police change and to fulfil local NRM in remote areas. However, as Lawry 
(1989) highlights: “…the state’s principle objective in centralising control was to 
assert its political authority over local interests, not to impose a new resource 
management regime.” The greatest NRM changes in this period would have resulted 
                                                 
18 According to Murombedzi (1998), the British colonies applied the concept of the “King’s Game” to 
legislation, while the French colonies regulated natural resources with reference to the French Forest 
Code.    19
from land reforms based on discriminatory forms of tenure, sometimes through forced 
relocation and the annexation of land as protected wildlife areas.  
 
However, these governments did operate efficiently at the local level for other 
purposes. Local chiefs were empowered to collect taxes for the state or to make by-
laws in a process the British termed “indirect rule” and the French “association” 
(Mamdani, 1996). The Portuguese devolved powers to traditional leaders to collect 
fees and taxes from fishing communities (Lopes et al. 1998)
19. 
 
In the post-colonial era, it took time for many of these NRM policies and approaches 
to be challenged or modified by new government. Early in this period, natural 
resources were seen as an essential source of foreign revenue to support government 
function and programmes were established to exploit these resources with logging and 
fishing contracts provided to private companies and legislation passed to further 
strengthen state control over fisheries (Hviding & Jul-Larsen, 1995). The existing 
colonial structures and policies were well suited to this task. 
 
According to Hyden (1993) the policy narrative that has affected NRM in most of 
Africa since the 1950s has passed through four key cycles whereby the emphasis 
changed from economic development to human development:  
 
The  modernisation phase (1955-65) saw governments place great emphasis on 
economic growth and industrialisation. Government para-statals were set up to 
develop the exploitation of resources and the bureaucratic machinery of government 
expanded. The development narrative was based on the perceived benefits of a 
technocratic and scientific approach to production, a desire to adopt European models 
for NRM and to improve international standing. Indigenous land tenure systems were 
seen as outmoded and virtually all sub-Saharan African countries set out to 
systematically redistribute rights to land. Bruce (1998) explains how a variety of 
strategies were adopted, ranging from the state ownership and collectivisation of 
production (Tanzania, Ethiopia and Mozambique), state ownership and household 
leases (e.g. Nigeria, Zambia and Sudan) to private ownership in isolation (e.g. 
Malawi, Kenya, Uganda and Guinea). 
 
The  dependency phase (1965-75) continued to promote natural resource use for 
development but changed the emphasis to agricultural and rural development through 
national programmes and central support. Although the rural economy was expected 
to drive development there was little awareness of rural issues, either by government 
or the international agencies that funded many of the Integrated Rural Development 
Programmes. Government focussed on the disbursement of loans and the provision of 
education and agricultural training through extension services. This phase represents a 
move away from enforcement to the “accommodation” of rural people. Wildlife 
conservation projects were promoted by funding local infrastructure and eliciting 
local support but no attempt was made to link NRM with local revenues and 
livelihoods (Murombedzi, 1998).  
 
                                                 
19 The British used a similar system in East Bengal whereby feudal Zamindar landlords were used to 
collect revenues and manage estates on behalf of the government.   20
The popular participation phase (1975-85) developed at a time when the economies 
of most African countries had gone into decline and large rural programmes had 
contributed to increasing national debt. As Murphree (1996) said, “the state’s reach 
had exceeded its grasp” and government performance was criticised domestically and 
from abroad.  
 
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) established strict Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that cut back central bureaucracy and created a 
further financial incentive for the decentralisation of many government functions. The 
participation and community-based NRM narrative that evolved as a response, was a 
convincing one and it continues to influence the approach of policy makers, donors 
and international agencies.  
 
The enabling environment phase (1985 -) 
 
Decentralisation was seen by international development agencies and donors as both a 
means to help achieve human development goals (rights to voice and democratic 
participation) and sustainable NRM through local incentives. Simultaneously, 
government was apparently keen to delegate greater responsibility to resource users. 
Prior to the 1980s, however, the decentralisation process in Africa could be more 
accurately described as “deconcentration” (Ribot, 2001). Rather than transferring 
power to downwardly accountable institutions, this deconcentration retained NRM 
powers within local departments of government agencies. 
 
From the early 1990s the international emphasis on CB-NRM was tempered by a 
growing realisation that the state must play a key role in providing a supportive 
framework for participation whilst retaining certain key NRM functions through co-
management arrangements. Local stakeholder participation in managing “their” 
resources had already been promoted (for instance, WCED, 1987). Globally, binding 
international environmental agreements were developed in parallel with international 
and national commitments to fight poverty. The livelihoods narrative (Chambers & 
Conway, 1992) that then followed influenced many donors and agencies. The 
livelihoods approach stressed the role of people’s participation as a means to 
influence and shape management objectives rather than to implement management. 
By encouraging a multi-dimensional analysis of poverty, the livelihoods narrative also 
questioned the suitability of sector-specific policy and management in isolation. A 
greater awareness of local processes and institutions associated with NRM has, in 




In summary, NRM policy in Africa has undergone several key changes with respect to 
the role of the state and the role of regional and local or “community” institutions. 
The colonial state was concerned with centralising power or, in some cases, co-opting 
local institutions to carry out certain tasks of government. Post-colonial policy later 
attempted to boost rural production but poor economic performance led to 
international pressure to decentralise. A widening array of actors began to influence 
NRM narratives and policy approaches from the early 1980s onward and a pro-poor 
                                                 
20 Bruce (1998), for instance, explains how the failure to replace existing tenure arrangement in Africa 
led to a new “adaptation reform” model that accommodated local rules or customary authority, rather 
than attempting to introduce new institutions.     21
and rights agenda drove pressure for decentralisation from abroad. In the next 
sections, a number of case-studies from different NR sectors in Africa will be 
examined to highlight the reality of the policy process and its impact.  
 
3.4.4.  The Forestry Policy Process in Ghana 
 
As elsewhere, the policy process in Ghana reflects more than just policy 
pronouncements and formal objectives. It also reflects the commitment and intensions 
of a wide range of actors, each operating in a context set by previous policies and 
present day economic pressures. 
 
The following case study draws from Kotey et al (1998) as an output of the project 
“Policy that works for forests and people”, supported by the UK Department for 
International Development and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
The political and historical setting 
 
Colonial government in Ghana developed legislation to invest “waste” lands in the 
Crown and to set provision for government to manage forestry exploitation. 
Traditional authorities and chiefs were co-opted to perform some of these regulatory 
functions through “indirect rule”. 
 
Post-colonial leaders in Ghana, as in other emerging countries in Africa, Latin 
America and Asia, were influenced by the rise of socialism and the image of the state 
as protector of the people. A drive for top-down and centralised planning ensued, 
further undermining the role of traditional authority and introducing a local 
dependence on central patronage. This period was accompanied by great faith in the 
role of science, technology and mechanisation to overcome poverty. 
 
The evolution of the forestry “sector” – international features and actors  
 
The Forestry Department, established in 1909, was mandated to develop Ghana’s 
forests for timber production. Forest management would have been based on the 
German-French forest management model mixed with recent British experiences in 
the teak forests of Burma and India, whereby the trees and soils are manipulated to 
maximise timber outputs. 
 
Post-independence, Ghanaian foresters would have perceived themselves as applied 
scientists and forestry institutions developed a “technocratic arrogance”. 
 
Prior to World War II, global demand for Ghanaian timber was insignificant but the 
emergence of a global market for cocoa provided the Forestry Department with a new 
objective and helped to extend its reach and influence. Reservation forests were 
protected in order to preserve the humid growing zone for commercial cocoa 
plantations. World War II and the European reconstruction that followed shaped 
forestry policy again so that timber production and export now became the objective. 
 
The next major political change in forestry occurred in the 1980s and 1990s when the 
“community” and “participation” narratives emerged internationally. The World Bank 
became an influential actor in forestry policy in the early 1980s. Ghana has since   22
pursued its own policies for “collaborative management” such as the Forest and 
Wildlife Policy (1994). 
 
Several “extra-sectoral” policies have impacted on forest management in Ghana. 
National trade policies to maximise cocoa revenues and exports led to disease in over-
aging cocoa stock and the loss of huge tracts in the bushfires of 1983. This led to 
migration and the attempts by farmers to diversify and produce food crops. 
 
The adoption of the structural adjustment programme in 1983 had a similar impact on 
forests. The World Bank’s Export Rehabilitation Project invested US$ 140 million in 
the timber industry with the intention to promote value-added processing. This 
increased demand for timber beyond the capacity of Ghana’s commercial forests and 
led to unsustainable practise in off-reserve areas. The international market for iron ore 
and bauxite also impact the forest sector and there have been particular concerns that 
gold surface mining has destroyed important reserves in the past. 
 
In summary, land use changes impacting forests have largely been a result of private 





There have been only two formal forestry policy pronouncements in Ghana. The 1948 
Forest Policy lasted nearly fifty years and was influenced by indirect rule and the 
establishment of forestry reserves against the will of local people. The promotion of 
cocoa as a cash crop and, later, timber were central objectives.  
 
In the 1980s, the Forest Policy was openly criticised by commentators who 
questioned its relevance to communities, its lack of integration with other sectors and 
its view of forests as commodities. Interestingly, much of this criticism came from 
within government or from “insiders that had gone outside”.  In addition to certain 
key individuals who drove the process of policy reform (see below) international 
drivers of change such as World Bank also played a part, encouraging a review 
process away from the control of the Forestry Department and within an independent 
and expert-led Forestry Commission. 
 
This Commission entered into an extended consultative phase with government 
agencies and, to some degree, traditional landowners leading to Ghana’s 1994 Forest 
and Wildlife Policy. This policy represented a fundamental shift in emphasis, from 
production without replacement of forest, to a focus on rights to local natural 
resources, participatory management and links to wildlife resources. 
 
The emergence of a new forestry policy narrative 
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s many developing countries were experimenting with 
“social forestry” or “rural forestry” that placed the emphasis on replicating village 
level institutions for sustainable practice. The greatest successes appeared to have 
occurred in countries such as Thailand, Nepal, the Philippines and some states in 
India where the policy merged with concerted efforts to introduce new village level 
institutions. This never happened in Ghana but the Forestry Department did recognise   23
the need for some form of “collaborative management” with local people because: 1) 
central government did not have the capacity to enforce forestry rules; 2) there was 
genuine concern relating to the erosion of local rights and the emergence of a new 
anti-Forestry Department culture; 3) international, national and civil society interests 
demanded participation; 4) growing research-based evidence of the contribution of 
local knowledge to NRM and; 5) donor support to follow a “leaning approach”. 
 
The consultative process that helped formulate the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy 
marked a new direction for policy development in Ghana
21.  
 
Lessons for understanding (and influencing) the policy process 
 
Although forestry policy in Ghana has changed to become more inclusive and to 
acknowledge non-timber aspects of forest management, Kotey et al (1998) state that 
there remained a need to formalise roles for the range of stakeholders and continue the 
process of feedback and adaptation. The main breakthrough has been the emergence 
of a dynamic policy process that can react to demand and can change emphasis when 
required to do so by actors. 
 
Many of the problems with forestry management had their roots in previous policy 
processes and approaches to implementation. These included: 
 
•  Passive or disenfranchised stakeholders – the state attempted to control all aspects 
of forestry management, removing the incentive (and so capacity) for landowners 
and others to direct management.  
•  The monopolisation of information – the Forestry Department developed a 
paternalistic relationship with primary stakeholders whereby the results of 
research or policy evaluation were retained between themselves and central 
government. When the Department made policy mistakes, there was no 
mechanism to query or correct them. 
•  Poorly communicated policies – the objectives of policy decisions have not often 
been clearly expressed to implementers of policy or other stakeholders. Forestry 
officers had sometimes lacked training, up to date manuals, or an understanding of 
forestry management objectives, for instance. 
 
The breakthroughs that enabled the development of collaborative forestry 
management through the Forest and Wildlife Policy included: 
. 
•  Negotiation with key stakeholders – government developed model by-laws but 
local stakeholders had the capacity to modify them (“native authorities developed 
a proprietary interest in the laws and the reserves”). The development of the 
Forest and Wildlife Policy drew from a series of national and regional stakeholder 
workshops that could debate issues in an open-ended manner and helped ensure 
the policy would be implemented. 
•  Good information flows – information regarding the status of resources, current 
management trends and the effects of these trends on forests and people is 
                                                 
21 A similar process was later adopted to produce Ghana’s National Land Policy. 
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essential. A good information base has been one of Ghana’s relative strengths. 
Several socio-economic studies in the 1990s helped to update this knowledge. 
•  Institutional structures for adaptive learning are linked to the policy process – 
central government institutions like the Ministry of Lands and Forestry and 
operational level agencies like the Forestry Department have demonstrated the 
ability to learn from past successes and failures – they have flexibility but do not 
compromise strategic objectives. The positioning of the Forestry Department 
Planning Branch allows it to demonstrate the results of pilot initiatives direct to 
central government. 
•  A mixture of complementary instruments – effective policy depends on coherence 
between incentives and regulation. For example, government provided 
enforcement personnel to landowners free of charge but it retained the right to 
enforce reservations if landowners refused to do so themselves. 
•  Conflict management – policy will generally introduce some conflict but if 
widely-accepted mechanisms for negotiation are provided major problems can be 
overcome. During the formation of the forest reservations, local chiefs chose to 
resolve disputes through the established court system. These stakeholders had 
more faith in existing conflict resolution mechanisms than in new processes 
offered by the Forestry Department and the result was broad agreement and 
compliance. 
•  The role of key actors as champions of change – the 20
th century provided 
numerous individuals who were impelled to change forestry in Ghana and to make 
the political space required for that change. Sometimes these individuals are 
“outside” the system and are unrestricted by departmental politics or bureaucratic 
issues but the main drive for recent policy change in Ghana has come from within 




The policies that impact forests are diverse and some of the most powerful actors that 
influence forest policy are situated outside the sector. Coherence is required and there 
must be attempts to balance different sector objectives. Other sectors are likely to 
complement forest policy when there are gains to be had (a “win-win” scenario). In 
the case of forests the main cross-over with other agencies and policies occurs “off-
reserve” and the Forestry Department must help establish a climate for forest-friendly 
economic activity in these areas without over-reaching or contradicting government 
elsewhere. 
 
Kotey et al (1996) believe that the process by which negotiation and consultation 
takes place between policy actors is as important as the content of these discussions. 
In other words, now that policy calls for collaborative management it is crucial that 
this process is promoted by establishing recognised roles for stakeholders and systems 
by which their opinions are collected and shared. The challenge is to install a more 
permanent inclusive process that can continually refresh policy. It will be important 
that government learns from the performance of the various management 
arrangements (incorporating civil society, land owners and district government, for 
example) that emerged in the 1990s. However: “Understanding is growing that 
participatory forestry is unlikely to flourish in a non-participatory society.” 
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Finally, this case study is representative of the diversity of interests that shape policy 
and policy performance. The forest policy process in Ghana has not been a linear one 
but it has been possible to trace the key stages and highlight key actors. The policy 
process cannot be isolated from the wider political economy, however, and issues 
relating to governance will impact policy direction and especially policy performance: 
 
“Forest policy change in Ghana has hardly ever been the direct result of 
“rational” analysis. It is almost always the result of compromises and trade-
offs among and between various and diverse interests and players. The 
outcome of these power relationships is often due to the formation of alliances 
and other factors in the political economy. Forest policy is therefore a product 
of the wider political economy.” 
 
3.4.5.  Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources – CAMPFIRE. 
 
The Campfire programme is today an important component of Zimbabwe’s policy for 
wildlife management but its development was a response to previous policy 
shortcomings and the strong CB-NRM narrative that emerged in the 1980s. Campfire 
attempts a co-management arrangement at the interface of the state, private land and 
traditional authority. The following outline draws from Martin (1986), Metcalfe 
(1994) and Arnold (1998). 
   
The political and historical setting 
 
With the advent of colonialism all communal land in Zimbabwe was transferred to a 
system of mixed state and private ownership governed by the British. Within the 
settler administration (1890-1980) wildlife was always regarded as an important 
resource for government. An initial phase of intense exploitation was replaced by a 
period when Africa’s wildlife was regarded as “exotic recreational goods”.  
 
A narrative emerged in the 1960s that linked conservation and sustainability with the 
ability of local people to enjoy revenues from wildlife. The Zimbabwe government 
acknowledged a problem with wildlife policy when the Department of National Parks 
and Wildlife Management questioned the role of state ownership. The 1975 Parks and 
Wildlife Act that resulted was intended to provide private commercial ranchers an 
incentive to protect wildlife in private or marginal lands that appeared under threat 
from over-exploitation. 
 
However, the history of top-down management has had a lasting impact. Initial 
attempts to devolve management responsibility resulted in passive participation, at 
best. 
 
The evolution of Campfire - actors as policy formers  
 
Zimbabwe, unlike many other African countries in the 1960s and 1970s, possessed 
professional research institutions with expertise in applied ecology. The changes to 
wildlife policy that culminated in the Campfire programme can be traced to a handful 
of dedicated and influential actors within the research wing of the National Parks 
Department.   26
 
These professionals highlighted that the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act emphasised the 
role of landowners in wildlife management but provided no management incentives 
for stakeholders in Communal Areas. The Campfire programme developed as direct 
attempt to introduce a social component to the economic and ecological objectives of 
the Act.  
 
Campfire’s objectives are: 
 
1)  to initiate a programme for the long term development, management and 
sustainable utilisation of resources in the Communal Areas; 
2)  to achieve management of resources by placing the custody and responsibility 
with the resident communities; 
3)  to allow communities to benefit directly from the exploitation of natural resources 
within the Communal Area and; 
4)  to establish the administrative and institutional structures necessary to make the 
programme work (Martin, 1986). 
 
When district councils and communities have successfully applied for Campfire status 
they receive training in wildlife and fire management and are supported in the process 
of forming committees.  
 
The core element is the generation of revenues through hunting concessions and 
trophy fees. The greatest successes have occurred in areas where livelihoods options 
are very limited and where membership and roles have been thoughtfully and 
patiently negotiated between communities and local government. In these cases, 
Campfire has generally increased household incomes, reduced poaching and 




Existing legislation meant that the original Campfire concept could not be fully 
implemented - decentralised wildlife management was only permissible down to the 
level of District Councils, not directly to communities – and no government agencies 
were willing to support the concept financially. 
 
Campfire was promoted by a coalition of national NGOs and international agencies 
such as WWF that could attempt the approach without national policy change. A 
series of prototype projects followed. Campfire became an established programme 
within national policy in 1989 when the responsibility for wildlife was formally 
granted to two Districts. 
 
Government acceptance of the Campfire concept was a significant achievement 
because it placed wildlife, communities and NRM at the centre of the debate about 
tenure and land reform. In addition, Campfire envisioned a role for local people in 
rural development, generally, rather than as passive custodians of “buffer zones”. 
 
The issue of policy coherence has been a key factor in implementing Campfire. The 
scope for communal wildlife is determined by policy in other sectors, all of which 
have a direct or indirect impact on wildlife. Some cross-cutting legislation conflicts   27
with wildlife conservation (legislation to promote and protect beef production from 
commercial herds, for example) and formal decentralisation policy is yet to reach the 
level required to make Campfire fully representative of local interests. In addition, the 
cross-over between the responsibilities of “modern” government structures and 
“traditional” authority is blurred and migration in and out of administrative areas 
makes it difficult to demarcate management areas and set boundaries. However, 
Campfire does attempt to actively include local wildlife users and has avoided conflict 
and management problems experienced in the wildlife sector in many other countries 
Box 1). 
 
Box 1. CBNRM Trusts for wildlife management in Botswana. Local government does not 
currently have the capacity to implement CBNRM in line with policy (Source: Blaikie, 2006). 
 
Other, non-NRM, policies also impact on Campfire. District Councils have tended to 
attempt to capture wildlife revenues before they reach community stakeholders. 
Arnold (1998) suggests that national fiscal policy and structural adjustments strategies 




Current Campfire stakeholders – actors as policy implementers  
 
Campfire has been promoted by a network of government and NGO partners called 
the Campfire Collaborative Group (CCG) that has assisted district councils and 
communities to develop and implement their management plans. The success of the 
CCG owes as much to the dedication of its members as to its structure but it has 
included the Department of National Parks and Wildlife, the University of Zimbabwe, 
the community-elected Campfire Associations at district level, the national NGO 




Up-scaling Campfire and other CBNRM in Zimbabwe requires flexibility on the part 
of both government and traditional authority. All previous externally-driven CBNRM 
in the country had failed because local people had neither the power nor motivation to 
develop new institutions. It is possible that collaboration in the future can create a 
win-win outcome for both government and communities. 
Botswana has a relatively well-established decentralisation policy relating to NRM which 
includes the Wildlife Conservation Policy (1986), the National Conservation Policy 
((1990), the Tourism Policy (1990) and a national policy for CB-NRM (1990). In 
addition, suitable structures such as democratically elected District Councils and the Land 
Boards are already in place and undertake NRM functions and decision-making. A 
number of special CBNRM Trusts for the management of wildlife have been established 
but their roles have been quite rigidly defined by the Department of Wildlife and National 
Parks. Unfortunately, the management skills required means that village level government 
is excluded and it is foreigners that successfully bid for these Trusts. The Trusts often fail 
to employ local people and the relationship between them and local communities and 
traditional huntsmen is often marked by friction (Twyman, 2001). There are no formal 
mechanisms by which wildlife-generated revenues from tourism and hunting are 
channelled to other local stakeholders. This is perhaps a process of privatisation of NRM 
responsibility rather than decentralisation.   28
 
Finally, Campfire was developed for wildlife management but there are indications 
that the principal approach (legal partnership between communities and the 
government at district level) could be applied to forestry resources or to rural 
development policy more generally. 
 
3.4.6.  Reforming and decentralising Zimbabwe’s water management policy 
 
Narratives do not only influence the design and formulation of policy, they also 
extend to impact policy performance. The following case study examines how the 
range of local water stakeholders in rural Zimbabwe have their own narratives of 
management which have affected the performance of new policies for integrated 
water resource management (IWRM). It draws from Mtisi and Nicol (2003): an 
output of the Sustainable Livelihoods in Southern Africa Programme funded by the 
UK Department for International Development. 
 
The regional and national context 
 
The sustainable and equitable management of water resources in the developing world 
has been a key international development objective since the late 1990s when the 
Global Water Partnership published the Framework for Action (FFA). The global aim 
has been to seek ways to maximise economic and social development through 
devolving responsibility to water users within IWRM (GWP 2000).  
 
The IWRM concept has been promulgated in Southern Africa by several policy 
drivers (including the German Technical Cooperation, the UK Department for 
International Development and the Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory 
Committee) and it has directly influenced water policy and planning in Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique and South Africa. In turn, these countries were receptive to new 
inclusive policy because they had recently undergone rapid political change or 
democratisation. These changes brought with them greater public demand for access 
to natural resources and demand for participation. 
 
Zimbabwe is a semi-arid country prone to droughts which can result in severe local 
and national economic effects. There have been five serious droughts in the last 30 
years but the drought of 1991-92 was particularly severe and has accelerated the pace 
of water policy reform
22.  
 
Water policy in Zimbabwe developed from the political economy of the settler 
colony. From 1920 to 1998 the legal and administrative structures associated with 
water ensured exclusive access only to commercial farming, mining and 
manufacturing interests. According to Mtisi and Nicol (2003), successive colonial 
legislation ensured that Africans were totally denied access to water for irrigation. 
This process culminated in the 1976 Water Act (1976) which required rights to all 
secondary uses of water (irrigation and commercial uses) to be granted formally by a 
                                                 
22 Kinsey et al (1998) estimate that annual household maize production dropped from about three 
tonnes in 1991 to less than half a tonne in 1992. Nationally, more than 40% of the population was 
affected, GNP fell by 12% and inflation reached 48%. 
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central administrative body, the Water Court. These rights were permanent and linked 
to land so that only landowners could apply for water rights. These rights entitled 
landowners to drill boreholes and extract water with no central controls on extraction 
rates or usage. During water shortages, priority was given to those who had acquired 
rights first – the “first in right, first in time” principle. River Boards were set up to 
provide technical support to commercial farmers and manufacturing industry. Despite 
new policy and legislation, the Water Act continues to influence current water use in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Water policy reforms 
 
During the 1990s the political debate in Zimbabwe focussed on issues of land reform 
and addressing historical injustice. The water sector was closely linked with these 
issues and the demand for change. The bad drought of 1991-92 emphasised the need 
for reform while increasing demand, and the substantial costs of national water 
programmes, required a new self-financing component of national water management. 
The Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) was set up specifically to 
rationalise water management and reduce the cost of supporting multiple institutions 
with similar objectives but with little or no horizontal integration between them. An 
attempt was made to completely overhaul the system, in effect removing preferential 
rights of use to White commercial farmers and making water accessible to all 



















Box 2. Zimbabwe’s major water management reforms of the 1990s (Source: Mtisi and Nicol, 
2003). 
 
The key actors and their narratives 
 
In 2002 Mtisi and Nicol undertook an analysis of the impacts on the new policy in 
Save Catchment, eastern Zimbabwe. Consultation with a wide range of water actors 
revealed a series of persistent narratives which appear to have ongoing consequences 
for policy performance. 
 
The Water Act (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998 & 2000) set out to remove or 
modify the previous system of water rights. 
 
•  All water was to be considered State water and rights were no longer to be granted 
in perpetuity. The concepts of private water and the “first in right, first in time 
principle” were abolished. 
•  A much wider range of stakeholders would be required to arbitrate decisions – 
communal and small-scale farmers would join commercial farming and industry 
interests in formal platforms. Catchment and Sub-Catchment Committees would 
comprise these stakeholders and manage water on the basis of catchment, 
irrespective of administrative regions. Seven Catchment Councils were to be 
established in the major hydrological zones of the country. 
•  The environment was to be perceived as a legitimate “user” of water resources and 
the polluter pays principle was to be adopted. 
•  A new parastal was established – the Zimbabwe National Water Authority 
(ZINWA) – with a remit to develop, manage and conserve water along IWRM 
lines.  
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•  Commercial farmers/irrigators – 90% of recorded water rights in the study area 
were allocated to White commercial farmers but were undergoing conversion to 
permits under the new Water Act. These stakeholders view water as the limiting 
constraint to agricultural production and have historically constructed dams on their 
land to conserve and regulate their own supply. Many of these commercial farmers 
view communal farming practices and the behaviour of new settlers to have serious 
negative impacts on the environment (soil erosion, siltation and the loss of rivers). 
There is a commonly held conservation narrative amongst the commercial farmers 
and many private companies view the use of water by newly settled farmers as 
“theft”. 
 
•  Local authorities – The Rural District Councils previously considered their main 
role to be sellers of water to residents and industry but with the new Water Act their 
perceived role has been transformed to one of facilitation and coordination. Their 
formal remit is now to provide drinking water, rehabilitate the infrastructure, 
establish local management and coordinate projects. However, along with 
commercial farmers, the local authorities have a long history of access to water and 
great influence in its management. Mtisi and Nicol found that the new institutions 
intended to deliver the Water Act, such as the Catchment Councils, were still 
strongly influenced by these groups and their long-established views (narratives) 
based on conservation and the criminalisation of new settlers (see later). 
 
•  Cultural/traditional narratives - Perspectives on water and its management also 
have a cultural dimension. A large proportion of Save District is occupied by the 
Ndau people who worship the supreme-being, Mwari, through an elaborate system 
of ancestral land spirits. Traditional leaders dictate land and water management 
practice on behalf of these spirits and access to natural resources is gained by 
adherence to these systems and beliefs. Water has huge religious significance and 
can only truly be owned by the ancestral spirits. The concept of charging for access 
to water completely contradicts this narrative.    
  
•  Small-scale farmers: This group emerged as a result of the land alienation process 
that took place during the colonial period. As land was partitioned and classified on 
behalf of the ruling class, some Africans were given the option to purchase 
marginal land. These farmers have a history strongly linked to the missionaries and 
the Christian church but they may also retain aspects of the traditional belief system 
in relation to nature and water. With the land, the small-scale farmers also inherited 
associated water rights and a similar agricultural production narrative to the 
commercial farmers. Since the new Water Act these stakeholders have 
demonstrated great willingness to participate in planning and they could represent a 
new voice in water management. Unfortunately, the purpose of the new Act has 
been poorly communicated by government and the local charges for water 
management have been resented and sometimes resisted by the small-scale farmers. 
Finally, some small-scale farmers are not converted Christians and will utilise 
traditional conflict resolution institutions or modern institutions depending on 
circumstance.  
 
•  War veterans: The war veterans are a prominent political force that gained strength 
from the land reform discussions of the 1990s. Their access to land (in 
compensation for their role in the 1970s war of liberation) is extremely symbolic   31
and politicised and as newly settled farmers the war veterans have emerged as 
another important water stakeholder. Water does not have the same political 
resonance as land for this group but along with small-scale farmers, they represent a 
new entrant to the politics of water management via the new Water Act. 
 
In summary, the stakeholders have adopted one of two basic responses to water 
management and the new water policy since the late 1990s. The commercial farmers, 
industry and local government authorities have retained their production/conservation 
narrative which views new entrants as environmentally irresponsible. The small-scale 
farmers and water veterans have expressed a desire for more information and to 
engage with new institutions – what Mtisi and Nicol call “narratives of involvement”. 
Historically, these groups were denied formal land and water right and lacked formal 
representation but crucially they did possess their own informal institutions for water 
management based on cultural/traditional narratives
23.  
 
Participation in water management 
 
The Water Act demonstrates the difficulty of instituting effective participation in a 
context where decision-making was historically confined to a narrow range of 
interests. Although participation was to be a cornerstone of the Act, there were no 
strategies to support wide representation and engagement with the management 
processes. Those actors with no previous formal role in the management process were 
still somewhat sidelined. The Catchment Councils operated an outreach programme to 
publicise the effects of the new Act (with respect to water charging) rather than its 
potential for small-scale farmers and settlers. The Councils used this programme as an 
opportunity to expand charging and an attempt to legitimise it. 
 
In addition, the Water Act has introduced another series of institutions that confuse 
and overlap other national processes of decentralisation. The newly formed Local 
Government Councils did not coincide with the Catchment Councils based on 
hydrological units. The overall effect of this new institutional complexity was to 
inadvertently reduce the prospects of new stakeholders participating in water 
management.  
 
The opportunity costs of participation often restricts the breadth of representation and 
the IWRM paradigm here was requiring people to engage with new individuals and 
institutions like the Catchment Councils often very distant from their homes. Those 
stakeholders with the ability to meet the opportunity and transport costs of 
participation (commercial farmers, industry and government stakeholders) remained 




This case study highlights the importance of understanding the role of pre-existing 
institutions and narratives based on power and access to natural resources. It 
demonstrates how a range of actors align themselves with new policy and 
management institutions according to their pre-held view (narrative) of water 
management. In the case of water-specific policy, it highlights the problems of 
                                                 
23 Mtisi and Nicol (2003) discuss these rules of use in detail.   32
introducing new resource management units based on hydrology with little regard to 
modes of linkage with existing structures and administrative units. With respect to 
fisheries, a similar strategy based solely on hydrological units is also unlikely to 
coordinate well with government bodies and social institutions linked with resource 
management. 
 
Finally, as in the case of Ghana’s forestry policy process, policy that promotes 
participation must include strategies and mechanisms that pro-actively support access 
to the decision-making process. In many respects, real participation will complicate 
the process of natural resource management and government facilitators must have 
the capacity (motivation, skill and time) to accommodate this: 
 
“Resource governance issues may be bound up closely with existing and new 
narratives on water and access to other forms of natural capital as well as 
past political and economic legacies, the influence of which is found in 
contemporary policy directions. Removing the “segmented” approaches of 
past water management models, and trying to bring broader concepts of 
management and governance to the fore, in fact instils greater decision making 
complexity on a broader (though possibly less technically adept) set of 
managers than in the past. The clear need is for far greater support to the 
institutional environment, and the knowledge-based functional strength of 
participation in these new institutions.” 
 
3.4.7. Common rangeland in Africa  
 
In the following sub-section, based largely on a review by Toulmin, Hesse and Cotula 
(2003), the impact of policy trends, including decentralisation, on rangeland 
management and utilisation in Africa is examined. 
 
Regional and national significance and context 
 
There are significant expanses of rangeland in many parts of the world including Sub-
Saharan Africa, typified by the savanna grasslands. Several studies show that 
rangeland provide a valuable resource of especial relevance to poor people’s 
livelihoods. For example, it is estimated that 70% of the world’s poor rely to some 
extent on livestock, the total number of poor livestock keeers is between 800 million 
and 1 billion (LID, 1999; Thornton et al 2000). Both livelihood and rangelands in 
general provide multiple outputs – food, fertiliser, drsught power, pasture, gathering 
of wild produce etc (many of which are difficult to quantify or value). However, in 
many parts of the world, common rangeland has been transformed through a 
succession of policies. 
 
Policy and narratives 
 
In Africa, colonial policy viewed rangelands as ‘unoccupied’. In fact, they had been 
used by both settled and migratory cattle-herders and others for centuries as 
‘commons’, with rights and management systems developed locally to control access 
and exploitation. The colonial administration expropriated the rangeland for other 
uses, primarily agriculture and commercial ranching, backed up by new concepts of 
land ownership. In Eastern and Southern Africa, controls on livestock movement and   33
marketing were often imposed to protect the interests of settler farmers, while much 
pastoral land was also lost to wildlife reserves and game parks as a result of a string 
conservationist lobby. In West Africa, given the lack of settlers, rangelands and 
pastoralists were largely ignored, unless constituting a threat to colonial authority.  
 
Post-independence governments have engaged more substantively to try and 
‘modernise’ the pastoral livestock economy through technical interventions and 
property rights reform. Much past and current debate regarding pastoral rangelands 
continues to make reference to Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968). The use 
of pastoralism as an example was arbitrary, but unfortunately policy makers have 
subsequently used used it to justify the need to privatise the commons in many 
countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, pastoral development policies were heavily 
influenced by negative perceptions of both pastoralism and customary tenure systems 
based on communal forms of management – the main thrust was to control rangeland 
degradation through the regulation of herders and the numbers of animals based on 
Western concepts of carrying capacity. Policies and initiatives developed to focus on 
capital investments and infrastructure (fencing, markets etc), stratification of 
production, intensification through sedentarisation and herd size control. 
Unfortunately few if any of these policies contributed to sustainable rangeland 
management or improved pastoral livelihoods. They were western-inspired and 
technologically-driven, seeking to control the vagaries of dryland environments rather 
than adapt to them.  
 
New narratives and decentralisation  
 
Over the past twenty years, extensive research on common property resource 
management and the dynamics of dryland ecosystems, coupled with the evident 
failure of past policies to deliver, has helped the development of alternative narratives 
and approaches. Opportunisitic management, allowing pastoralists to respond rapidly 
to changing grazing conditions and fodder availability through mobility or the 
opportunity to off-load or re-stock livestock, is now recognised as a key requirement 
for the sustainable management of rangelands in dryland areas. In recent years, many 
Sahelian states have sought to clarify access and tenure rights to rangelands within the 
broader context of decentralisation and the devolution of management rights and 




Although decentralisation offers great potential for the sustainable management of 
rangeland, there are still many problems of a conceptual and practical nature to 
overcome: 
-  the allocation of tenure rights over the commons to local groups and 
individuals has paid little attention to issues of equity and the fact that rural 
communities are often highly differentiated; 
-  by failing to take account of the political and economic complexity of local 
situations, new initiatives can threaten livelihoods, expose resources to 
overexploitation and produce social conflicts; 
-  questions remain as to how much control over common property resources 
should be transferred from the State to local communities, and what should be 
the role of the government in mediating between interests;   34
-  although many governments are committed in theory to devolve powers to 
locally elected government bodies, in practice the process is very slow, with 
foot-dragging and unwillingness by state structures to transfer powers which 
would mean effcetive disempowerment, and loss of rent-seeking opportunities.   
 
Key factors for success in rangeland management, including decentralisation 
 
There are at least ten issues that appear to be important in establishing successful 
policy approach and rangeland management arrangements, particularly using a 
decentralised approach as follows: 
 
-  include all actors in agreeing the arrangements for management; 
-  develop strategies to avoid elite capture of management organisations 
(transparency of procedures, good information flows, external champions, 
promote inclusion in decision-making); 
-  ensure legal recognition of use rights; 
-  build local capacity to manage resources and to manage conflicts between 
groups; 
-  ensure that the management institution (or group) retains control over revenue 
flows from the resource; 
-  clarify the relationship between devolved rangeland management and the 
broader decentralisation process (who is in charge?); 
-  consider the impact of privatisation on the management of rangeland, and with 
respect to the poor, herder mobility and conflict levels; 
-  consider rangeland management as part of a broader livelihoods picture; 
-  important lessons concerning success and how these enable systems to adapt 
should be shared between actors and used by government in policy 
development; 
-  use appropriate technical concepts and approaches (e.g. building on local 




The management of rangeland in Africa, if this can be done successfully, offers 
important possibilities for contributing to sustainable development in many countries. 
In common with other resource sectors (forestry, water etc), approaches tried under 
the colonial and ‘modernising’ eras of the past have now been replaced by approaches 
derived from new thinking and narratives, focusing on local level management. For 
new rangeland management initiatives pursued under new decentralised 
arrangements, there are many instutional complexities to resolve. But there have been 
some success stories, and lessons and guidelines are emerging, particularly on the role 
and interaction of the different actors involved, the incentives involved in 
participating in new management arrangements and the rules and practices needed to 
cope with highly variable resource systems and multiple users. 
 
 
3.4.8. Fisheries Co-management in Africa 
 
The links between CPR management and poverty are complex but there is now 
national and international awareness that the range of activities described as   35
“marginal” or “subsistence” perform important economic functions to millions of 
vulnerable people. In the case of small-scale fisheries, there is a strong relationship 
between poverty, vulnerability and the sub-sector and much research has centred on 
the function that fisheries provide with regards livelihoods mobility and the issue of 
access for the vulnerable (see Bene et al, 2002). Although the relationship between 
vulnerability and fishing livelihoods is complex, small-scale fishers are often amongst 
the poorest groups in society, often economically, socially and politically isolated, 
lacking access to capital (cash, land and inputs) and enduring exposure to risks and 



























Box 3. Susceptibility and vulnerability of small-scale fishing communities to HIV/AIDS in 
Uganda (Source: Bishop-Sambrook & Tanzarn, 2003). 
 
Policy pronouncements may acknowledge the role fisheries play in providing national 
sources of protein, foreign exchange and employment but the local context is often 
overlooked (see Section 6 review of selected Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers). 
However, many of the often donor-led experiments with fisheries co-management in 
Africa have implicitly sought to channel the benefits derived via rational management 
to local poor users. 
 
A range of fisheries co-management projects and policies operate throughout Africa 
but, as with other forms of decentralised NRM, their character and purpose is often 
shaped by other features like rural development policy, government institutions and 
constitutional factors
24. Most countries in Africa though have promoted some form of 
                                                 
24 In South Africa, the right to participate in the management of natural resources is enshrined in the 
Constitution of 1996 and has been supported with several policies that have emerged since democracy 
in 1994 (Hauck & Sowman, 2001). Local NR stakeholders in South Africa are obviously learning new 
relationships with government structures since the revision of apartheid-era laws. In other countries the 
linkage with government is well-established through “villagisation” in socialist states like Tanzania and 
The African HIV/AIDS pandemic was first identified in 1982 in the Kasensero 
and Lukunyu fishing communities of Rakai district in Uganda and the rates of 
infection in fishing villages remain consistently higher than in surrounding 
agricultural areas (Allison, 2003). According to Bishop-Sambrook & Tanzarn 
(2003) there are three characteristics of fishing communities that make them 
susceptible to HIV infection: 
 
Neglect – government and foreign support in Uganda has tended to focus on 
improving infrastructure and facilities in line with international processing and 
handling standards rather than the social conditions associated with production. 
 
Mobility of fishers – fishery opportunities attract transient populations of poor 
including the young and there are daily flows of men and women into and away 
from landing sites and distribution points. 
 
Lacking social cohesion – the transitory nature of many fishing communities 
means that: “the ethos is very much one of independence, with individuals 
relying on their ability to raise cash when needed and return to their villages in 
the event of a calamity (for example, AIDS-related sickness)”. This dispersal 
makes continual monitoring, assessment and health support extremely 
problematic. 
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decentralised fisheries management and have revised their Fisheries Acts and 
developed legislation that supports the transfer of power downwards (Hara & Nielsen, 
2002).There are few examples of co-management in industrial fisheries of Africa, 
however, and it appears that the contribution of small-scale fisheries to the livelihoods 
of the poor has been the key political driver for co-management on the continent. 
 
 




Co-management policy often bolted on to 
previous policy objective to limit 
exploitation of wildlife. 
 
In fisheries, the assumption remains that 
effort must be controlled to prevent “ruin” 
but there needs to be understanding of the 
socio-economic (livelihoods function) of 
fisheries. 
 
Lake Malombe (Hara et al. 
2002) 




Establishing exclusive rights of use is well 
meaning but in reality it often presents 
elites an opportunity to exclude the poor or 
“part-time” users. 
 
Gulf of Guinea (Horemans & 
Jallow, 1998) 
 





Primary stakeholders take part in 
“implementation” rather than “design”. 
 
Government sees co-management as an 
opportunity to achieve agency objectives. 
 
Communities may be unwilling to adopt 
enforcement role. 
 
Lake Malombe and Upper Shire 




Traditional authorities may be legitimised 
by government to the detriment of 
transparent & democratic processes or…. 
 
Government may work independently of 
traditional authority (informal institutions) 
and lose local legitimacy / create conflict as 
a result. 
 
Lake Kariba, Zimbabwe 
(Jackson et al 1998) 
 






Facilitating agencies are trained in natural 
sciences but often lack social sciences 
expertise. 
 
Communities may lack the skills, capacity, 
time or incentive to take on new roles. 




Table 2.  Key issues of fisheries co-management in Africa (adapted from Hara & Nielsen (2002)). 
 
Donor-supported projects have been instrumental in establishing fisheries co-
management in Africa – in some cases by establishing working resource management 
                                                                                                                                            
Mozambique or it has evolved through established programmes associated with decentralised rural 
development such as Campfire. 
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structures and institutional arrangements in projects and then handing these on to 
government, but principally through influencing the NRM policy narrative
25. 
Although most examples of fisheries co-management in Africa have only been 
established in the last ten years or so, it is possible to derive some key observations on 
performance in this time. Hara and Nielsen (2002) consider five key characters of co-
management policy and projects in Africa: 1) conservation versus economic 
subsistence; 2) property rights and exclusion; 3) levels of participation; 4) the role of 
traditional authority and; 5) the capacity of community and government (see Table 2). 
 
One of the key problems in co-management relates to the issue of participation. The 
participation narrative convinces many policy actors and is one of the key drivers of 
co-management policies and projects. However, there appears to be a tendency for co-
management in Africa, as elsewhere, to pursue sector-specific models for project 
implementation (the “blue-print” approach). Stakeholder roles may be predefined, 
representing a type of “passive participation” (Pimbert and Pretty, 1994) whereby 
local fisheries stakeholders are directed rather than consulted. 
 
Many constraints can broadly be termed “institutional”. The normal role of elites and 
traditional authority, for instance, should be acknowledged by facilitating agencies 
rather than ignored or directly challenged. Although their role remains controversial, 






Policy formation in the case studies (above) was a product of international, national 
and, in the case of forests, commercial sector pressure. Policy approaches were 
modified over a long period of time and are still undergoing change. In none of the 
cases presented was the formulation of policy an open and transparent process. In 
Ghana, for instance, it took the concerted efforts of a few individuals within 
government and research institutions to develop and maintain narratives that built 
pressure for change. 
 
The studies demonstrate well how NRM problems and constraints to policy 
performance often have roots in the past. Implementing new policy, coherent with 
other management objectives, and changing previous institutions (“ways of doing 
things”) takes time and political commitment. 
 
Policy related to decentralisation infers new roles for government and public 
stakeholders and all stakeholders will take time to develop capacity in these new 
roles. In the case of the Forestry Department in Ghana, it took field staff some time to 
switch from a paternalistic and technocratic stance towards a flexible way of working 
that looked for opportunities for “collaborative management”.  
 
                                                 
25 There are several serious constraints to operationalising co-management, especially at local level. 
These include the focus on “building” new institutions with western characteristics of “success” 
(transparency, participation etc.), the disenfranchisement of existing institutions and actors, including 
traditional authority and technical government staff (see Lewins, 2004 and Blaikie, 2006), and the 
inadvertent exclusion of the poor.    38
The Ghana case study demonstrates how information flows, evaluation and feedback 
to policy makers, can keep the policy process dynamic and responsive. In this case, a 
research and planning arm of the Forestry Department was given the responsibility to 
pilot collaborative management projects and relay progress direct to central 
government. 
 
In Zimbabwe, rangeland policy was intended to protect the interests of land owners 
and commercial farmers but there were few incentives for wildlife management in the 
communal areas. However, Campfire is a co-management policy of central 
government that actively brokers new partnerships between district and local 
government, traditional authority and local people. Although central government set 
the right conditions in 1989 (transferring formal responsibility to district level), 
Campfire requires all these actors to take on new roles. The uptake of Campfire has 
been restricted by the lengthy negotiations between these parties.  
 
Attempted changes to Zimbabwe’s water management policy demonstrate the critical 
role of a broad range of factors which can be broadly termed “institutional”. The 
obstacles to policy change here relate to the lack of fit between new management 
institutions and pre-existing formal and informal (or social) institutions. With respect 
to formal institutions, new water management bodies replicated the remits of existing 
structures or failed to link with local government or existing bodies representing other 
sectors - largely because water catchment units spanned administrative units. In the 
case of informal institutions, the setting comprised resilient narratives based on the 
past economic roles and belief systems of the various water stakeholders. The “world 
views” of the stakeholders have a huge impact on policy implementation (who 
participates fully in planning and has real power) and performance (perverse 
incentives for government officials or non-compliance by users, for example).  
 
In the case of fisheries co-management initiatives in Africa, albeit this is relatively 
youthful, the role of external actors (donors) has been significant in advocating 
greater local participation through co-management. However, it is increasingly 
apparent that increased ‘real’ participation is not so easily achieved in many situations 
where the existing political and institutional architecture is resistant to such changes. 
There is a need to develop sophisticated strategies to enable a realistic change to co-
management over time, incentivizing and accommodating the full range of 
stakeholders. Such a process needs to be carefully and adequately supported at all 
levels, and new capacities established to manage the process within national 
institutions. 
 
Together the case studies represent the non-linear character of the policy process, 
especially the “messy” character of policy formulation and the unexpected outcomes 
of implementation (or partial implementation). Historic features of NRM continue to 
influence management and so policy outcomes. These case studies are representative 
of the problems and opportunities associated with NRM in the development context 
and they highlight the need to fully understand institutional setting. Institutionalising 
participatory processes with new roles for stakeholders requires government 
facilitators to look beyond entrenched positions and to attempt to understand and 
accommodate the interests and motivations of the various stakeholders. 
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The countries of the Lake Chad (LCB) and Zambesi River (ZRB) Basins represent 
some of the least developed nations in Africa with at least 40% of the total population 
of the region living below the poverty line. Despite a considerable resource base 
featuring mineral reserves, oil and hydro-electric power, over 50% of the population 
lack access to basic health and education services with the majority of the poor living 
in remote rural areas. Mozambique and Zambia represent two of the poorest countries 
in the world with approximately 70% of the population living below the poverty line 
and an average life expectancy at birth of 41 and 36 years respectively. 
 
4.2. The Lake Chad Basin Countries 
 
The countries with territory most associated with the LCB (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, 
Nigeria and, to a lesser degree, the Central African Republic) all demonstrate poor 
performance in relation to world indicators of economic and social development (see 
Table 3). With the exception of Nigeria and to a lesser extent Cameroon, the 
economies are strongly dependent on the agriculture sector and at least 50% of the 
population are classed as rural. Chad and Niger represent 73% of the total LCB by 
area and exhibit the greatest shortfalls in global indicators of social and economic 
development.  Niger has an adult literacy rate of only 17.6% and in both countries the 
total population below the poverty line is about 64%, for instance. 
 
Multi-lateral water management structures and commitments 
 
About 20% of the total area of the LCB (the “Conventional Basin”) is under the 
mandate of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). The LCBC was created in 
1964 by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria with the overall policy objective to 
exploit and improve the management of the LCBC water resources for the welfare of 
the people (Magomna and N’Gaba Tchéré, 1999). This includes: 1) the regulation and 
control of water and other natural resources in the Basin; 2) the promotion and 
coordination of research and development projects in the Basin and; 3) the promotion 
of regional cooperation and conflict resolution (Neiland et al, 2002). 
 
The role of the LCBC with respect to regional and national fisheries policy is limited 





•  Cameroon 
 
Cameroon has enjoyed relative stability since independence in 1960. Regionally, it 
has one of the broadest primary resource bases in sub-Saharan Africa that includes oil 
and a strong agriculture sector and this has supported modest economic growth and 
                                                 
26 Source: World Bank Country Briefs (http://web.worldbank.org) and the CIA World Factbook 
(https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook ).   40
diversification. The national economy is strongly linked to international coffee, cocoa 
and oil prices, however. Cotton, rubber and timber are other important commodities 
and the processing sector is relatively well developed. Desertification, deforestation 
and overgrazing are the key environmental concerns. 
 
As with Nigeria, the country has significant urban centres like Douala and Yaoundé 
and less than 50% of the 16 million population is in rural areas.  
 
Although 53% of the population are below the poverty line, Cameroon shows some of 
the more positive social and economic development characteristics in the region with 
relatively high literacy (79%), life expectancy (48%) and apparently lowest levels of 
national inequality in the LCB (Gini index 44.6). 
 
•  Chad 
 
Chad has endured several decades of conflict since independence in 1960. The civil 
was subsided before the first democratic elections were held in 1996 but the eastern 
border with Sudan remains unstable and lawless with the humanitarian crisis in Darfur 
resulting in mass movement of refugees across the border. 
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French civil law, 
revised 1996 
 
Ratified by referendum 






Adopted 1999, based on 
French law 
 
Adopted 1999, English 
common law & Shariah 
law in 12 states 
Demography 
Population  16.1  3.9  8.6  11.8  136.5 
% rural   49  51  75  78  53 
% Agric. emplymnt.*  70  -  80  90  70 
Poverty & 
Vulnerability 
% below  poverty line  53.3 -  64  63  43 
% Child labour   22  27 36 43 23 
Education 
% spending eductn.  17.3  -  -  -  - 
Av. school yrs (m / f)  10 / 8  -  -  3 / 2  - 
Adult literacy %*  79  51  47.5  17.6  68 
Health 
Life expectancy  48  42 48 46 45 
Access improved water 
% 
63  75 34 46 60 
Undernourished %   25  43  34  34  9 
HIV prevalence % 
  3.9 13.5 4.8  1.2  5.4 
Table 3. The Chad Basin countries – political, social, economic and environmental development indicators  


























   Cameroon  Central African 
Republic  Chad Niger Nigeria 
Economy 
 
(see text for 
economy overview) 
Total GDP  12,491  1,198  2,608  2,731  58,390 
% GDP agriculture  44  61  46  40  26 
% GDP industry  17  25  13  17  49 
Inequality (Gini 
index) 
44.6  61.3  -  50.5  50.6 
Total external debt  9,189  1,328  1,499  2,116  34,963 
Aid dependency  884  50  247  453  318 
Environment   
% arable or 
permanent cropland 




(billion cu. m) 
273 141 15  4  221 
 
Environmental 
strategies / action 
plans 
- - 1990  - 1990 
 
Biodiversity 
strategies / action 
plans 
1989  - - 1991  1992 
Table 3. continued    43
Chad is heavily reliant on the agriculture sector with about 80% of the workforce 
engaged in livestock and subsistence farming activities. However, the agriculture 
sector suffers from its poor communications, its landlocked setting, limited surface 
water and recurrent drought. Despite domestic oil revenues since 2003, the country 
remains strongly dependent on foreign investment for public and private sector 
infrastructure projects. Cotton, beef and gum arabic are the key non-oil exports. 
Agriculture is extensive, with only 2.9% land areas dedicated to permanent arable or 
cropland. Industry contributes just 13% of national GDP. 
 
Chad performs very poorly in relation to many social and economic development 
indicators. Of the LCB countries, Chad has the highest proportion of people below the 
poverty line (64%) and 34% of the country are classified undernourished and with no 
access to potable or improved water supplies. As with Niger, approximately 34% of 
the population is classified as undernourished. 
 
•  Niger 
 
Despite military coups in 1996 and 1999, Niger has had a relatively stable political 
history since independence in 1960. Now a multi-party democracy, it unfortunately 
remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The country ranks last in the United 
Nations Development Fund index of human development. Infrastructure is poor and 
access to basic government services is severely limited (a literacy rate of 17.6%). 
Eighty percent of the country lives within the Sahel zone and the agrarian economy, 
comprising livestock and subsistence agriculture, is severely hampered by drought 
cycles.  
 
Extensive livestock and agriculture supports as much as 90% of the national 
population and 78% are classed as rural. Only 17% national GDP is derived from the 
industry sector and nearly half the national budget originates from foreign donors 
(approximately $453 million). It is hoped that recent debt relief may free up revenue 
to develop oil, coal and gold reserves. 
 
•  Nigeria 
 
Nigeria gained independence in 1960 but experienced an extended period of political 
instability until 1999 when a new democratic constitution made way for civilian 
government. Nigeria has now been through its longest period of civilian rule and takes 
a lead role in international bodies such as NEPAD and ECOWAS. 
 
Nigeria is the most populous and densely populated country in Africa with about 136 
million people in less than a million sq km. The country is also the most industrialised 
in the region but although oil resources contribute a major part of domestic GDP, 
inequity is a major challenge to social development in Nigeria - GDP per capita is 
$1,400 but about 45% of the population lives below the poverty line. 37% of the 
population live in extreme poverty.  
 
The largely subsistence agriculture sector has failed to keep up with population 
growth and Nigeria is no longer a net exporter of food. Desertification is major 
environment concern in the north of the country where there are serious water 
management issues with demand from urban centres and hydroelectric power   44
impacting agriculture and fisheries systems in the Lake Chad Basin. The Niger delta 
area has suffered serious damage from oils spills and other pollution associated with 
the industry. 
 
4.3. The Zambesi River Basin Countries 
 
The countries of the ZRB are principally Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe although Namibia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and 
Botswana also have territory inside the Basin. About 32 million people live within the 
Basin, employed mainly in agriculture, fisheries or industry associated with minerals 
and the region is characterised by low economic growth.  As with the LCB, the ZRB 
countries rank poorly with respect to indicators of social and economic development 
(Table 4). 
 
Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola have undergone significant 
political upheaval since 2000 and although the region’s 3.4% aggregate growth in 
GDP is comparable with Africa as a whole, political uncertainty has reduced inward 
investment and the growth rate is below the UN target of 6% required for sustainable 
development in Africa (Danida, 2005). 
 
Multi-lateral water management structures and commitments 
 
The eight riparian countries in the ZRB are members of the SADC which established 
the protocol for Shared Watercourse Systems in 1995. The protocol, which became 
operational in 1998, is intended to provide a framework for the establishment of river 
basin institutions in Southern Africa and a forum for dispute settlement (Bourgeois, 
2003). In 1987, SADC adopted an action plan for the Zambezi River Basin 
(ZACPLAN), for rational environmental planning and management of the water and 
related resources and consisting of 19 projects including the formation of a 
commission for the Zambezi River Basin (ZAMCOM).  
 
From a regional planning perspective, the Zambesi Action Plan Project 6 (ZACPRO 
6) of 1991 is the most important of the ZACPLAN projects. The first phase of the 
project (1995-2000) established a database for water resources information and the 
second phase (2001-2008) is intended to establish an institutional framework for 
managing the shared water resources of the ZRB and the formulation of an integrated 
water resources management strategy for the basin.  
 
The Zambesi River Authority (ZRA) was founded by the governments of Zambia and 
Zimbabwe in 1987. The core functions of the ZRA are: 1) to operate and maintain the 
Kariba Dam Complex; 2) make recommendations on the suitability of new dams on 
the Zambezi River; 3) construct and operate other dams of the Zambezi River; 4) 
monitor hydrological processes of the River and; 5) provide recommendations to 




•  Malawi 
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The independent nation of Malawi was founded in 1964 and after three decades of 
one-party rule the country became a democratic republic when multi-party elections 
were held in 1994. 
 
Malawi has a sub-tropical climate and about 20% of the country is comprised of 
arable land dedicated to commodities for domestic and international markets include 
tobacco, tea, and sugar cane. As much as 90% of the labour force is associated with 
agriculture (the highest proportion in the ZRB) and the sector contributed 36% of 
GDP and 80% of export revenues in 2005. Malawi’s land is amongst the most fertile 
in the region but ownership of land is concentrated in the hands of relatively few. 
  
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world and qualified for relief under the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Programme in 2000. GDP per capita is 
extremely low ($600) with as much as 54% of the population living below the poverty 
line. Malawi depends on significant economic support from the IMF, the World Bank 
and international donors. Development assistance, excluding debt relief, currently 
stands at approximately $498 million per year and although recent fiscal policy has 
been commended, the serious droughts of 2005 and 2006 have heightened pressure 
for additional government spending. 
 
Major national issues include high levels of government corruption, the spread of 
HIV/AIDS (which as an infection rate of about 14%) and the threat to agricultural 
from population pressure. Water and land use issues are interlinked with 
deforestation, irrigation, agricultural run-off and industrial pollution damaging the 
aquatic environment and impacting fisheries livelihoods. 
 
•  Mozambique 
 
Mozambique has endured prolonged instability since independence in 1975 but in 
1990 a multi-party constitution partly abandoned Marxism and helped set the ground 
for an end to the civil war (1977-1992). Fiscal reforms and donor assistance have 
since helped control inflation and increase growth but Mozambique remains one of 
the poorest countries in the world with at least 69% of the population living below the 
poverty line. Mozambique qualifies as a HIPC but its broad resource base suggests 
potential for economic growth based on transport, mining and energy.   46
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law since 1990 
 
Based on English 







Population  13.5  1.7  53.2  11  18.8  2  10.4  13.1 
% rural   64  50  -  84  64  68  60  63 
% Agric.emplymnt.*  85  -  -  90  81  47  85  66 
Poverty & 
Vulnerability 
% below  poverty line  -  -  - 54  69.4  -  69.2  25.8 
% Child labour   26  13  28  29  32  15  15  26 
Education 
% spending eductn.  -  25.6  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Av. school yrs (m / f)  -  11 / 11  -  -  -  12 / 12  7 / 7  10 / 9 
Adult literacy %*  66.8  79.8  65.5  62.7  47.8  84  86.8  90.7 
Health 
Life  expectancy  47  38 45 38  41  40  36 39 
Access improved 
water %  50  95 46 67  42  80  55 83 
Undernourished  %  40  32 71 33  47  22  49 44 
HIV prevalence %  3.9  37.3  4.2  14.2  12.2  21.3  15.6  24.6 
Table 4. The Zambesi Basin countries – political, social, economic and environmental development indicators  




   Angola Botswana  DRC  Malawi Mozambique  Namibia  Zambia  Zimbabwe 
Economy 
 
(see text for 
economy overview) 
Total GDP  13,189  7,530  5,671  1,714  4,321  4,271  4,335  17,750 
% GDP agriculture  9  2  58  38  26  11  23  17 
% GDP industry  65  45  19  15  31  26  27  24 
Inequality(Gini 
index) 
-  63  -  50.3  39.6  70.7  52.6  56.8 
Total external debt ($ 
million) 
9,698  514  11,170  3,134  4,930  -  6,425  4,445 
Aid dependency  
($ million)  
499  30  5,381  498  1,033  146  560  186 
Environment 
 
% arable or 
permanent cropland 




(billion cu. m) 
184 3  900 16  99  6  80  14 
 
Environmental 
strategies / action 
plans 
- 1990  - 1994  1994  1992  1994  1987 
 
Biodiversity 
strategies / action 
plans 
- 1991  1990  - -  - -  - 
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Agriculture provides employment for 81% of the workforce but foreign exchange is 
increasing with recent new investments in the aluminium, titanium and garment 
industries. Industry actually provides a greater proportion of national GDP (31%) than 
it does in the other principal ZRB countries. Social development indicators reveal a 
very high incidence of poverty and limited access to basic health and education 
services – 47% of the population is considered undernourished, only 42% have access 
to improved water, life expectancy is only 41years and Mozambique has the lowest 
level of adult literacy in the region at less than 50%. Poverty in the rural areas and the 
north, where women and children especially suffer from limited access to basic 
services, is particularly pronounced (Danida, 2005). 
 
•  Zambia 
 
Since independence in 1964, Zambia’s political climate has been rather more stable 
than other nations in the region. A series of elections followed the removal of one 
party rule in 1991 but the country has suffered from extended periods of drought in 
the 1980s and the 1990s and depressed global markets. Zambia is extremely reliant on 
world copper process and recent collapses have damaged the economy and had 
repercussions for the poor. Over 69% of the population live below the poverty line 
and Zambia also qualifies for debt relief under the HIPC initiative.  
 
The mining industry has caused air and soil pollution and reduced water quality. Only 
55% of the population have access to safe potable water. 
 
Although industry (largely associated with copper, cobalt zinc and lead) contributes 
more to national GDP, about 85% of the population are employed in the agriculture 
sector. Social development indicators reveal a high incidence of poverty and of the 
main ZRB countries Zambia has the highest proportion of its population classified 
“undernourished” (49%) and the lowest life expectancy at 36 years. 
 
•  Zimbabwe 
 
Free elections in 1979 led to full independence a year later but the multi-party system 
has been controlled by Robert Mugabe since 1987. Zimbabwe is classified as a low-
income, rather than a least developed country (LDC), but it is currently undergoing a 
political crisis which is having severe economic impacts on its people and threatens to 
reduce the country to LDC status. Zimbabwe’s commercial agriculture sector is well 
developed and provided a major proportion of export revenues but the chaotic and 
violent land reform programme started in 2000 has damaged the sector and 
undermined its function in rural employment (400,000 were directly employed in the 
sub-sector). According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
inflation in 2007 has been excess of 3500% and the UNDP estimate that the 
proportion of the population now living below the poverty line may be as high as 70% 
(Danida, 2005). 
 
Regionally, Zimbabwe’s performance in relation to many social and economic 
development indicators is relatively good but there are indications that the pace of 
recent negative change will have long term impacts on the prevalence of poverty in 
the country. Of particular concern is the high incidence of HIV (24%) which will have 
long lasting social and economic consequences for Zimbabwe.    49
4.4. Summary 
 
All the countries of the two basins – LCB and ZRB – are relatively youthful, having 
gained independence from colonial rule around 1960. Despite possessing a significant 
portfolio of natural resources, in general, national economic and social development 
has shown a low level of performance due to policy weaknesses and mis-
management. The outcome has been relatively small and undeveloped economies, 
high levels of external debt and significant levels of poverty.  
 
Many of the LCB and ZRB countries have also experienced political upheaval, with 
numerous changes of government and some serious wars. The level of political 
development is also low in most countries with a tendency towards political 
hegemony and weak governance conditions, which limits democratic government.   
 
Both regions are also susceptible to highly variable climatic conditions which impact 
agriculture and fisheries production. In the absence of well-developed and diversified 
economies, many rural people rely on livelihood diversification (often based on a 
combination of farming and use of common pool resources [trees, grazing, fisheries], 
where access allows) to reduce poverty vulnerability and risk. Both water and 
fisheries resources are important in both the LCB and the ZRB in this respect.  
 
Rural development constraints in both regions relate to remoteness from markets and 
uncertainty in relation to production. In addition, the prevalence of HIV in the ZRB is 
particularly serious and this will have long-term impacts on social and economic 
development in the region by limiting the productive workforce and increasing 
inequality. 
 
More generally, the SADC countries as a whole (including middle-income Botswana 
and South Africa) have experienced a decline in per capita food production over the 
last two decades with the greatest hardship endured by the 70% of the region’s 
population people living in rural areas. Although intraregional trade in the SADC 
accounts for only 1% of total exports, the stimulation of intraregional and 
international trade is seen a potential mechanism to support small-scale producers in 
the region (www.fao.org/spfs//pdf/fact_sadc.pdf - accessed 15/5/07). 
 
 




The following section draws on the key observations provided by the country reports 
and offers a synthesis of the main themes. The full reports are presented in 




•  Policy and administrative setting  
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Although there are no policies for decentralised fisheries management in Cameroon, 
government has embarked on a process of decentralisation as part of broader, national 
and rural development programmes. 
 
After independence in 1960, Cameroon adopted a planning and development 
approach based on five-year plans. The first two of these (1960-1971) focused on the 
promotion of exports. The industrial fishing sub-sector was modernised and artisanal 
fisheries overlooked. The third to fifth five-year plans (1971-1986) extended this 
modernisation process in the sea fishery, developed administrative capacity and 
promoted aquaculture and marketing.  
 
Although Cameroon’s economy had benefited from oil production from the mid-
1970s, the country was hit by massive recession from 1985-1989 when the value of 
exports suddenly fell. The government developed SAPs with the IFM and World 
Bank to rationalise public finances and used the opportunity to promote a broader 
process of reform which included market liberalisation and price deregulation. 
Cameroon’s Fisheries Mater Plan (1992) was developed at this time and reflected the 
national emphasis on production, export and capacity–building in order to achieve 
self-sufficiency.  
 
Cameroon experienced an economic recovery in the early 1990s but it was recognised 
that national growth would not sufficiently support rural development and poverty 
alleviation. Cameroon joined the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 
1999 and went on to develop a PRSP emphasising an integrated approach to 
supporting livelihoods. 
 
The 1996 Constitution set the foundation for both the central administration and local 
government institutions to drive a new process of decentralisation.  
 
Cameroon has possessed legal instruments to regulate forest, fauna and fisheries but a 
mixture of top-down implementation and low levels of participation has limited their 
performance and relevance. In 2005, a consultation process between government 
agencies, the private sector and fishers helped to modify these texts and bring them 
into line with the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF). 
 
The policy case study 
 
A participatory approach has been encouraged within all sectors since 1990 and the 
1992 Fisheries Master Plan was developed with input from the full range of 
stakeholders. However, it was not until 2000 that the fisheries administration adopted 
a proactive position towards participation. The Sustainable Fisheries Livelihoods 
Programme (SFLP) has supported three co-management projects in Cameroon since 
2002. 
 
Co-management projects were established at the dam reservoirs of Mape and Maga 
where overfishing and serious ethnic conflict between fishers had led the fisheries 
department to present the case to SFLP. The projects started with a broad consultation 
phase, including direct fisheries stakeholders, sector agencies, local government, 
traditional authority and the police, before training and supporting management 
committees and facilitating stakeholder meetings. In both cases the projects have   51
relieved social tensions and reduced conflict, increased collaboration with local 
government and increased responsible practice. Reservoir management agreements 
have been established and signed by all stakeholders. 
 
A third co-management project – “Project for the Support of the Association of 
Northern Female Fishsellers” - was established in 2003 at the two Garoura fish 
markets where sanitation and hygiene had become a serious issue. The project was an 
opportunity to develop capacity at the markets by improving freezing and smoking 
facilities. The early phase included a stakeholder analysis, committee formation and 
the development of a management agreement with the main local stakeholders. The 
project has succeeded in delivering better facilities and improving health and working 
conditions in the markets. 
 
•  Narratives 
 
A key factor that seems to have encouraged policy associated with decentralisation in 
Cameroon is the international and regional (NEPAD, for example) demand for “good 
governance”. Internationally, a narrative has evolved that argues policy and 
management failures relate to the quality and accountability of decision-making 
processes. Decentralised democracy, it argues, is more likely to identify and 
implement pro-poor and sustainable policy. The President of Cameroon implemented 
the National Governance Programme (PNG) in 1995, eventually leading to a UNDP-
supported strategy (2001).   
 
As elsewhere, sectoral policy has been influenced by other global and donor 
objectives and concerns. The PRSP process is shaped by an international consensus 
that national government must provide conditions for pro-poor sustainable growth. In 
the case of Cameroon, the PRSP emphasised rural sector strategies and the need to 
maintain rural livelihoods.  
 
Other international narratives have influenced the structure of Cameroon’s 
government. The formation of ministerial departments responsible for environmental 
issues and an advisory national commission for environment and sustainable 
development, for example, was influenced by the Rio Summit of June 1992 and the 
“sustainable development” narrative that resulted. 
 
Many development partners made participation a prerequisite for project funding. The 
participation narrative has influenced Cameroon’s fisheries sector since the 1990s. 
 
Specifically with respect to fisheries, policy has reflected the “production” (1960-
1976), “regulation” and “income generation” scenarios identified by Neiland et al 
(2002). The “ecology or environment” scenario is becoming stronger with greater 
awareness of the seriousness of water management issues in the LCB and its impact 
on human and economic development. 
 
•  Actor networks 
 
Policies related to decentralised fisheries management have been driven by an 
international narrative promoted by international donors and development agencies. 
As in other countries in the region, the SAP and PRSP process was driven externally   52
but went on to influence national policy related to decentralisation and the fisheries 
sector. 
 
The case studies presented here also show that civil society can demand change from 
below - the concerns of fishers and women traders were articulated to donors and 
government via local government institutions.  
 
In future a new set of actors will be important in implementing decentralised fisheries 
management. These actors include civil society organisations such as emerging 
producers’ organisations and GIC and other actors within the new decentralised local 
authority (CTD). 
 
•  Coherence 
 
Policy coherence is greater now in Cameroon since the PRSP of 2000. Prior to 2000 
there were particularly marked inconsistencies between the fisheries, livestock and 
agriculture sectors associated with development projects linked with dams, for 
instance (each sector contradicted the objectives of the others). 
 
The PRSP was formed through a process of consultation with key stakeholders and 
this has set a precedent for each sector to repeat similar processes and to establish 
policies and approaches that can meet rural development objectives, generally. The 
strategies of each sector have been compiled by the ministries in charge of rural 
development to formulate the Document for the Strategy for Rural Sector 
Development (DSDSR). 
 
The decentralisation process supported by the 1996 Constitution requires supportive 
legislation and institutional change.  Three new laws passed in 2004 (concerning 
decentralisation, the rules applicable to districts and the rules applicable to regions) 
represent an important advance in this respect. 
 
•  Policy spaces and opportunities  
 
Significant advances were made by Cameroon in the area of governance during the 
first four years of the PNG. Greater support for the rule of Law and public 
administrations was accompanied by increased transparency in public institutions and 
three new laws to promote decentralisation. The new PNG programme (2006-2010) is 
more realistic and should help meet international community demand for public sector 
reforms, support to business and citizen participation. 
 
During the colonial period and up to 1996, government in Cameroon had followed a 
process of deconcentration whereby functions of the state were passed to local 
departments. The new constitution of 1996 offers the prospect of future 
decentralisation through the recognition a new administrative level – the CTD. 
 
As elsewhere, however, there are discrepancies between government policy 
pronouncements and policy outcomes. There remains a need to take a cross-sectoral 
perspective and to understand the role of policy, governance and society. The 
formulation of a regional strategy to reduce poverty via the PRSP, the rural sector and   53
sectoral strategies of most of the LCB countries will provide this opportunity (Neiland 
et al 2002). 
 
Government, to date, has tended to examine the role of stakeholder groups in relation 
to the market rather than their potential role in participatory planning and policy 
implementation. The three co-management case studies also suffer from this problem 
with the most powerful business interests having the greatest influence in decision-
making. 
 
The primary and secondary actors organised as the Common Initiative Group (GIC) 
represents a major opportunity for more inclusive policy and planning. GIC and civil 
society organisations are increasingly involved in fora concerned with the formulation 
of fisheries development policies organised at local, regional and national levels (but 
less so at a regional level). These actors are also active in the implementation of 
measures and associations and federations like this are trying to set up a network in 
order to influence government. These groups are supported by government, the donor 
agencies and NGOs. A national producer organisation network for agriculture, 
husbandry and fisheries held its first meeting in Yaoundé in June 2006, for instance. 
 
With respect to the LCB, the LCBC could become a more significant actor in the 
policy process. Fisheries development process in the LCB must involve the range of 
actors but in order for LCBC to contribute further it will be necessary to reinforce its 
expertise in fisheries and to create, within it, a structure or a body which would work 
with member countries on a programme with the following objectives: to harmonise 
fisheries policies in the LCB, monitor and collect information on the fisheries policy 
performance of each country, improve fisheries policy performance and information 
sharing. This body would need to develop a framework with which to engage with 
actors at local and regional levels and could be supported by international 




•  Policy and administrative setting  
 
Appropriate policies and strategies to provide a solid basis for the development of the 
fisheries sub-sector do not exist in Niger. However, all economic and social policies 
in the rural sector are shaped by the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) adopted in 
2002. The development of the fisheries sector is defined in the Rural Development 
Strategy (SRD) adopted by the government in 2003 and created in response to the 
PRS. This document was the result of a participatory and iterative process lasting 
around two years involving a large range of actors including administrative services at 
national and local levels, professional organisations and NGOs. The general objective 
assigned to SRD is to: “reduce the level of rural poverty from 66% to 52% by 2015” 
by creating the conditions for sustainable economic and social development which 
would guarantee food security for the people and sustainable management of natural 
resources. This general objective is a direct consequence of the global objective 
pursued by the PRS - to reduce poverty below 50% for the whole Niger population. 
 
The policy case study 
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The SDR does not focus on agriculture and fisheries production but recognises the 
wider socio-economic role of NR and non-agricultural activities to rural populations. 
The first strategic axis of SDR is: “to promote the access of rural people to economic 
opportunities in order to create the conditions for sustainable economic growth in the 
rural area". The aims is economic development though secure production conditions 
and livelihoods down to household level. The second strategic axis of the SDR is to: 
“prevent risks, improve food security and manage natural resources in a sustainable 
way in order to guarantee greater security for people’s livelihoods”. The third 
strategic axis of SDR, which overlaps the first two, is to: “strengthen the capacities of 
public institutions and rural organisations in order to improve the management of the 
rural sector”.  
 
The SDR aims to meet the objectives of the National Policy for Local and Community 
Development (PNDLC): to strengthen local government and make district and 
community levels the main centres of actions; to promote development which will 
meet the expectations of stakeholders; to reinforce local governance resulting from 
decentralization and State reform and; to reinforce the social sustainability of these 
achievements. 
 
Although there is little direct reference to fisheries, the implication is that fisheries 
development would centre on the transfer of skills and management capacity to local 
people and through support to processing and marketing. Fisheries are regulated by 
several laws and decrees that stipulate ownership and the rights of use to the state. A 
licensing system grants these rights to fishery operators for one year.  
 
Since 2002, new government structures have been created at district and local level. 
The Law n° 2002-12 establishes the fundamental principles underlying the 
autonomous running of the regions, the departments and the districts, in addition to 
their competencies and resources, with skills transferred from the State to the region, 
the department and the district.  Local authorities should benefit from the transfer of 
skills in the fisheries sector and the district will be able to develop, implement and 
monitor community action plans for fisheries in accordance with guidelines defined 
by the departmental council.  
 
In summary, the State is the supervising authority for fisheries resources and defines 
management though policy and law but decentralisation means that many roles have 
now been passed to local authorities and departments. Since the municipal elections 
of July 2004, the districts have also taken on fisheries responsibilities regarding 
regulation and revenue collection.    
 
•  Narratives 
 
The SRD reflects the global narrative that promotes decentralisation for better 
government and sustainable and democratic NRM. Rather than promoting production, 
the policy stresses building capacity within existing government and traditional 
institutions for democratic decision-making. This reflects national and international 
demand for integrated rural development and the assertion that natural resources 
provide a crucial function for the poor.  
 
•  Actor networks   55
 
With respect to fisheries management and the implementation of decentralisation 
policy, the key actors are the State authorities, traditional authorities and the 
stakeholders that work within projects and programmes associated with local 
governance such as the Support Projects for Local Development (PADL/N’guigmi 
and PADL/Diffa) and the Community Action Programme (PAC/Diffa). 
 
Other important stakeholders for implementation include the technical departments 
concerning Environment, Customs and Excise, Justice and administrative managers, 
prefects and members of the Government Cabinet. They are the enforcement agencies 
for policies and legislation, with an advisory role concerning the management of 
fisheries resources. In addition to these formal agencies are traditional leaders and the 
territorial administrations based on traditional authority and boundaries. This 
integration means that traditional leaders have become actors in the management of 
fisheries resources particularly with respect to tenure and access rights and the 
management of conflicts.  
 
This specific support has involved institutional and technical areas and has led to the 
formulation and the implementation of suitable local statutory frameworks (systems 
of participatory planning and prevention/management/resolution of conflicts 
associated with access).  
 
•  Coherence 
 
The main issue of coherence here relates to the mismatch between traditional 
authority and new local government agencies and primary fisheries stakeholders. The 
decentralisation process in Niger is not without problems and traditional authorities 




To date, local government structures still lack the necessary power and resources to 
play an effective role because the transfer of management capacity has not yet been 
accompanied by a concomitant transfer of financial and human resources. Local 
government councils are unable to define equitable development plans and to 
formalise the rights of all users of natural resources. They are also unable to negotiate 
with State representatives for new systems with the consensus of the full range all 
stakeholders. In this regard, the PADL and PAC programmes stress the need to 
develop the roles and functions of local institutions over time. This would involve 
consolidating existing institutions and those emerging through policy (new district 
committees for rural development, natural resource management and planning, for 
instance).  
 
•  Policy spaces and opportunities  
 
In addition to local capacity building, projects and programmes supporting local 
development (PADL/N’guigmi and PADL/Diffa, PAC/Diffa) have contributed to the 
decentralisation of fisheries management through initiatives relating to information, 
                                                 
27 According to Ribot (2003) this is a common problem with decentralisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Roles and responsibilities must be made clear from the outset (see Section 5).    56
awareness-raising and training of administrative actors and the managers of fish 
producer organizations.  
 
This specific support has involved institutional and technical areas and has led to the 
formulation and implementation of appropriate local statutory frameworks (systems 
of participatory planning, consultation; prevention/management/resolution of conflicts 
linked to the access to productive resources). The dissemination of best practice 
resource management to fishers has been accompanied by initiatives in organization 
and provision of fisheries inputs to primary producers. 
 
It can be argued that against the background of changing institutional arrangements 
and local level jurisdiction, the fisheries sector could be an entry-point for genuine 
local level development. The sector has a range of important assets – large potential 
for aquaculture, a high demand for fish, good know-how in fishing and high potential 
to generate employment, income and food security (which can be evaluated). Once 
the decentralisation process is properly underway – it is expected that there will be 
renewed interest by both government and non-government actors in this sector which 
could represent a driver for the local economy. There is a good chance that emergent 
opportunities will be supported by Niger’s bilateral and multi-lateral partners. 
 
5.4  Nigeria 
 
•  Policy and administrative setting  
 
The political landscape of Nigeria has been shaped by a series of unstable phases 
since independence in 1960. The British parliamentary system was replaced by a 
series of military governments interspersed with relatively short-lived periods of 
democratic government. This instability has worked against both the emergence of 
stable institutions and a policy environment whereby policy actors are impelled to 
respond to civil society concerns.  
 
Aspects of Nigeria’s geography, its religious and ethnic diversity, have an impact on 
bureaucratic structures and the way they interact with other political stakeholders. The 
tendency is for government institutions to try to defend the status quo, reducing the 
prospects of decentralisation or the development of cross-sectoral initiatives. In the 
case of Nigeria’s fisheries, policy objectives are set by the Federal Department of 
Fisheries (FDF) within the Ministry of Agriculture. It is the function of FDF to both 
set and implement fisheries policy but the “defence of territoriality” within 
government structures like FDF does not represent a suitable environment for 
transparent, responsive and representative policy. This political isolation also has 
important consequences for developing legislation required to support and implement 
new policy. 
 
The British colonial government established the FDF for the purposes of marine stock 
assessment and survey but direct efforts to control and regulate fishing activity were 
introduced much later in the 1970s. The Inland Water Fisheries Decree (1992) was a 
significant milestone in Nigerian fisheries policy because it drew on empirical 
research linking declining catch to demographic and technological change (see Annex 
5; Section 3.1 for a timeline of the main fisheries related policies). 
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The fisheries policy process in Nigeria has not moved out of the “sectoral boxes” that 
constrain inclusive policy-making processes (Keeley, 2001). 
 
The policy case study 
  
Although there have been no policies for fisheries co-management on a national basis 
there have been project-based experiments with community-based management. The 
Nigerian-German Kainji Lake Fisheries Promotion Project (NGKLFPP) from 1993 
to 2001 was intended to address declining fish catches and to improve the welfare of 
the communities in the basin. The Nigerian project partners that comprised the 
implementing committee cross-cut fisheries, planning and agriculture and included 
Federal and State level agencies in addition to fisher representatives. 
 
The project aimed to rationalise fishing activity (the “regulation narrative” - see 
below) in the Lake based on licensing and bans on destructive gears and to this end 
the project was successful during its lifespan. Post-project, however, the Kainji Lake 
Fisheries Management and Conservation Unit has failed to meet regularly or to 
implement the Community-Based Fisheries Management Plan. The period since 
project end has seen a doubling of the use of the beach seine and a reduction in 
catches of 30% because there has been inadequate financial support for monitoring 
and enforcement. 
 
•  Narratives 
 
Drawing from Neiland et al (2002), there appear to have been four dominant 
narratives that have shaped policy in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). 
 
The National Accelerated Fisheries Programme of 1971 represented the “production 
narrative” whereby government tried to increased fisheries production through 
subsidised inputs. Fish was recognised as a vital food for local populations, the 
national markets and international trade but elites were best placed to exploit this 
government support. 
 
The “regulation narrative” was built on the apparent need to constrain irrational and 
unsustainable practice. In Nigeria this resulted in a range of decrees stipulating gear 
types and went on to shape the Inland Water Fisheries Decree (1992). 
 
In parallel, a “revenue-generation narrative” worked to develop the capacity to 
license and tax fishing stakeholders. The purpose was to raise funds for central 
government rather than to support fisheries management functions. 
 
Climatic factors and major water projects have had obvious visible impacts on the 
LCB and meant that the “environment narrative” has dominated in recent years. 
Water and water management is seen as the unifying factor for NRM and livelihoods 
in the region. 
 
Counter-narratives are now shaping NRM and participatory projects supported by 
international agencies. An international narrative has evolved that views fisheries as 
just one component of rural livelihoods that support millions of poor people and this 
may affect future policy in Nigeria. In addition to this livelihoods narrative, there is a   58
new agenda relating to participation and governance. There is demand for inclusive 
policy processes from both international and African stakeholders. The New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) states that “a new policy process 
must begin with an announced goal that is clear, publicly debated and well accepted 
for public sector intervention.” In Nigeria, donors such as the UK Department for 
International Development are attempting to promote such transparency through 
support to Federal and State programmes and are highlighting the role of CSOs as 
potential “Drivers of Change”. Governance issues such as these are now seen to 
influence all NRM-related policy and performance. 
 
•  Actor networks 
 
Ideally the range of primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders outlined in Ovie et al 
(2006) would be expected to inform policy and to participate in policy 
implementation. However, the fisheries policy process in Nigeria is very centralised 
with central government line ministries such as the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, 
Water Resources and Rural Development (FMAWRRD) and FDF and the State 
Ministries of Agriculture apparently monopolising the policy process. Interviews 
conducted for the above report reveal that many of the agencies mandated to 
undertake fisheries development have little awareness of participatory planning and 
the FDF admits that fisher or industry participation has been poor. The same problem 
is true of other actors such as the Dams Authority the National Planning Commission 
(NPC) and, crucially, traditional authorities. 
 
There are several key stakeholders that could perhaps be more influential policy 
actors and more closely linked to policy formulation. These include the research 
institutes, the State level fisheries departments and agencies such as the Fisheries 
Society of Nigeria (FISON). 
 
•  Coherence 
 
The problems of NRM within the Komadugu-Yobe Basin (KYB) represent well the 
lack of policy coherence and institutional linkage. The absence of policy coherence 
between the water, environment, fisheries and agriculture sector has exacerbated 
environmental problems associated with climate and dam construction and has 
restricted the capacity to confront them. 
 
•  Policy spaces and opportunities  
 
Ovie  et al (2006) found that the FDF recognised the policy process was too 
centralised and that planning needed to become more decentralised and participatory. 
There is need to incorporate the full range of fisheries interests that includes 
traditional authority and new commercial interests and other CSOs. 
 
The “Drivers of Change” principle places a strong emphasis on the media as a 
platform for civil society to present its concerns to government and to publicise key 
issues. This is seen as one potential mechanism to restore the “social contract” 
whereby government is impelled to address public demands.  
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Better communication between the various sectors would allow a more inclusionary 
policy process and ensure that proposals “..would have been argued and thoroughly 
thought through before enactment or pronouncement.” (Keeley, 2001). There are 
signs that there is some political support for more inclusionary policy processes. 
NEPAD states that “all proposed policies must be publicly announced and debated 
before enactment.” Supporters of participatory planning argue that the quality of these 
processes and the likelihood of consensus (win-win) outcomes increases if planning is 





•  Policy and administrative setting  
 
In the years after independence in 1964, policy development in the one-party republic 
drew from research, development theory and sectoral profiles and attempted to 
identify suitable data collection strategies to update the Annual Sector Policy 
Statements. These Statements were intended to ensure that sector performance was on 
target and in line with National Development Policy across all sectors. However, 
some of the sector-specific policies did not adapt to use new knowledge or react to 
trends in other sectors and macroeconomic policy. 
 
The centralised policy development process meant that there was little transparency, 
few direct policy stakeholders and little consultation beyond the technocrats of the 
concerned ministries.  
 
Since 1994, the multi-party era has developed current policy in a political 
environment where transparency has been strongly advocated. In the case of fisheries, 
the policy development process drew on information from the Fisheries Bulletins, 
Research Papers, National Development Documents, cross-sectoral documentation 
and stakeholder consultations with care to avoid conflicting strategies and to ensure 
harmonisation. The output of these consultations was the production of an Annual 
Sector Policy Statement which identified priority objectives and strategies. This went 
through a process of formal Policy Review and relevant changes were made in the 
preparation of the policy. 
 
A new drive for decentralisation was intended as a strategy to consolidate democracy 
and meet national development and poverty reduction goals and a new role for district 
government was established with the National Decentralisation Policy (1998). 
 
Formally, policy strategies are shaped by the National Strategy for Sustainable 
Development (NSSD) drafted since the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) 2002, Malawi’s Vision 2020 and the national PRSP. These have influenced 
the strategic plans and policy content of the Malawi Growth Development Strategy, 
the Fisheries Policy, the Fisheries Act, the Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management (CBNRM) strategy, the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) 
and the Fisheries Strategic Plans.  
 
The policy case study 
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The primary objective of the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy (1999) is “to 
enhance the quality of life for fishing communities by increasing harvests within safe, 
sustainable yields” from the national waters of Lakes Malawi, Malombe, Chilwa, 
Chiuta, and Shire River and other smaller river systems and small natural and man-
made water bodies. As a secondary objective, it aims to improve the efficiency of 
exploitation, processing and marketing of fish and fishery products. The policy has 
sub-policies in extension, research, participatory fisheries management, training, 
enforcement and riverine and floodplain fisheries. 
 
Co-management is legislated for by the new Fisheries Conservation and Management 
Act of 1997. The overall goal of the Participatory Fisheries Management Sub-Policy 
(approved in 2001) is to establish and sustain the co-management of fisheries 
resources between DoF and key stakeholders (e.g. fishing communities, traditional 
leaders) in order to achieve sustainable exploitation of aquatic resource management 
for the artisanal fisheries. The sub-policy aims to promote the formation of local 
fisheries management authorities and harmonise their strategies with other community 
committees, such as those for forest or agriculture management. The strategy is to 
establish distinct boundaries for local fisheries management authorities (LFMAs) such 
as Beach Village Committees (BVCs) and to provide legal support and procedures for 
participation. DoF is intended to develop suitable fisheries management plans and by-
laws with the LFMAs and support them in enforcement, research, and monitoring. 
 
In addition, to formal co-management projects there have been several independent 
initiatives since the mid-1990s which have attempted to control fishing effort in the 
Lower Shire. There are strong local level institutions such as the BVCs and 
associations representing traditional leaders. Experiences from Lake Malombe, Lake 
Chiuta and Lake Chilwa (Annex 2; Box 2) demonstrate how co-management 
initiatives established in the mid-1990s have benefited from the greater powers and 
legal recognition provided by the PFM sub-policy since 2001. The initial focus of 
these schemes was to publicise the negative impact of illegal practices and to establish 
local committees to enforce new rules. Early problems related to BVC function and 
legitimacy - local stakeholders challenged the need for effort control and power 
struggles occurred with traditional leaders. Since the formal decentralisation policy of 
2001 and an increased emphasis on the role of District Assemblies, however, there is 
far greater capacity to design and enforce local by-laws that incorporate the interests 
of traditional authority and BVCs. 
 
•  Narratives 
 
Fisheries policy in Malawi, as elsewhere, was strongly guided by the conservation 
paradigm and achieving MSY. This shaped the first fishing regulations under colonial 
rule in 1930 where the focus was effort control, established by central government 
and based on knowledge of stocks and catches. 
  
A counter narrative for decentralised government emerged in the 1990s and was seen 
as a means to accelerate a national drive for democratisation and to meet poverty 
reduction goals. This influenced NRM policy and led to a new emphasis on 
participation and co-management for fisheries resulting in a series of community-
based development projects on Lakes Malombe, Chilwa and Chiuta in the mid-1990s. 
The conservation paradigm was being superseded by the social/community paradigm   61
that placed faith in resource users to design and implement local rules for sustainable 
NRM. This narrative and realignment in approach drew from common property 
resource (CPR) theory and was supported externally by donors. 
 
The existing fisheries policy was amended and given a new emphasis and, relative to 
the Fisheries Management and Conservation Act (1997), the National Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Policy (1999) reflects this greater awareness of socio-cultural and socio-
economic features of fisheries management. A focus on participation is worked into 
each of one of its eight sub-policies. 
. 
Finally, in parallel with the increased focus on local level management, there has been 
increasing awareness of the potential role of existing, traditional, institutions in 
supporting co-management. 
  
•  Actor networks 
 
Globally, international development agencies, donors and research stakeholders have 
expressed the need to connect direct NRM beneficiaries to the management process 
and to understand the role NR provides for the poor.  
 
Co-management in fisheries is promoted as a means to establish compliance through 
locally legitimate rules of use and to reduce the transaction costs of management, 
normally incurred by the state. In the case of co-management, DoF has been the key 
policy actor and driven participatory fisheries management as an opportunity to 
reduce or control fishing effort in the lakes. 
 
However, the process of policy formulation and implementation has not draw on the 
full range of management stakeholders (see Policy Spaces below).   
 
•  Coherence 
 
Key policy declarations in other sectors generally complement fisheries management 
objectives. The National Environmental Policy (1996) and National Forestry Policy 
(1997) aim to reduce pollution and soil erosion and to maintain biodiversity while the 
Water Resources Policy (1994) aims to enhance riparian habitats, for instance. The 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (1997) also recognises the need for 
departmental cooperation in fish resource management. 
 
However, while all sectoral policy should be influenced by the Decentralisation 
Policy (1998) some ministries are currently centralised and may be less likely to 
decentralise management responsibilities than others in future (see Policy Spaces 
below). The National Parks and Wildlife Policy actually works to centralise control 
over established protected areas, for instance.   
 
The FCMA of 1997 and the NFAP that followed in 1999 emphasised the role of the 
state in managing fisheries: “…orientation [previously] was mainly focused on the 
needs of the fish resources themselves and the Department of Fisheries was seen as 
the guardian of those resources.” (DoF, 1999).   
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Both relate awkwardly to decentralisation.  FCMA was passed before the Local 
Government Act and NFAP does not explicitly link to the decentralisation programme 
started in 1998. As such, there is still no formal role for District Assemblies. Recently, 
however, the policy has become less centralised and better integrated with the 
involvement of the Departments/Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation, Marine and 
Wildlife and Forestry. The FCMA needs stronger statutory support to legally 
demarcate BVCs and requires new legal instruments (establishing formal roles for 
traditional authorities etc.) to be pushed through for its operationalisation, however. In 
addition, the Local Government Act (1998) is silent on sectoral law enforcement but 
should perhaps stipulate a formal role in some NRM functions. 
 
The Fisheries Conservation and Management Regulations (2000) support the PFM 
sub-policy by promoting local enforcement and establishing models for BVCs 
(constitutions and registration etc.). 
 
Finally, although there are provisions relating to international relations in the FCMA, 
the PFM sub-policy does not sufficiently acknowledge trans-boundary issues (Malawi 
and Mozambique) in Lake Chiuta.  
 
•  Policy spaces and opportunities  
 
Project or policy impacts on the Lower Shire (drought or flood) will require an 
integrated approach to planning and project management at the regional level in 
future. The District Development Plans are normally focussed on education, health 
and other infrastructure rather than NRM but these Plans should attempt to meet the 
needs of fishing communities. The Area Development Committees (ADCs) and the 
Village Development Committees (VDCs) offer a potential space for this, 
communicating the BVC issues to District Assemblies (as has been done in the case 
of Lakes Malawi and Malombe). There may need to be further clarification of BVC 
powers in the legislation. 
 
It is important to link with other sectors and their initiatives instead of repeating the 
committee formation process and capacity building at district level can support the 
transfer of some NRM responsibilities to resource user committees for fisheries, 
wildlife, forests and water issues.  
 
There is much greater scope for stakeholder representation in the policy formulation 
process and Seymour (2005) suggests a more active role for DoF in providing 
guidance for new for co-management arrangements and for establishing standards by 
which to monitor them. The policy development process should ideally draw on 
consultations with other sector agencies and engage more fully with fishing 
stakeholders. 
 
Finally, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol (Article 7) 
calls for community participation in the management of shared resources. If ratified, 
Article 7 could provide the framework for a coordinated strategy to support the 
communities that share the Lower Shire River fisheries from both Malawi and 
Mozambique. 
 
5.6. Summary   63
 
The four policy studies reveal much about the history, objective and performance of 
fisheries policy in the countries. Policy formation is difficult to understand because it 
is rarely transparent or linear and the “politics of policy” (Borrini-Feyeraband et al, 
2004) mean that there are rarely obvious strategies to influence the policy making 
process. It is possible to identify policy “spaces”, however, and places where “win-
win” outcomes may be achieved (Table 6 and Section 6). 
 
Of the four countries here, only Malawi has policy specifically intended to 
decentralise fisheries management or support forms of co-management on a national 
basis. Local fisheries management institutions are already established and new 
decentralisation policy may see these institutions given further capacity and the 
autonomy to undertake greater fisheries management roles in the future. In Nigeria 
and Cameroon, fisheries co-management has only operated within donor-funded 
projects. Nigeria is alone here in lacking formal policy for decentralisation. 
 
In Cameroon, Niger and Malawi, however, it is intended that positive changes in 
fisheries management will occur as new roles and responsibilities are established for 
regional and local government. The majority of these decentralisation policies are 
associated with national PRSPs and the international narrative that links inclusive 
forms of local government with pro-poor change. Apart from Malawi, however, there 
are no special arrangements made for fisheries. It is assumed that a process of 
decentralisation will naturally extend to local and inclusive fisheries management 
institutions. Political and legal support to the decentralisation process in these 
countries covers broader rural development objectives such as education and health, 
as much as NRM. However, there is a danger that decentralisation without capacity 
building can introduce NRM conflict and erode existing institutions for management. 
 
The Cameroon and Niger reports show these two countries have detailed rural 
development and decentralisation policies. The reports indicate that these polices 
should incorporate fisheries management but, especially in the case of Niger, 
sufficient financial support for local government institutions is lacking and the 
decentralisation process is slow. 
 
The Malawi report demonstrates the problems of enacting several policies relating to 
decentralisation - each developed by a different range of actors and for slightly 
different purposes. In this case, new policies have not always acknowledged the 
“spaces” provided by previous policy or legislation. Coherence is just one of many 
constraints to policy implementation. 
 
Transboundary issues relating to fisheries and natural resource management are 
obviously significant in both the LCB and the Zambesi Basin. Where the country 
reports have highlighted this issue they have stressed the role of existing institutions 
and regional agreements for improved management. In the case of the LCB, the 
LCBC may be the best positioned agency to oversee coordinated management across 
the four countries but this would require greater capacity and sharing of information.  
Neiland et al, (2002) propose support to a new platform - the LCB Fisheries Forum - 
that would allow feedback between all fisheries stakeholders in the region.  
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In the case of the ZRB, the Malawi report suggests that Article 7 of the SADC 
Protocol can provide the basis to promote policy coherence between Malawi and 
Mozambique. 
 
The narratives that underpin formal policy pronouncements and strategies are largely 
internationally driven and this is in part a reflection of the PRSP process. The 
fisheries content of the study country PRSPs were broadly consistent with existing 
policy. The fundamental difference between the governance-based agenda for Nigeria 
and the decentralisation narrative of Niger, Cameroon and Malawi is clear (Table 5). 
In this latter case, the agriculture sector is seen by international actors to represent the 
greatest potential for growth, especially in Niger. 
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Table 6. The policy setting for decentralisation of fisheries management in the four countries. Observations are those of the NARS partners. 
*Many constraints to 
achieving sustainable decentralised or co-managed fisheries relate to “institutional” issues at local level and the political economy of decision-making (governance).  
Policy setting (for decentralisation of  
fisheries)  
Political constraints to implementation
*  Opportunities & potential “win-wins” 
Cameroon 
•  National Constitution (1996) 
•  National Governance Programme (1995)  
•  PRSP (2000) 
 
No policies for fisheries decentralisation or co-
management specifically   
There is still a requirement for more cross-sectoral 
approaches at regional and local level 
 
New fisheries management institutions must be more 
inclusive of poorer interests  
 
Greater regional collaboration needed 
Implementation of new law (2004) supporting district & regional 
government & use of the new “Decentralised Local Authority” 
 
Regional planning with new CSOs such as GIC and developing 
consensus building role of government agencies  
 
Strengthen role of LCBC 
Niger 
•  PRSP (2002) 
•  Rural Development Strategy (2003) 
•  National Policy for Local & Community 
Development 
•  Three programmes for local governance  
 
No policies for fisheries decentralisation or co-
management specifically   
  
Policy pronouncements have not been supported with 
sufficient capacity building at local government level 
– both human and financial resources are lacking. 
 
Unclear role for traditional authorities leads to local 
conflict  
Local statutory frameworks and fisheries best practice is emerging 
as a result of slow capacity building through the three governance 
programmes.  
 
CSOs have negotiated new partnerships & management 
arrangements & could be supported further in local planning & 
consensus building   
Nigeria  
•  Inland Water Fisheries Decree (1992) 
•  PRSP  
 
No policies for fisheries decentralisation or co-
management specifically   
Lacking policy coherence and collaboration between 
fisheries, water and agriculture sectors 
 
Lacking policy accountability to public and other 
government administrations  
Encouraging input of CSOs such as FISON could meet 
governance (donor) concerns and help sustainability of local 
arrangements (for Fisheries Department) 
 
Key government stakeholders such as FDF acknowledge a serious 
problem exists  
 
Malawi  
•  National Strategy for Sustainable Development 
(2002)  
•  National Decentralisation Policy (1998) 
•  PRSP (2000) 
•  Participatory Fisheries Management Sub-Policy 
(2001)  - Fisheries Department to work with local fisheries 
authorities to develop by-laws, monitoring arrangements etc.   
Sectors decentralising slowly and at different rates. 
 
Multiple resource user institutions with limited 
capacity 
 
Transboundary issues (Mozambique) not tackled. 
District Development Plans could include NRM. 
 
Fisheries Department can reduce fishing effort while promoting 
participation and local democracy. 
 
Ratify SADC Protocol 7 to set framework for shared resource 
management  66 
 
6. The Poverty Reduction Strategies – policy cohesion and the projected role of 




This section outlines the key components of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) of the four study countries and discusses their relevance with respect to 
fisheries policy pronouncements and current political objectives in the sector. 
 
In general, the PRSPs do not fully acknowledge or address the function of the range 
of natural resource-based economic activities to national populations and their role for 
the poor. The socio-economic role of freshwater fisheries is not represented by 
quantitative and global economic performance indicators and strategies aimed to 
improve macro-economic performance could compromise the current role of fisheries 




The Cameroon Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2003) identifies the paradox 
between an improved macro-economic performance, resulting from structural reform, 
stabilisation and a more attractive foreign business environment, and increasing 
poverty in the rural population. According to the paper, approximately 80% of the 
population live in rural areas where the incidence of poverty is twice that in the 
cities
28. The paper outlines how poverty reflects the agro-ecological characters of the 
regions and how poverty has increased markedly in the northern savanna provinces. 
 
The main focus is to create the conditions for macro-economic growth and as with 
Niger and Malawi the rural sectors are seen as the key sources of wealth and 
employment opportunities. There are four components to the Integrated Rural 
Development Strategy: 1) modernising overall production strategies (including 
improved access to viable land; 2) institutional restructuring and continued support to 
ongoing agriculture and forestry programmes; 3) incentives for private partnerships in 
services and regulation and; 4) the coordination of multiple stakeholders for 
sustainable local NRM. 
 
Fisheries, especially the artisanal sub-sector, has a more prominent role in the 
Cameroon PRSP text than the other study countries but again this does not extend to 
identifying detailed fisheries-specific interventions. The importance of fish protein to 
the national diet and the fact that the artisanal sub-sector loses 30-35% product (three 
times total industrial fishery production) due to poor infrastructure is discussed but the 
paper also stresses the important role the sector currently provides in distributing food 
from land-locked areas to collecting centres and in meeting demand in other national 
and international markets. Given existing demand (production shortfalls are only 
partially met by fish imports) the paper suggests that the prospects for increased 
production are good and that training and equipment can boost national production. 
However, the sub-sector is seen as one characterised by “low professionalism” and as 
with the other PRSPs, fisheries development emphasises technological capacity, 
                                                 
28 Douala and Yaoundé represent about 20% of the population but only 11.8% of the nation’s poor, for 
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training and skills and financial support. A similar approach is envisioned for 
aquaculture. The paper suggests a possible role for community-based fisheries 
management and urges that lessons are learned from successful projects in countries 
like Ghana and Senegal.  
 
The Cameroon PRSP discusses the pressing need for action on environmental 
degradation and proposes greater adherence to international conventions such as 
Agenda 21. 
 
Coherence with fisheries policy  
 
The Cameroon PRSP is the only paper to make specific reference to the national 
economic contribution from artisanal fisheries and it acknowledges the scale of the 
associated distribution network and its role in domestic and international trade.  
 
There are two aspects of the PRSP that particularly relate to fisheries and fisheries 
policy in Cameroon: the effort to decentralise and the attempt to support production 
through technical and human capital development. The policy case study suggests that 
both approaches may focus attention on the potential of the private sector with 
possible negative consequences for representation of less influential groups of poor 
such as fishers. 
 
With respect to rural development strategies, more broadly, the PRSP has influenced 
the strategies of the various line departments, helping to coordinate their planning 
through the Document for the Strategy for Rural Sector Development.  
 
It is unclear whether new laws associated with the decentralisation process (2004) will 
help “the coordination of multiple stakeholders for sustainable local NRM” or 





29 acknowledges the environmental, economic and political features 
that make poverty in the country a particularly rural phenomenon, as reflected in 
social and health indicators like child malnutrition. The paper highlights the four 
decades during which rural development and agricultural production has been a 
priority policy area. The sector represents about 40% national GDP with 85% of the 
population classified rural and as such the paper identifies agriculture as the key 
“growth engine” for Niger in the short and medium term. 
 
There are four basic aspects to Niger’s strategy for rural areas: increased production 
within the agro-sylvo-pastoral sector; the control of desertification; support to natural 
resource management and; the provision of associated revenue generation 
opportunities. The action plan projects increased total expenditure on these four 
priority areas but total government expenditure in the rural sector is modest in relation 
to other sectors. 
 
                                                 
29 Full Poverty Reduction Strategy (Republic of Niger, 2002) 
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Water management is identified as a critical and cross-cutting issue in relation to 
production, poverty and the environment. Technical considerations (management of 
underground reserves, irrigation etc.) are stressed, rather than local institutional or 
planning options like increased user participation or new conflict management roles, 
however.  
 
The focus is on access to technological support for increased production and “opening 
up remote production areas”. Fisheries are highlighted only in respect to stocking (the 
action plan states 180 ponds to be stocked each year).  
 
Decentralisation is a key aspect of the paper and the overall strategy makes a 
connection between participation, good governance, democracy and sustainable 
NRM. The decentralisation process is to be supported mainly through institutional and 
human capacity building within local government. 
 
In addition to the benefits derived from decentralisation and additional technical 
support to the rural production sectors, the poor will be given greater opportunities to 
develop new revenue generating activities such as processing and marketing with the 
aid of credit schemes (decentralised financial systems – DFS). 
 
A key component of the paper is a strategy to develop a Poverty Reduction 
Information System (SIRP).   
 
Coherence with fisheries policy  
 
Natural resources policy, especially with respect to local and regional management, is 
closely associated with Niger’s PRSP. The Rural Development Strategy (SRD) was 
developed in response to the paper and prioritises poverty reduction and food security 
through sustainable NRM. The role of natural resources to the poor in providing 
options and reducing vulnerability is central to the Strategy and this is a reflection of 
Niger’s predominantly rural population and economy. 
 
However, the PRSP focus is on national performance measures and as such the rural 
sector is seen firstly as a key growth engine in macro-economic terms. The focus is on 
increased production through finance, technical inputs and human capital and this is 
reflected in the paper’s only reference to fisheries: the commitment to stock ponds in 
aquaculture schemes. 
 
Legislation in 2002 has established new district and local government structures but 
there is no reference to their potential role in fisheries management in the PRSP. 
According to the policy case study (section 5.3) there is potential for these local 
authorities to develop and monitor community management plans but the PRSP does 
not propose a strategy to support this in relation to the fisheries sector. In summary, 
despite a focus on rural areas and the decentralisation process, neither the PRSP nor 
national fisheries policy seems to acknowledge an important role for small-scale 





Given the country’s significant natural resource base and oil revenue, donors have 
targeted corruption and waste as the starting point for delivering economic and social 
development. The key PRSP
30 differs from the other country papers because its 
overall objective is to tackle poor governance and to improve government 
performance through the National Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (NEEDS). The rural economy is not covered in great detail and the paper’s 
focus is the NEEDS strategy for reform and associated budgetary, legal and 














Box 4. Nigeria’s National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (Source: Nigerian 
National Planning Commission, 2005). 
Despite the focus on government performance, the paper acknowledges that the rural 
population (53% of the national total) are particularly prone to poverty as a result of 
seasonality in production and income, lacking infrastructure, out-migration, and 
limited access to agriculture inputs. The paper makes the link between the 
environment, vulnerability and livelihoods:  
 
“Empirical evidence shows that poverty and environmental degradation are 
inextricably linked in Nigeria, because 75 percent of rural people depend on 
natural resources for their livelihood. Environmental degradation reduces 
opportunities for poor people to earn sustainable incomes. Left with no other 
viable options, they engage in extractive activities, contributing to the vicious 
cycle of poverty and environmental degradation. Rural dwellers are also more 
vulnerable to environmental disasters and hazards and have few or no 
strategies for coping with these stresses.” 
 
However, the main policy thrusts target quantifiable national objectives relating to 
health, housing, employment and a stronger role for the private sector. Many of these 
objectives appear to relate to government commitment to international performance 
measures and this is also the case where environmental management objectives are 
made explicit (pollution control, impact on health, conservation of biodiversity etc.). 
 
The “rural poor” are discussed in relation to access to credit and land, participation in 
decision-making, agricultural extension services and improved farm inputs. The paper 
states that “rural communities” must have access to water, rural roads, electricity, 
schools health facilities and communications. 
                                                 
30 Meeting Everyone’s Needs – National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 
(Nigerian National Planning Commission, 2005). 
NEEDS focuses on four key strategies: reorienting values, reducing poverty, creating wealth, and 
generating employment. It is based on the notion that these goals can be achieved only by creating an 
environment in which business can thrive, government is redirected to providing basic services, and 
people are empowered to take advantage of the new livelihood opportunities the plan will stimulate. 
 
NEEDS sets out far-reaching public reforms that will make clear that corruption and graft will be 
punished. The National Orientation Agency and its state-level counterparts will be strengthened to lead a 
campaign to re-instil the virtues of honesty, hard work, selfless service, moral rectitude, and patriotism. 
The campaign will draw on resources from a variety of government agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and community-based organizations, including schools colleges, universities, and 
private sector, religious, social, cultural, and traditional organizations. 70 
 
 
Water management is recognised as a critical area requiring reform and as an issue 
that cross-cuts sectors (health, agriculture, security and trade) and the paper commits 
to institutional change that can link the diverse range of interests. However, there is 
particular emphasis on a command and control approach that positions the private 
sector as a key player in auditing, enforcement, compliance and quality control and 
the paper’s focus is on domestic water supply and sanitation rather than livelihoods 
functions and social issues relating to scarcity and environmental change. 
 
The paper pledges support to the River Basin Development Authority and the 
National Water Resources Management Strategy. 
 
In relation to fisheries, the paper overlooks the significant economic contribution of 
freshwater fisheries, particularly in the rural context and with respect to poverty: “The 
country’s fishery resources are small, concentrated in the coastal area.”  Although 
the environment is acknowledged as an important feature of the national economy, 
there is no reference to the hidden socio-economic role of the range of production 
systems, including small-scale fisheries: “It is a glaring paradox that despite the 
contribution of the environment to the national economy, environmental 
considerations are rarely mainstreamed into national development planning in 
Nigeria.” 
 
There is limited reference to supporting “community-based development approaches” 
and a stronger focus on developing regulatory structures of the state and the capacity 
to monitor and enforce.  
 
There is acknowledgement that environmental legislation is required to support and 
implement NEEDS: The National Forestry Bill (reform to include sustainability and 
equitable distribution of benefits) and the National Environmental Management Bill 
(to update existing laws).  
 
In summary, NEEDS focuses on the bureaucratic and formal structures of government 
and as such targets national political, rather than regional or rural, issues. 
 
Coherence with fisheries policy  
 
The limited reference to fisheries in the PRSP reflects the narrow range of fisheries-
specific policy pronouncements from government. The Nigerian PRSP (and the 
Nigerian Federal Government) differs from the other case study countries in that it 
does not identify decentralised government and decentralised NRM as an objective. In 
this regard, the lack of government-led local NRM programmes reflects this (the co-
management case study at Kainji Lake was a donor-led and isolated project currently 
unlikely to influence national policy). 
 
However, the PRSP does highlight the need for a cross-sectoral approach to water 
management and acknowledges that this could deliver improved macro-economic 
performance on a wide number of fronts. However, the emphasis here is on data 
collection and enforcement of central policy and capacity building within existing 
institutions such as the River Basin Development Authorities is seen as an important 71 
 
step in delivering rational management. The potential role of participation in NRM 
planning is not addressed. 
 
While NEEDS will attempt to impact the performance and behaviour of fisheries-
related government institutions such as FMAWRRD, it will not deliver greater 
horizontal integration. With regards international strategies, international donors are 
attempting to establish a more inclusive political environment that incorporates CSOs, 
the private sector and other positive drivers. This extends beyond the PRSP action 
plan and, in the case or natural resources, apparently the policy objectives of Federal 
Government. 
 
6.5. Malawi  
 
The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
31 (MGDS) is intended to build on the 
experience of the 2002-2005 PRSP and to accelerate the process of decentralisation. 
The central objective of the MGDS is to achieve rapid broad-based growth and 
increase the economic benefits derived from agriculture. The MGDS attempts to 
incorporate the MDGs and reduce poverty by 8% but it makes clears that this assumes 
a stable political environment and continued annual growth in GDP. 
 
Approximately 85% of the country’s population is based in rural areas and the rural 
economy is seen as the key opportunity for boosting national economic growth.  
 
There are six priority areas: 1) agriculture and food security; 2) irrigation and water 
development; 3) transport infrastructure development; 4) energy; 5) integrated rural 
development and; 6) the prevention and management of nutrition disorders, HIV and 
AIDS. 
 
The MGDS intends to boost national macro-economic performance, particularly in 
the agriculture and related trade sectors, and its key approach is to develop extension 
and business opportunities in production and processing. Overall the aim is to 
increase production and exports with improved linkages to the sea. Malawi is 
dependent on narrow range of commodities and the strategy will aim to diversify 
national and international trade. Direct government spending on the agriculture and 
food security strategies is projected to reduce by half between 2006 and 2011, 
however.   
 
Water management strategies include the development of new dams to maximise 
electricity production while reducing “over dependence on rain-fed agriculture”. The 
integrated rural development strategy aims to reduce the negative consequences of 
continuous rural-to-urban migration and focuses on “rural growth centres” as potential 
“engines of national growth”.  
 
Environmental policy is addressed in relation to increased compliance with 
conservation objectives, especially with respect to forestry, wildlife and “fish 
species”. Fisheries are mentioned in relation to Lake Malawi and its particular 
                                                 




contribution to protein in the national diet. The MGDS identifies low productivity, 
over-exploitation, lacking enforcement and poor preservation as the key constraints to 
the sector’s performance and overall contribution. The medium-term goal is to 
maintain stocks and fishery-related incomes but the strategies include the construction 
of 500 new stocked ponds, improved enforcement of existing legislation and the 
provision of modern techniques. Community-capacity building is intended to increase 
small-scale aquaculture operations.  
 
Finally, the vulnerability of the rural poor is approached in relation to national 
economic performance. Social protection programmes (such as Public Works 
Programmes) are intended to enable the vulnerable to contribute to economic growth 
while new private investment will provide additional opportunities to the poor to 
participate in national wealth creation. 
 
Coherence with fisheries policy 
 
The MDGS overall perception of agriculture, forest, wildlife and fisheries is broadly 
consistent with the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy (1999) and the 
Participatory Fisheries Management Sub-Policy (2001) that preceded it. Both the 
MDGS and the fisheries policies focus on increased production as a means to support 
national economic growth. This equates to technical and training support at the local 
level in order to increase harvests “within safe, sustainable yields”. Local fisheries 
stakeholders are intended to play a role in implementing this by planning enforcement 
measures, community monitoring etc. 
 
Although the rural sector is seen as priority (both in terms of the demographics of 
poverty and potential agricultural production), with the exception of Nigeria, there is 
perhaps less emphasis on the role of decentralisation and participation than in the 
PRSPs of the other study countries
32. In the case of fisheries, the emphasis seems to 
be on better implementation of existing policy and the case study suggests that the 
strategy is to strengthen the capacity of agencies such as the Department of Fisheries 
rather than to devolve responsibility.  
 
One of the six priorities of the MDGS is integrated rural development but the case 
study suggests that local management plans are unlikely to be conducted across 
sectors and line departments – they are unlikely to identify the linkages and “win-
win” opportunities associated with agriculture, water management and fisheries, for 
instance. However, the Participatory Fisheries Management Sub-Policy is aiming to 
promote integration between the sectors and prevent replication.  
 
Because the MDGS focuses on macro-economic performance and growth there is no 
acknowledgement of the role of fisheries in reducing the vulnerability of the poor. 
The MDGS fisheries strategy is to maintain fisheries-related incomes but there are no 
measures to ensure continued access to the poor and other existing users. The plan is 
to professionalize the sector and diversify production, especially through aquaculture. 
 
                                                 
32 The MGDS does however commit to consolidating the process of decentralisation (given the poor 
rates of progress under the previous PRSP) and explicitly refers to the Decentralisation Policy (1998) 
and the Local Government Act (1998).  
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6.6. Summary  
 
The PRSPs focus on macro-economic indicators such as financial contribution to the 
national economy by sector. The intention here is to provide consistent generic 
markers of progress that allow international comparisons of performance and a 
benchmark for national government. The PRSPs provide a broad overview of the 
national economy and together are intended to provide a consistent indication of 
international standing but they do not provide detailed analysis of the dynamics of 
poverty in the countries – where, how and why some sections of society are made 
vulnerable, their current coping mechanisms and recent trends or developments in this 
regard. 
 
The focus is on agriculture, industry and trade and as a result there tends to be a 
narrow analysis of the rural economy. The PRSPs do link poverty with environmental 
degradation and economic activities in the rural context but they do not highlight the 
overall functions of the various production systems and their interconnectedness. 
More importantly, they do not contain plans to directly support the livelihoods 
functions of these systems.  
 
It is the range of production systems that provides opportunities and resilience to the 
poor in times of stress and hardship (predictable or seasonal trends and erratic 
shocks). Artisanal fisheries perform a particularly important socio-economic role 
when and where the vulnerable must rely on occupational mobility and the option to 
spread risk. 
 
These socio-economic functions of artisanal fisheries are difficult to quantify but they 
are likely to remain important in the future, both with respect to local and national 
food security, social development and even peace. Recent world events have 
highlighted the link between resource scarcity, NRM institutions and serious conflict 
in remote areas in sub-Saharan Africa and globally. These remote areas are often both 
geographically and politically marginalised, often lacking government or social 
institutions to mediate resource management decisions (see Box 5). 
 
A combination of environmental, economic and demographic change means that the 
local function to the poor of this range of production systems in rural areas, including 














Bird (2002) has defined four basic ‘remote rural areas’ according to their development 
constraints: 
 
•  Areas with ‘extreme ecologies’ where infrastructure and communication is limited and 
difficult e.g. mountains, swamps, deserts, islands and wetlands; 
•  Low-potential areas such as semi-arid areas, areas lacking topsoil, water resources 
and/or are degraded (polluted, saline, with landmines etc.) 
•  Poverty pockets where social-political exclusion on the basis of language, identity 
(caste, religion, ethnicity etc.) or gender maintain significant proportions of the 
population in poverty 
•  Areas experiencing long-term conflict where violence and dislocation has undermined 
the resource base and the capacity of poor people to secure reliable livelihoods. 
Box 5.  Characteristics of remote rural areas 74 
 
 
The PRSP demand for increased growth through fisheries production, improved 
marketing and distribution etc. does not necessarily link well with greater national 
commitment to participation and decentralisation for pro-poor development in 
Cameroon, Niger and Malawi. Institutionalising truly representative and sustainable 
participation is difficult and if fisheries are perceived solely as an underutilised 
development opportunity, and the socio-economic function of fisheries to the poor is 
overlooked, there is a danger that government projects and programmes will result in 








































Box 6. Key findings from a review of Sub-Saharan Africa Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (Source: Thin et al, 2001)  
•  The documents recognise that poverty is multidimensional and multi-causal but tend not to pay 
attention to livelihood strategies or to social dimensions of anti-poverty strategies.   
 
•  The IPRSPs disaggregate the poor to some extent but whilst the analysis of poverty usually 
accommodates disaggregation, the pro-poor strategies themselves do not. 
  
•  The documents generally exaggerate the reliability of income and consumption measures as proxy 
indicators of well-being. 
 
•  PRSPs suggest there are opportunities to scale up participatory learning strategies from grassroots to 
national level. However, sufficient engagement between government, civil society, and the private 
sector is yet to develop and consultations have yet to feed into the political activity of prioritising 
among a range of policy options. 
 
•  Sectoral priorities are expressed in terms which are broad and standardised, and potentially evasive, 
including: ‘social,’ ‘rural’ and ‘informal’ sectors. Priorities within these broad categories must be 
disaggregated. 
 
•  More tightly defined sub-categories are essential for prioritising pro-poor activities and investments. 
The concept of a so-called ‘social sector’ is not useful in identifying pro-poor strategies and resource 
allocations.  
 
•  International debt figures prominently in causal explanations. But debts owed within countries, which 
are major causes of poverty – such as debts owed by the poor to money-lenders – are usually ignored. 
 
•  Livelihood analysis is either rudimentary or (more often) non-existent in the documents.  The term 
‘livelihood’ is not in general use and is generally applied to agriculture.   
 
•  PRS documents do not exhibit an appreciation of the multidimensionality of livelihood strategies and 
the ‘rural sector’ is seen as a priority in all documents.  
 
•  Agricultural growth is seen as essential for poverty reduction. The emphasis is on productivity and 
income. Food security is mentioned but with little or no attention to the trade-offs between productivity 
and long-term income stability, security, and sustainability. 
 
•  The emphasis on productivity does not tend to be matched by an adequate discussion of consumption - 
there is little attention to the ways in which produce is used, and to ways of guaranteeing that improved 
production will benefit the poor. 
 
•  It is recommended that future PRS processes should be encouraged to show how the interventions 
proposed are underpinned by information on poverty and by analysis of opportunities for specific kinds 
of improvement among specific categories of people. 75 
 
The Cameroon PRSP is the only paper of the four to acknowledge the close link 
between poverty and agro-ecological regions, implying that poverty and vulnerability 
are closely associated with economic options based on the natural resource base.   
However, the strategies of all four papers place government agencies as the sole 
agents of change through capacity building and enforcement. These strategies 
overlook the significant rural economic activity that takes place irrespective of 
government programmes and support. As a result, the strategies propose 
improvements to delivery of existing government services and functions such as 
training and monitoring e.g. Niger’s pond stocking strategy and Poverty Reduction 
Information System. In the case of fisheries, the PRSPs are re-emphasising the 
technological/production or command and control narratives that have had limited 
positive impact with respect to poverty alleviation in the past. 
 
A review of 19 Sub-Saharan Africa Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(IPRSPs) by Thin et al (2001) found similar limitations with respect to the 





It is possible to draw themes from the four country case studies and the international 
literature on the policy process and decentralisation. This discussion distils these key 
themes with respect to the partners’ working methodology (i.e. a discussion of 




The CBNRM narrative that has evolved over the last three decades is a persuasive 
one, linking empirical observations of apparently sustainable local management 
arrangements with the common property resource (CPR) theory that outlines the 
precursors for success
33. In addition, it has influenced national and donor NRM and 
development policy for a surprisingly long period of time.  
 
The international narrative of decentralisation and participation has been driven by 
NRM and non-NRM concerns such as rights and human development, generally. 
While international policy actors had previously placed great emphasis on the 
“community” to manage natural resources, the international development agenda has 
now expanded to incorporate the issue of governance and institutions. A narrative has 
developed that suggests that good governance (accountable democracy, subsidiarity, 
rights to “voice” etc.) will not just enable sustainable NRM and livelihoods but will 
deliver success on the whole range of human development targets. Poverty Reduction 
Strategies articulate these narratives and attempt to put them into practice. 
 
These global narratives influence the national policy process and it is possible to see 
how sectoral policy objectives and strategies have evolved in response in the four 
country reports (Sections - “Policy and administrative setting” and “Narratives”). The 
emphasis has changed from technical support, effort control etc. in the sector to 
decentralisation and integration between sectors. The country reports show that 
                                                 
33 The most influential of which have been Ostrom’s (1990) eight “design principles”.  76 
 
national decentralisation policy in Niger, Malawi and Cameroon are intended to 
support local and regional NRM and fisheries management in the future. In Nigeria, 
donors are changing their emphasis from NRM project support to governance 
programmes that promote transparency (“due process”) and local government 
capacity. In the case of fisheries, government has recognised that the environment and 
livelihoods issues in the LCB are based on regional water management, cross-cutting 
departmental responsibilities and capacity, so making an integrated approach 
essential.  
 
However, there are dangers that the international emphasis on decentralisation and 
participation is perceived as a panacea for past management failings. The 
decentralisation narrative incorporates the entire range of attractive development 
outcomes (rights and equality, environmental sustainability, social and economic 
development) but there remains a need to critically assess the performance of 
decentralisation policy with respect to the poor. Ultimately, decentralisation and 
participation must serve a tangible development function, as must the parallel 




Coherence with existing policy, and with the remit of existing institutions, appears to 
have a very large effect on policy performance and the level of implementation. In 
South Africa, for instance, national policy is generally very supportive of local NRM 
but policy is hampered by fragmentation across departments and a lack of 
complementary legislation for land reform (Isaacs and Mohamed, 2000). 
In Malawi, decentralisation policy, local government reforms and national fisheries 
policies were not well integrated because they were staggered and did not refer to 
existing legislation. There also needs to be greater sectoral integration in Malawi. 
Established local NRM institutions such as those involved in forestry, or the BVCs, 
are probably well placed to undertake broader NRM roles without having to attempt 
to establish new management bodies, for instance.  
 
Institutional coherence is a key factor and it extends beyond the issue of 
harmonisation between government institutions. The informal institutional context is 
often overlooked but can include resilient and locally-legitimate institutions related to 
traditional authority and that influence NRM. Policy and policy implementers such as 
technical line ministries and their staff should be clear about the role these institutions 
have to play. The example from Niger suggests that traditional authority and local 
government can both gain rent-seeking opportunities from this confusion over roles 
and responsibilities. 
 
There are interesting questions relating to coherence and compatibility of objectives 
between the various strands of the PRSPs. Macro-economic growth through increased 
agricultural production is viewed as the basic driver of social and economic 
development and envisioned decentralisation in the PRSPs preserves a strong local 
function for the state in technical capacity building etc. This deconcentration may do 
little to develop participation. 
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Finally, NRM and decentralisation policy must also be in line with public spending 
projections. In Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon, policy pronouncements are not matched 





The policy case studies and the country reports demonstrate the importance of a wide 
range of actors in the policy process - especially with respect to implementation and 
policy performance. The range of actors involved in fisheries and other related policy 
is likely to increase in the future because: 1) national policy is intending to develop 
inclusive forms of government with suitable fora or “platforms for negotiation” at 
different levels and; 2) new interests are emerging (the private sector, civil society 































Box 7. The typical range of actors in the implementation of decentralisation policy (adapted from 
Shackleton et al 2002). 
 
National decentralisation policies in Niger and Cameroon are setting out to establish 
partnerships with new local and regional institutions such as civil society 
organisations and producers’ organisations. In Malawi, relevant institutions such as 
Donors attempt to shape decentralisation policy and projects to make them accountable to local people. NGOs may 
be an important partner in this process but donors often lack a full awareness of local “processes” – the real politik of 
rural life and the expression of power within “communities”. 
 
Traditional leaders were found to play a key part in most decentralisation case studies taken from Africa and often 
chiefs exerted disproportionate power. Removing these actors from management, however, can prove 
counterproductive and undermine public legitimacy and support for new NRM arrangements. It seems most 
productive to allow local stakeholders to make a proactive decision whether to include or exclude traditional 
authority from decision-making. 
 
Alliances and people’s organisations such as coalitions of NGOs and civil society have proved effective in promoting 
regional or local interests to government (as has been the case of umbrella groups in State level policy in India, for 
instance). These professional groups may not be representative of the poor, however, and are often most expert at 
expressing their own agenda. 
 
Sometimes NGOs operate as brokers between the local level and government or are formally appointed 
project/policy implementers. NGOs are often granted extension and training roles but their influence can be negative, 
sometimes developing dependency rather than empowerment. 
 
Existing local government structures are key actors but their performance is variable. Where these structures have 
existing planning and rural development roles and experience (e.g. the Indian Panchayats) they represent a useful 
interface between government sector agencies and the public. In other cases local government can attempt to block 
new NRM arrangements driven by government or local stakeholders.  
 
The private sector can interfere with policy objectives and is often better placed to exploit or intercept new 
opportunities intended for poor beneficiaries. Mobile entrepreneurs may pose a great threat to schemes based on 
territory and local rules of use (e.g. illegal hunters and Campfire). 
 
Local “community” power interests mean that new democratic processes are challenged or manipulated by local 
elites. Previous ways of doing things (informal institutions) cannot be ignored by facilitators of decentralised NRM 
but it is very difficult to introduce procedures that restrict this influence. 78 
 
LFMAs already exist but the country report suggests that these bodies will need 
support and guidance in setting their geographic boundaries and level of authority. In 
Nigeria, the policy process has been very centralised but government has 
acknowledged new roles may be required of research institutes, producers’ 
organisations and regional agencies such as the LCBC. However, in each country, 
new formal roles for traditional authority will not emerge simply because this may 
challenge the status quo, government and the constitution.  
 
Shackleton et al (2002) have reviewed the typical actors that are critical in influencing 
the outcomes of decentralisation policy (Box 7).  
 
Spaces and opportunities 
 
The apparent success of the reform of Ghana’s forest policy seems to relate to the 
ability to make “policy space” for implementation at the district and local level. In 
this case, local technical staff were encouraged to interpret the generalised resource 
management rules of state bureaucracy (the Wildlife and Forest Policy) and shape it 
with local stakeholders to make it site-specific, relevant and widely supported. 
Implementation will require similar support and guidance to agencies in other 
settings. 
 
The Campfire, Zimbabwe water management policy and Cameroon studies reveal that 
formal policy declarations for decentralisation need to be backed up by capacity 
building and real transfers of power at regional and local level. Despite that “the 
subsidiarity principle is not followed in any African environmental decentralisation” 
(Ribot, 2003), the multitude of actors at local level and the emergence of new interests 
can be seen as a pool of potential new forms of government especially with respect to 
NRM: 
 
“Decentralised natural resource management and decisions can…be a fulcrum 
for democratic change. Natural resources are revenue-generating as opposed to 
other important public services, such as infrastructure, health and education, 
hence they can provide revenues needed to make local government more 
independent and can give local government allocative powers over lucrative 
opportunities, both of which can help build local government legitimacy.” 
Ribot (2003) 
 
However, the PRSP commitments do tend to overlook the potential role of civil 
society actors. Although the private sector is expected to help deliver greater technical 
efficiency, new markets and diversification in the rural context, no equivalent roles 
for CSOs in social development (e.g. health) are considered. The difficulty for 
government here is that such groups have played an important role in the past but 
precisely because they challenge the state or provide alternative services. 
 
International actors will continue to be an important influence and have an important 
role to play. Project-level experiments with decentralised NRM and co-management 
can influence and reinforce policy narratives and shape policy objectives on into the 
future (Mosse, 2001). The success or failure of these projects or programmes can 
influence successive interventions because donor-led initiatives remain such a key 
part of NRM policy and government reforms in many countries. 79 
 
 
The performance of decentralised NRM policies 
 
Reviewing the performance of decentralisation is problematic. The term 
“decentralisation” is used to describe a wide range of processes and scales, from local 
government reform and transfers of authority to project-specific experiments in co-
management. In addition, each sector may relate to national policy rather differently 
in each country. According to the literature, however, the main weaknesses of the 
overall policy process are most often poor implementation and feedback of 
performance.  
 
Ribot (2003) highlights that case study experience indicates NRM capacity can be 
undermined and conflict introduced if the process of decentralisation does not follow 
a step-wise and coordinated strategy. Strategies to implement policy are rarely well 
developed. In the case of broader rural development policy, it appears that 
decentralisation must unfold in a controlled manner - following distinct phases of: 1) 
establishing democratic local institutions; 2) engaging local people by transferring 
power before management burdens and; 3) building management capacity.  
 
Crucially there is always a discrepancy between policy pronouncements and policy 
outcomes.  Most constraints to policy implementation broadly relate to “governance” 
i.e. the way power is distributed and the way decisions are made within society and 
the political economy. Government agencies may obstruct change and wish to protect 
the status quo, for example, but these factors are no less significant locally. Formal 
and informal institutions at the local level tend to interact to provide unexpected and 
often undesirable management outcomes (Cleaver and Franks, 2005 for example). Co-
management and decentralisation policies have applied a wide range of local resource 
management institutions (Box 8) with varying degrees of success but it is often the 
local context, interacting with these structures, that influences outcomes.   
 
One way to overcome this problem is to attempt to make the policy process more 
dynamic and able to respond to local performance, problems or new opportunities. 
The Ghana cases study demonstrates the role of research in this regard when it is 
situated within the policy making structure. National decentralisation policies require 
departmental strategies for evaluation and reporting back as expressed in the Niger 
and Cameroon reports. Because co-management and decentralisation concerns the 
quality of “process” (transparency, consensus, equity etc.) the role and expertise of 
technical line departments may have to evolve, as it appears to have done in Ghana’s 
forestry sector. 
    80 
 
One of the most useful contributions policy analysts can make is to uncover the way 
in which policy performance is influenced by political and institutional features. 
Without an understanding, or acknowledgement, of the ways in which policy is 
shaped by a diverse array of actors, past failures or partial successes will be repeated. 
Issues relating to governance and the way formal and informal institutions mediate 
decision-making and the ways in which power is exerted are key to understanding the 
differential impact of policy and its relevance to groups of poor. 
 
Box 8 .The organisational foundations of decentralisation (Source: Shackleton et al, 2002) 
 
The types of organisations that exercised ‘local’ authority (through decentralisation) and the direction and 
degree of their accountability had a strong influence on whether the outcomes of decentralisation policies 
were favourable for local people or not. The following organisational models were identified: 
 
• District organisations. These include local government organisations such as Rural District Councils in 
Zimbabwe and panchayats in India, and multi-stakeholder district structures aligned to line departments 
such as Wildlife Management Authorities in Zambia and forest farms in China. The measure of downward 
accountability vary from very little (CAMPFIRE and Zambia) to modest (as among panchayats in some 
parts of India). 
 
• Village committees facilitated by government departments, e.g. Village Natural Resource Management 
Committees in Malawi and Forest Protection Committees in India. Here, accountability related to the degree 
of control transferred by the state (in Malawi and Tanzania many committees can formulate their own by-
laws, while committees in Zimbabwe and much of India and the Philippines are weak and largely controlled 
by forestry officials) and the extent to which local élites capture the process.  
 
• Corporate, legal organisations composed of all rights holders and/or residents, e.g. Trusts (Botswana), 
Conservancies (Namibia), Communal Property Associations (Makuleke, South Africa), Villages (Tanzania), 
and Range Management Associations (Lesotho). Since the foundation and legitimacy of these organisations 
derived from the community itself, interference by the state was less pervasive than in the preceding 
arrangements, but it still retained ultimate authority and continued to make decisions with negative impacts 
on local interests. 
 
• Household-based and individual management in China and the Philippines, where individuals exercised 
varying degrees of authority over species selection, harvesting practices, sale and consumption, and the 
distribution of benefits. The state maintained its control through providing access to processing technology, 
permit systems, planning requirements and fees and taxes.  
 
• Self-initiated organisations that operated outside the state hierarchy. Cases range from traditional leaders 
to Residents’ Associations in South Africa (e.g. Fish River), and share-holding schemes in China. Self-
initiated schemes often were accountable to disadvantaged resource users (e.g. Orissa, India), but were co-
opted by elites or officials in the absence of a supportive policy and legal framework. Where these 
organisations were representative and accountable, a lack of official support often limited their effectiveness 
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Aims and Scope of the Guidelines 
These “Technical Guidelines for Economic Valuation of Inland Small-scale Fisheries 
in Developing Countries” are one of the outputs of the project on “Food security and 
poverty alleviation through improved valuation and governance of river fisheries in 
Africa”. The guidelines draw upon research results and experience gained during the 
course of the project. The project was coordinated and implemented by the WorldFish 
Center and was carried out in cooperation with the National Agricultural Research 
Institutes (NARs) from the participating countries: the Nigeria Institute for Freshwater 
Fisheries Research, the Departments of Fishery of Niger, Malawi and Zambia, and the 
Cameroonian Ministère de l’Elevage, des Pêches et de l’Industrie Animale; and three 
advanced research institutes  (ARIs): the Leibniz University of Hannover in Germany, 
the Institute for Sustainable Development and Aquatic Resources in UK, and the 
University of Cape Town in South Africa. 
 
The rationale for these guidelines is the pressing need for data and information on the 
value of fisheries, particularly their contribution to the livelihoods of rural households 
(Béné 2006). Currently, there is an acute lack of relevant research and data about the 
socio-economic value of small scale fisheries to fish-dependent households and 
communities. As a result, communities depending on small-scale fisheries are often 
marginalized or ignored in national and regional development policies due to a 
relative dearth of information about the conditions of poverty, the specific elements 
contributing to it, and the factors governing vulnerability to poverty. Up to now, very 
few studies on fisheries have been conducted at household level, the majority mainly 
focusing on macroeconomic and market analyses. Organizations (e.g. FAO, DFID, 
WorldFish Center) have therefore repeatedly called for the generation of adequate 
information on and assessment of the extent, nature, causes and dynamics of poverty 
in fishery-dependent communities (Macfadyen and Corcoran 2002, FAO 2005, 2006, 
Béné 2009). 
 
Several issues have to be addressed in order to assure reliable and adequate results 
when conducting valuation of fisheries worldwide. Methodological improvements 
need to be adapted to the conditions of institutions in fisheries and should be 
harmonized to the degree possible. Of particular concern is the clarity and 
practicability of the methods. Achievements in desk-based methodological 
development and their adaptation to fisheries, as well as the approach to survey design 
and methodology have to be accurately documented and made available to national 
and international research community and policy makers. 
  
The Technical Guidelines presented here constitute a “handbook” on the economic 
valuation of small-scale fisheries in developing countries. Applying the tools and 
techniques described in these guidelines can help to make the contribution of small 
scale fisheries to the well-being (for e.g. risk mitigation, poverty reduction and food-
security) of households clearer.  
 
The targeted audience for this document includes national and international research 
organizations, universities, practitioners and non-governmental organizations engaged 5 
 
in research and intervention related to small-scale inland fisheries. The guidelines 
may also be useful for experts dealing with broader development issues in natural 
resources management, poverty reduction, food and nutrition security, policy and 
governance issues.  
 
The core of the document is a methodological toolkit for economic valuation of small 
scale fisheries. This includes an overview of techniques of valuation of natural 
resources, as well as practical issues in design and implementation of household 
surveys for economic analysis, including sampling issues, questionnaire design and 
interview methodology. A basic introduction to the analysis of quantitative household 
data is also given at hand, so that the user may benefit from the experiences and 
lessons drawn during the course of the project. 
 
The Project Framework 
The goal of the project within which these guidelines were developed was to sustain 
and improve the livelihoods of the rural poor who depend on fisheries for their 
employment, income and food security along the rivers of the Lake Chad and 
Zambezi river basins, and at the same time strengthening the capacity of national and 
regional decision-makers to develop and implement improved governance and policy 
mechanisms that sustain river fisheries and enhance their contribution to poverty 
alleviation and national food security (WorldFish Center 2004). 
 
The project started in January 2006 and was sub-divided into three phases. The first 
phase focuses on policy and governance in small scale fisheries. It looked at how the 
existing policy and governance arrangements in small scale fisheries can be improved 
to strengthen the contribution of small scale fisheries to household livelihoods. In the 
second phase, the contribution of small scale fisheries to the wellbeing of households 
and communities were assessed. The phase was implemented in two locations in the 
Chad Basin: the Hadejia-Nguru Wetlands in North-East Nigeria and the Yaéres 
floodplain along the Logone river in North Cameroon; and two in the Zambezi Basin: 
the Kafue floodplain in central Zambia and the Lower Shire floodplain along the 
Shire river in South Malawi. In the course of implementing this phase, methodologies 
of collecting and assessing poverty and vulnerability of households have been adapted 
to small scale fishing communities.  
 
This approach was intended to lead to the development of an adapted portfolio of 
methodologies for inland fisheries valuation, presented in these Technical Guidelines, 
which will specifically account for the contextual and institutional constraints of 
developing countries fisheries: strong interaction and interdependence between 
fishery and other rural activities, incomplete markets of the activities (high degree of 
subsistence), and lack of institutional capacities for a large number of NARS of the 
African continent. 
 
Phase three of the project was about scaling up and dissemination of the 
methodologies that have been developed. These Guidelines are therefore an output of 
the third phase of the project.  
 6 
 
Structure of the Guidelines 
The document is organized as follows. Chapter two presents the state of the art in 
evaluation techniques. It is divided in two sections. At first, the general principles of 
economic valuation are reviewed. In the second section, important conceptual issues in 
economic welfare indicators, such as income, consumption and assets, are introduced. This 
section also includes a brief description of vulnerability assessment.  In chapter three data 
collection techniques and sampling procedures are presented. This includes country-specific 
examples. Chapter four presents data management issues. The guidelines are concluded 
with a summary in chapter five. 
 
 
Methods of Valuation 
 
To better understand the methods used in economic valuation of fisheries resources, it 
is useful to begin by presenting what economists mean when they talk of ‘economic 
value’. Economic value is a measure of what the maximum amount of resources an 
individual is willing to forgo in order to obtain some good and/or services (Lipton, et 
al., 1995). This definition of economic value is derived from the fact that resources 
are limited but the demands for those resources may be unlimited. As such, 
individuals and societies make trade-offs on which commodities (goods, services, or 
state of the world) they should spend their few resources on and they reveal their 
valuation of the commodity by their willingness-to-pay (WTP). The money an 
individual pays for a commodity is the market price. The market price is not always 
equal to the economic value of the commodity. An individual buys a commodity 
when his/her willingness-to-pay for the commodity (i.e. the value the individual 
places on the commodity) is equal or greater than the market price. This difference 
between market price and economic value of a commodity is illustrated in Figure 1 
below. 
   
 
 




The demand curve maps out the consumers’ willingness-to-pay at different quantities 
and the market price (or equilibrium price) is equal to the point where the demand 
curve intersects with the supply curve. When consumers value a commodity more 
than its market price, they will buy the commodity. On the other hand, if the market 
price of a commodity is greater than the consumer valuation, the consumers will not 
buy. The excess of what consumers are willing to pay over what they actually pay for 
the total quantity of a good purchased is called consumer surplus and this reflects the 
good’s value to the consumers in terms of net WTP. Consumer surplus is presented by 
the area below a good’s demand curve and above the equilibrium price line.  
 
General principles 
Valuation of fisheries resources is a sub-component of environmental and natural 
resource valuation. In general, this involves the quantification of the benefits of the 
resource. Economic valuation studies in fisheries can be categorized into conventional 
economic valuation techniques and socioeconomic and livelihood analysis (Neiland 
and Béné 2003). 
 
Conventional economic approaches involve measuring the monetary value a 
society/community attaches to a natural resource. These values are classified into use 
and non-use values. When both use and non-use values of the resource are considered 
in a valuation, the valuation exercise is said to capture the total economic value 
(TEV). Estimating the total economic value of a natural resource poses a challenge 
because of the benefits of the natural resource that are not traded in the market and do 






Figure 2: Components of the Total Economic Value (TEV) of an aquatic resource, 




Direct use values relate to direct utilisation of the resource such as harvesting of fish. 
These are relatively straightforward to measure, and usually involve market value of 
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total fish catch at market prices. Indirect use values relate to indirect utilisation of the 
resource which is comprised of the environmental and ecological functions and 
benefits provided by the coastal marine system. Option values on the other hand are 
values perceived by the people in terms of their ability to use the resource at present 
and in the future, including use options that may go beyond small scale fisheries 
(Kronen, 2007).  
 
Non-use values on the other hand comprise of the continuous existence of the coastal 
fisheries system and its value for future generations. This might include the value 
associated with the desire to maintain a river fishery intact for future generations 
(bequest value) or simply the satisfaction of knowing that a particular aquatic habitat 
has been preserved in perpetuity (existence value) (Béné and Neiland, 2003).  
 
The methods that are used to measure these values are broadly categorised to market 
based approaches, revealed preference approaches and stated preference approaches 
(OECD, 2002; Bann, 2002). 
 
Market based approaches 
Market based approaches involve the observation and use of market prices to value 
the resource. These are grouped into (1) observed market value approach; (2) 
productivity approach; and (3) cost based approach.  
 
The observed market approaches are applied where the market prices of the resource 
exist and the prices are combined with quantity of the resource to estimate the value. 
In fisheries valuation, this involves multiplying fish catch with market price of the 
fish to find the value of the catch. This is a straight forward way of valuating fisheries 
resources and provides relatively cheap and quick estimates of value. This method 
may however undervalue the resource if the market price is less than the consumer 
willingness to pay. 
 
The market-based approach has been used in a number of valuation studies. Yet there 
are still some unanswered questions. One of the questions is: which price should we 
use? Should it be the price the fisher receives for his catch, or should it be the final 
price the consumer pays? Use of the fisher’s price shows the income fishers obtain 
from fishing. On the other hand, the consumer’s price includes the utility addition 
activities such as place, time, and utilities of the fish processing form. The choice of 
the price depends therefore on the type of policy that initially drives the value 
exercise.  
 
One of the major disadvantages of this method is that it uses market values that do not 
necessarily reflect non-use values. The approach may also require large data to 
correctly estimate the resource value (see below).  
 
The second approach under market-based approaches is the production function 
approach. A production function relates output of a commodity to different levels of 
inputs or factors of production (land, labour, capital, raw materials). More formally 
the production function of a single output may be given by: 
 
 Y  =  f (X, Z)  (1) 9 
 
 
where Y is the output, X is a set of factors of production and Z is the input of un-
priced environmental resource. It is assumed that output Y that has a market price can 
be measured. If prices of inputs are not expected to change when supply of 
environmental resource (Z) changes, then the economic value of the change ∆Z in the 
supply of Z is the value of the production change ∆Y associated with the change in Z 
at constant inputs of the other factors (X) (Pearce and Moran, 1994). This method, 
which can be data intensive, ignores non-use values. Additionally, a more complex 
view of the market structure may be needed if the environmental changes have 
sizeable impact on the market. The application to fisheries valuation is limited 
because fish is not used as an input in a production system. 
 
Finally, cost-based valuation techniques assess the costs of different measures that 
would ensure maintenance of the benefits provided by the environmental goods or 
services being valued. Cost based approaches include opportunity cost-based 
approaches, and approaches that measure environmental values by examining the 
costs of reproducing the original level of benefits (e.g. replacement, restoration, and 
relocation cost methods). This is a practically difficult approach and is usually 
considered as the second best valuation techniques. 
 
Revealed preference approaches 
Revealed preference approaches include a set of conventional economic valuation 
approaches that do not require observation of market prices. They are sometimes 
known as the indirect techniques. These methods make use of observable behaviours 
of individuals to deduce how much an individual values something even if the 
commodity is not traded in the market. The methods are designed to estimate demand 
curves and consumer surplus. These approaches are favoured by many economists 
and policy makers because the values are revealed in real rather than hypothetical 
markets as we will see below with stated preference approaches. A disadvantage of 
these approaches though is that they are unable to account for non-use values and they 
require a lot of data. Examples of revealed preference methods include travel cost 
models of recreation, random utility models, hedonic models, and averting behaviour 
models. The travel cost method is presented succinctly below as it is easily 
understood. 
 
The travel cost method (TCM) can be used to estimate recreational values of the 
fisheries and other natural resources. The cost of travelling to the site where the 
resource is located (which includes time and travel expenses) is used to proxy the 
value of the site to the individual. The idea is that if the individual spent a given 
amount of money to travel to a site, then the travel cost should reflect the lower bound 
of the value of the resource for the individual. By observing the characteristics of 
individuals visiting the site, it is possible to estimate the derived demand for the site. 
That is for any given price of the site, the derived demand relationship will determine 
the number of visits consumers will “purchase” at a price. The TCM is applicable 
when the study site is accessible for at least part of the time and people spend a 
significant time, or incur other costs to travel to the site (Bann, 2002). Figure 3 below 






Figure 3: Travel cost demand curve 
 
 
To derive this curve, one has to conduct a survey of individuals who visit the site. The 
cost of travelling to the site can then be plotted against the number of trips made to 
derive the travel cost demand curve. The consumer surplus which measures the value 
of the resource to the society can then be derived from the demand curve. The 
application of the TCM in small scale fisheries in developing countries is limited 
because many times individuals do not go to the small fisheries just for site seeing.  
 
Stated preference 
Under stated preference methods people are directly asked to state their values, rather 
than these values being inferred from actual choices, as in the “revealed preference” 
methods. The contingent valuation method (CVM) is an example of the stated 
preference technique that is commonly used to estimate economic values for all kinds 
of ecosystem and environmental services. The method allows valuation of a wider 
variety of non-market goods and services than is possible with any other non-market 
valuation technique. It is used for both ‘use’ and ‘non-use’ values, and it is the most 
widely used method for estimating non-use values.  The method involves directly 
asking people in a survey, how much they would be willing to pay (WTP) for specific 
environmental goods and services.  In some cases, people are asked for the amount of 
compensation they would be willing to accept (WTA) to give up specific 
environmental goods and services.  It is called “contingent” valuation, because people 
are asked to state their willingness to pay, contingent on a specific hypothetical 
scenario and description of the environmental service. In small scale fisheries, 
individuals for example can be asked how much they are willing to pay to maintain a 
certain status of the fisheries. An alternative can be a case when a dam is about to be 
constructed upstream which is expected to affect the small scale fisheries. Before the 
river is dammed, the population that is deriving their livelihood from the fisheries can 
be asked how much they are willing to accept (WTA) to be paid for them to allow the 
productivity of the fishery to be affected by the dam. The individuals are given full 
information of the changes that are expected. The money they are willing to accept 
shows how much they value the fishery. 
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Household welfare analysis 
The household approach 
 
The type of information collected for the evaluation of fisheries can be categorized in 
two basic approaches: (1) the market (or sector) approach, and (2) the household 
approach. The market approach can be summarized as a “value chain” approach, 
where the different steps in the value adding process are analyzed from producer 
(fisher) to the final consumer. This involves a detailed analysis of all the steps in-
between, such as processing, trade etc. Previous studies on SSF have mostly focused 
on the analysis of the sub-sector, i.e. applying the market approach. While this 
approach is particularly attractive for value chain analyses, it has a number of 
weaknesses if it comes to the valuation of non-market benefits of SSF. Market 
analyses are unsuitable for the assessment of welfare among a given population, since 
only a fraction of total welfare is considered. Hence, the relative importance of a sub-
sector can only be shown in aggregated market values but not at the household level. 
As it has been argued before, such figures systematically ignore the benefits that 
accrue outside the market economy such as nutritional security, stability within the 
rural environment, or the value of SSF in providing protection against external 
economic variations, thus reducing risk and vulnerability to poverty. In addition, 
market approaches ignore the interrelationships between different activities. 
Comparing the market value of SSF with other sectors often implies a conflictive 
relationship. However, different activities performed by the household with the goal 
of income generation and risk mitigation suggest rather a complementary relationship 
between fisheries and crop production, for example. 
 
In contrast to the market approach, the household approach has a different objective. 
It is particularly practical for the analysis of social welfare in general. Data on all 
economic aspects of a household allow the assessment of household well-being by use 
of different welfare indicators, e.g. consumption, income or assets, and hence a 
detailed analysis of different activities and their interrelation. As such, the household 
approach concentrates on all the activities that are performed by a household for 
income generation. In a simple framework four basic types of inputs can be assumed 
as factors of production: land, labour, capital, and knowledge (Figure 4). Each 
household undergoes a decision-making process that results in the allocation of 
production factors to different activities or processes, such as crops, fishing, livestock 
and off-farm enterprises. In making decisions on how to allocate their inputs in 
producing one or more products, households have to make decisions that involve 
using their knowledge to come as close as possible to fulfilling the goals for which 
they are striving. These goals may vary from household to household (e.g. 
maximizing their income, producing enough food to feed the family, etc.). Livelihood 
strategies are comprised of the range and combination of activities and choices that 
people undertake in order to achieve their livelihood goals. The resulting combination 
(portfolio) of products they are producing with their inputs depends on the production 
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Figure 4: Schematic presentation of the household system  (Source: adapted from 
Norman et al., 1995) 
 
Hence, there is a clear difference between the two approaches. While the market 
approach focuses on one economic activity from producer to consumer, the household 
approach combines all different activities (not just fishing) – no matter where the 
household finds himself on the value chain. Very often households are producers, 
processors, traders and consumers at the same time. 
 
The decision making on the production portfolio has to be understood as a dynamic 
process in which people combine activities to meet their various needs at different 
times and on different geographical or economical levels. Their direct dependence on 
asset status and transforming structures and processes becomes clear through the 
position they occupy within the framework. A changing asset status may strengthen or 
hinder other strategies depending on the policies and institutions at work. For 
example, imagine a household with 10 members. They have now to decide what to do 
during the cropping season. For illustration purposes we assume two activities, rice 
production and fishing. The household has a limited labor supply, and limited capital, 
and these input factors have to be allocated between the activities. The different 
combinations of the two activities are depicted on the production possibilities curve, 
which is a result of the input allocation (Figure 5). The input-output relationship 
illustrates that no activity should be regarded alone, because all activities are 
interrelated and interdependent. If a household chooses a specialization strategy, e.g. 
only rice production, it has its reasons. If somebody pursues a diversification strategy, 
doing many activities at the same time, he or she also has its reasons. A household 















Figure 5: Input-output relationship in a rural production system 
 
In order to demonstrate the strength of the household approach, an illustrative 
example of two households is presented. Both are real households who live in the 
Logone floodplain in Cameroon. Household 1 is from the village of Galazi, which is 
located at the Lorome Mazra River, a tributary of the Logone River. The second 
household lives in Kalang, a village at the border of the Maga Lake. To assure 
comparability, the two households have almost the same demographic structure. The 
household heads are of similar age, each has one wife and a grown-up but unmarried 
son. 
 
Looking at fishing income only (Figure 6), we could conclude that the second 
household is better off. It has the opportunity to fish 9 months in the year and has a 
much higher income from fishing than the first household.  
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Figure 6: Two household illustrative example: Income from fishing 
 
However, this picture is misleading. Looking at income from other activities (Figure 
7) it becomes obvious that household 1 is in reality much better off. This is the 
strength of the household approach: It shows the relative importance of one activity, 




























Figure 7: Two household illustrative example: Total household income 
 
Box 1 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the market and household 
approaches. 
 
We can conclude that the household approach is more appropriate to assess the 
economic value of fishing. Using the market approach it is possible to derive the 
“market value” which has its advantages for value chain analyses. However, the 
market value of fisheries does not sufficiently show the economic value of this sector. 
We shall see below that the household approach goes beyond that market value and 
captures the manifold contributions of fisheries to the local economy (e.g. food 










•  yields information of the value adding process from producer to consumer 
→ Value chain analysis possible 
•  yields a value for a certain “market” in a region, e.g. the fish market 
•  allows the identification of weaknesses in the system, e.g. access to markets (input and output), 
prices, regulations, property rights etc. 
 
Disadvantages: 
•  fails to assess the welfare of the target group, i.e. single households or communities 
•  ignores the interrelationships between different activities, e.g. fishing, farming, livestock 




•  suitable to assess household economics by use of different welfare indicators, e.g. consumption, 
income, assets 
•  allows a detailed analysis of different activities and their interrelation 
•  allows optimization solutions (portfolio optimization) 
•  allows the assessment of economic value (not just the market price) 
 
Disadvantages: 
•  requires a large amount of primary household data 





Welfare indicators are measures used to estimate the level of household or individual 
wellbeing. Household wellbeing can be measured by different variables such as 
consumption expenditure, income, food security, education, assets, health, etc. Some 
of the most commonly used measures are presented and discussed here. 
 
1. Consumption 
Consumption expenditure is usually categorized as food consumption and non-food 
consumption.  
 
Food consumption - food consumption is comprised of both food that is produced by 
the household (crops, livestock products, fish, and other natural resources), and food 
that is purchased at the market. Valuing food purchased from the market is straight 
forward because the information about the quantities that were purchased and the 
prices can be easily obtained. The product of the two provides a value of total 
expenditure on those items. 
 
To value the food consumed from home production (auto consumption), one needs to 
obtain information about quantities that were consumed and the market prices. In 
valuing auto consumed commodities it is assumed that the household would have 
bought the commodity from the market if it did not produce it on its own. One of the 
challenges of valuing auto consumption is to choose the price of the commodity. 
Many of the commodities have different prices along the value chain (the route it 16 
 
takes from the producer to the final consumer). Use of local market price is more 
realistic even if the commodities are not always sold to final consumers in the local 
market.  
 
Non-Food Consumption  - non-food consumption constitutes items such as 
expenditures on education, clothing, housing, health care, water, electricity, body 
care, etc.  
 
2. Household Income 
All the inflows (monetary and non-monetary) that are obtained from all activities in a 
livelihood/production system are referred to as total household income. In a typical 
farm household in the floodplains, this will be comprised of income from agriculture, 
livestock sales (including livestock products such as milk and eggs), fishing, other 
natural resources, remittances, and off-farm activities. 
 
Gross revenue (Gross income) – this is total monetary value of an output without 
considering costs. For crops this is the monetary value of total yield (auto consumed 
or sold). For fish, this is the monetary value of total catch (auto consumed or sold) 
while for livestock this is equal to the revenue obtained from livestock and livestock 
products plus the value of livestock and livestock products auto consumed. Note that a 
cow in the grazing field is not an income unless it is sold while crops in the storage 
may be considered as an income. 
 
Production costs – the expenses incurred in production processes are referred to as 
production costs. Total production costs are the sum of total fixed costs and total 
variable costs.  
 
Fixed costs - the costs that do not vary with the level of production e.g. rent for a 
piece of land or a dugout canoe. When a household rents a fixed piece of land, say 
one hectare, or one dugout canoe, the cost of rent will not increase or decrease with 
respect to the level of crop production or fish catch. 
 
Variable costs - the costs that vary depending on the level of production e.g. cost of 
labour. If the usage of labour is increased, output is also expected to increase.  
 
Opportunity costs – these are defined as the costs of any course of action as compared 
to alternatives. These are referred to as forgone benefits and they reflect the real cost 
of a resource. 
  
Net revenue (net income) - this is computed when the production costs are subtracted 
from the gross revenue. The net revenue shows the profitability of an enterprise 
(activity). This is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Both gross income and net income can be used to assess the welfare of a household. 
Net income is a better measure because it shows the amount of income that is 













Figure 8: Illustrative calculation of net income 
 
3. Assets 
Broadly, an asset can be defined as a tangible or intangible holding that can be 
converted to cash and/or used for production. In most rural settings tangible assets 
matter most and these can be categorized as productive assets and consumptive assets. 
 
Productive assets – assets that are used for productive purposes such as land, fishing 
gear, ploughs, irrigation engines, etc.  
 
Non-productive assets – assets not used for production such as furniture, housing 
facilities, etc 
 
Livestock – livestock is also a form of an asset that is used for consumption and 
production 
 
The ownership of these assets can also be used to assess household welfare. Assets 
can be measured in different ways. One possibility is to count them (e.g. number of 
cattle owned by the household, which is often used as an explanatory variable in 
econometric estimations). Another possibility of measuring assets is to find the 
monetary value of the asset by taking the market price (sale price). In the cases where 
it is difficult to quantify/monetize the asset, a way of accounting for the asset holdings 




Livelihood outcomes are the achievements of livelihood strategies. They help us to 
understand the 'output' of the current configuration of factors within the livelihood 
framework. They demonstrate what motivates households to act as they do and what 
their priorities are. They might give an idea of how people are likely to respond to 




Livelihood outcomes can also be called welfare measures. Total expenditure on 
consumption or total income over some period are the mostly used welfare measures 
but other indicators such as food security, life expectancy, infant mortality, and 
literacy are also used in some studies. The use of either income or consumption 
expenditure has raised debates mainly in developing countries where measurement of 
both indicators is problematic. Presently, consumption expenditure is a more preferred 
welfare measure than income mainly because it is much difficult to measure income 
than consumption expenditure. In terms of practicalities, at least three factors make 
household income more difficult to measure than household consumption 
expenditures. These difficulties are likely to impair the accuracy of the income data 
gathered and are especially apparent in developing and transition countries.  
 
First, survey questions on income typically require a longer reference period than is 
needed for questions on expenditures because income estimates for periods less than a 
year will be affected by seasonal variation, especially for agricultural households. 
While there may be seasonal and other short-term temporal patterns in consumption 
expenditures, they will normally be less marked if households have access to 
consumption-smoothing devices such as savings, credit, storage, and exchange 
networks. Longer reference periods needed for measuring income introduce greater 
problems of recall error. Second, household income is harder to construct for self-
employed households and those working in the informal sector because of the 
difficulty in separating out business costs and revenue. Frequently, arbitrary 
assumptions are needed to measure the income streams from assets such as 
agricultural and livestock, and there can be difficulties in valuing the receipt of in-
kind payments and self-produced items. These problems are less severe, although not 
absent, when household consumption is measured. Moreover, in developing and 
transition economies, the sources of household income are more diverse than the 
categories of household consumption so it is harder to design and implement 
questions for all of these sources. Third, questions about consumption are usually 
viewed as less sensitive than questions about income (although alcohol, tobacco and 
narcotics, and sexual services are usually viewed as sensitive and so expenditure on 
these is unlikely to be reliably measured), especially if respondents are concerned that 
the information will be used for tax collecting purposes or where illegal or barely 
legal activities provide a substantial portion of household income (Gibson, 2005).  
 
Although household income is a less favoured welfare measure in poverty 
assessments, it should be said that income provides a different dimension of the 
contribution of fisheries to household livelihood. Comparisons of incomes from 
different livelihood strategies to total income would show the contribution of the 
livelihood strategy more directly than comparing household consumption of 
households that have different livelihood strategies. There are a lot of decisions and 
processes that are just implied if consumption is used as a welfare measure. Apart 
from own consumption of fish catch, it is very difficult or impossible to trace 
consumption of other goods and services to incomes from fishing. That is why 
looking at income from fishing itself is a more direct way of looking at the 
contribution of this activity to household livelihood outcomes. 
 
After understanding the different measures that are used to assess welfare, there is 
need to know how we can use these to assess the value of small scale fisheries. 
Household income will be used for illustrations. 19 
 
 
Different ways can be used to conduct a simple static welfare analysis. In the 
following example some possible approaches to data analysis are presented.  
 
1.  Assessing the contribution of income from fishing to total household income. This 
shows how important fishing is to the household economy. For example, Figure 9 
shows that for the groups of households considered, fishing contributes 20% on 
average to total income. 
 
Figure 9: Pie-chart of household income, by income source 
 
 
2.  Fishing income can further be divided into the different fishery-related activities, 
such as fishing, fish trade, fish processing, boat construction etc (Figure 10). This 
helps identifying the type of fishing activity that is more important to the 
households. 
 
Figure 10: Pie-chart of income from different fishing-related activities 
 
3.  In order to disaggregate households depending on their major livelihood activities 
it is possible to compare total household income for fishing and non-fishing 
households. This method begins by dividing households into fishing and non-
fishing groups and then computing mean incomes for the two groups. This method 



















difficult to assess directly. Figure 11 shows the income from different activities 
for two groups of households. This offers some insights into the production 























4.  Comparing contribution of fishing households to externally defined welfare 
groups. This may involve the use of a welfare benchmark that defines better off 
and worse off households. In terms of the assets for instance, comparisons can be 
made between households that have a given asset such as a plough and others that 
do not have it.  
 
5.  In terms of income and consumption, percentile analysis or poverty line can be 
used. In a percentile analysis, the households are ranked with respect to the 
welfare measure from the household with the lowest value to the household with 
the highest value. The households are then grouped into equal sizes which are 
known as quantiles. The researcher can decide on the number of groups depending 
on the size of the sample. In using this approach, it is possible to assess the 
income for different intensities of fishing. In Figure 12 households were classified 
in quartiles, i.e. each percentile contains 25% of the sampled households. The 
variable for categorization is “cash income from fishing”, where 1 is the lowest 
and 4 highest quartile. If the households in the highest quantile obtain the highest 
income, then there should be something with fishing that makes most of the 







































Figure 12: Total household income by quantiles of fish income 
 
 
6.  Poverty analysis applies a poverty line, which is a threshold below families or 
individuals who are considered to be lacking the resources to meet the basic 
needs. Families or individuals whose income or consumption is below the poverty 
line are said to be poor while those that have their incomes or consumption above 
the poverty line are said to be non-poor. Finding the proportion of the poor and 
non-poor for the different groups (fishing versus non-fishing) is therefore another 




















Welfare measures are subject to fluctuations over time. Increasingly in the literature, 
the necessity to account for this fluctuating nature is recognised (Christiaensen and 
Subbarao 2004), suggesting the need for a dynamic welfare analysis. These dynamic 22 
 
welfare analyses consider the changes in household or individual welfare over time. 
For example, if a given household was surveyed in two years say, 2007 and 2008, the 
points on the vertical dotted lines in Figure 14 would represent the household specific 
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Figure 14: Illustration of variation in household welfare levels at different times 
 
 
When this household was surveyed in 2007, it was categorized as poor, while in 2008 
it was categorized as non-poor. The question is: which information should be trusted, 
2007 or 2008? The answer is: both. Observing the household over a long period of 
time to understand changes in its welfare position is the best way to capture these 
dynamics. 
 
This dynamic consideration leads to important distinctions between transient and 
chronic poverty. Transiently poor households or individuals are households that are 
temporarily poor due essentially to stochastic events. In opposition, the chronically 
poor are households who are observed to be permanently under the poverty line. 

























Figure 15: Illustration of dynamic poverty concepts 
 
 
Households that are chronically poor do not have the capacity to get out of poverty 
and require policies that favor asset accumulation to help them getting out of their 23 
 
poverty trap. On the other hand, transiently poor households need to be protected 
from negative income shocks through safety nets and similar interventions to reduce 
the effects of risks and shocks.  
 
Both short term fluctuations and longer term fluctuations (e.g. over life cycle) can be 
important for household or individual. Long term changes in welfare are mostly due 
to asset accumulation or de-accumulation, while short term changes are mainly due to 
shocks and seasonal changes. Inter-temporal variations in welfare mean that different 
levels of welfare can be observed for a given household. Short term variations are 
huge in communities where income sources are very sensitive to seasonal changes and 
this can have serious implications on the characterization and profiling of households 
in welfare groups. For example, if we consider in a farming-fishing community, a 
household that is involved more in farming is expected to be better off during 
harvesting period while a household that depends more on fishing is expected to be 
better off during peak fishing period. If a single cross section survey is conducted, the 
results will not give a true picture of welfare profile of the households in the area. If 
the surveys are conducted at different times of the year the researcher will manage to 
classify the households at least in that year but this does not say anything about long 
term changes in welfare which is also important in understanding welfare dynamics. 
Assessment of livelihood outcomes should therefore be conducted at different times 
of the year to capture short term variations and it should also be done for a number of 
years to understand the long term fluctuations. This however may constitute a major 
challenge in terms of survey as some of these fishers may live in very remote areas or 
may even be migratory. 
 
The concept of dynamic welfare measurement accounts for uncertainty about future 
level of welfare. In the presence of risk and uncertainty, it is possible to differentiate 
between the observed welfare status and the expected welfare status. The expected 
welfare status is dependent on household resource endowment while the observed 
welfare status depends on both household resource endowments and stochastic events. 
A simple illustration using the two-household example from the previous section can 












































For household 1, the expected income is greater than the observed income, which 
suggests that household 1 may have experienced positive income shocks (such as, 
e.g., very good rains) and this helped the household have an income greater than what 
it was expected (based on its assets endowment). Household 2 on the other hand has 
an expected income higher than the observed one. This may be the result of a negative 
shock that reduces its actual income below the expected one.  
 
This difference between expected and observed incomes shows another important 
dimension of dynamic poverty analysis, namely vulnerability to poverty. In economic 
literature vulnerability to poverty is defined as the probability that at a given time in 
the future, an individual will fall to a level of welfare below some norm or 
benchmark. The risk of falling below poverty line is computed by considering the 
expected income level and its variance. Figure 17 is a simple illustration of the 
concept of economic vulnerability. 
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In this figure the vertical axis represents the expected levels of consumption at some 
point in the future, t+1; the horizontal axis represents households with different 
expected levels of consumption. Households differ in their exposure to shocks and 
their ability to cope with these shocks. The expected (mean) levels of consumption are 
denoted by the filled circles along the vertical lines. The variability of consumption 
around these mean levels is shown by the vertical rule that passes through these 
circles. In the above illustration, household A is more vulnerable than household B 
(although the two households have the same expected consumption level in period 
t+1) as its consumption variability is greater than that of household B. Indeed, some 
individual or even groups of households may be more sensitive to shocks than others 
(for example, they may live in localities more prone to natural disasters or their 
livelihoods depend on commodities with especially volatile prices) or have less ability 
to manage these shocks; such groups are characterized by consumption with greater 
variance (see Hoddinott and Quisumbing, 2003).  
 
The predicted probabilities of falling into poverty can be calculated as a function of 
the mean and the variance of consumption. An example of probabilities to be poor for 





















































Figure 18: An example showing vulnerability levels of two households 
 
 
Analyzing vulnerability of individuals and households does not only involve the 
estimation of the probability of becoming poor in the future but also the identification 
of factors that are responsible for increasing or reducing this probability. Additionally, 
the analysis looks at what households do when they are faced with negative income 
shocks to cope with the impact. The value of fishing can therefore be either in 
reducing the probability of falling into poverty or in providing coping means to 
households when the households are faced with shocks. For example, the probabilities 
of falling into poverty can be computed for households with different livelihood 




















































Figure 19: Assessing the role of livelihood strategies to household vulnerability 
 
 
The econometric procedures used to estimate these probability values are beyond the 
scope of these guidelines and they will not be discussed. For an overview of different 
methodological approaches to vulnerability estimation see Hoddinott and Quisumbing 
(2003). For researchers that do not have adequate econometrics knowledge, assessing 
the contribution of small scale fisheries may involve assessing the relationship 26 
 
between fishing and vulnerability. For example, a researcher can use variations in 
incomes to infer to household vulnerability and relate it to different livelihood 
activities. Other variables such as asset level and accumulation, land holding size, and 
household demographic characteristics can also be used to infer about the 
vulnerability level. In the presence of household observations over a long time, 
researcher can compute the expected income and variance directly from the 
observations. These can be used to compute probability measures. 
 
An asset based approach to vulnerability can yield insights into the nature of poverty, 
i.e. whether poverty is chronic, structural-transient or stochastic transient. The 
theoretical framework for such analysis is presented in Figure 20. The figure shows 
that if a household has assets equal to A and its structural income equals C which is 
less than the income poverty line, it implies that this household is expected to be poor. 
However, due to risks and shocks, the household’s income is expected to be varying 
between E and B which means that the household can still experience some episodes 
of non-poverty (as E is above the income poverty line) due to positive shocks such as 
good weather or increased fishing opportunities, although on average the household is 
expected to be poor. Since there are some prospects of non-poverty for this 
household, its vulnerability level is less than one but greater than zero because it is 
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Figure 20: Illustration of an asset-based vulnerability measure 
 
 
When the highest possible income is below the income poverty line, households are 
said to be 100% vulnerable, i.e. they are categorized as structural-chronically poor 
even in the presence of good luck such as favourable weather conditions. Households 
with productive assets between point F and G belong to this category. When the 
lowest possible income is above the poverty line, those households are non-
vulnerable, i.e. they are expected to be always non-poor even in the presence of bad 
luck such as for example a severe drought or flood. Households to the right of point I 27 
 
belong to this category. Households whose assets lie between G and I, i.e. when the 
lowest and highest income prospects are equal to the income poverty line, are 
vulnerable, i.e. they can be expected to move in and out of poverty (transient poverty) 
but for different reasons. If their level of vulnerability VTP is above 50% and below 
100% (0.5≤ VTP<1), they are expected to be structural-transient poor (i.e. between G 
and H). They are defined as structural-transient poor because the transient poverty 
they (are likely to) experience is due to insufficient asset levels. Households who are 
not expected to be poor (i.e. between H and I) but because of negative shocks end up 
below the income poverty line some time in the future are called stochastic-transient 
poor. These households are also vulnerable but their level of vulnerability is below 
50%. Hence, the different poverty groups are defined as: 
 
a)  Structural-chronic poor, if  VTP =1 
b)  Structural-transient poor, if 0.5≤ VTP<1 
c)  Stochastic-transient poor if  0 < VTP<0.5 
d)  Never poor, if VTP =0 
 
Table 1 shows how this approach can be used to elicit the value of fisheries in terms 
of poverty and vulnerability reduction. For example the data shows that poverty and 
vulnerability indicators are improving across the board with increasing dependence on 
fishing.  
 










Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Expected income per capita [USD PPP]  342.46  291.64  467.49  309.66  467.49  309.66 
Expected poverty head count ratio  0.77  0.43  0.54  0.50  0.54  0.50 
Average vulnerability level [%]  0.75  0.34  0.57  0.43  0.57  0.43 
Structural‐chronic poverty [%]  0.48  0.50  0.35  0.48  0.35  0.48 
Transient poverty [%]  0.44  0.50  0.43  0.50  0.43  0.50 
   Structural‐transient (VTP>0.5) [%]  0.29  0.46  0.19  0.40  0.19  0.40 
   Stochastic‐transient (VTP<0.5) [%]  0.15  0.36  0.24  0.43  0.24  0.43 
Never poor  [%]  0.08  0.27  0.22  0.42  0.22  0.42 
 
For the non-fishing households, low expected income levels and high variation of 
income result in more pronounced poverty, particularly structural poverty. Adding up 
the structural-chronically poor and the structural-transiently poor, over 77 percent of 
non-fishing households are asset-poor. Households with fishing as a secondary 
income source also have a high share of chronically poor. However, 25 percent of this 
livelihood group are estimated to be non-poor, i.e. adverse stochastic events are not 
supposed to push these households below the poverty line. Finally, fishing-oriented 
households rank lowest in the poverty distribution. About 46 percent are estimated to 
be non-poor or at worst, stochastically poor. Such results may provide a strong 28 
 
argument for the value of SSF, concerning their function as a risk-mitigating and 
hence vulnerability reducing activity. 
 
 
Survey research methodology 
 
One of the essential conditions for the assessment of socio economic contribution of 
small scale fisheries is the generation of reliable, consistent (unbiased), representative, 
and accurate data. This section gives an overview of methods in social and economic 
empirical studies with special emphasis to social research in fisheries communities. 
Generally, five stages can be distinguished in the process of development and 
completion of a survey (adapted from Czaja and Blair 1996): 
 
1.  Preliminary planning 
2.  Field trip 
3.  Survey design  
4.  Questionnaire design, pre-testing and enumerator training 
5.  Survey implementation 
 
At any of these stages, the researcher needs to make sure that he/she is not getting 
away from the research objectives and that he/she collect appropriate data. Since data 
collection is costly (both in terms of money and time), it becomes very important for 
researchers to make sure that they plan and implement their survey effectively and 
collect the relevant data.  
 
Preliminary planning 
Preliminary planning needs to cover a wide range of aspects of the survey from the 
establishment of the need to collect data to the time the data is ready for use. The plan 
should provide answers to questions such as: Who or what is the population of 
interest? Which geographic area should the survey represent? Is a sampling frame 
from which to select a random sample available? If not, it has to be reflected on the 
procedure to generate a sampling frame that would suit the research objectives.  
 
Another issue that should be considered is the kind of analysis that is going to be 
performed with the data from the survey. The methodological and model requirements 
may crucially determine the questionnaire design. In designing a first draft of the 
questionnaire, decisions have to be made on the type of information that has to be 
elicited from respondents and how to go about it. For example, would open-ended or 
rather close-ended questions fit better? What variables are important for the analysis 
in mind, and what type of information on demography, income, expenditures, 
ecological conditions etc. is needed? Based on these considerations, an outline of the 
questionnaire and type of information needed can be produced at this stage.  
 
Two other important factors in the preliminary design stage are the budget and time 
that is available for conducting the survey. Money and time determine the size of the 
study area, which may have logistical implications such as: number of enumerators 
that have to be hired, the modes of transport, the length of the questionnaire and the 
sample size (depending on the geographic distribution of the sample). 29 
 
Field trip 
Having settled the issues discussed above, usually a field trip is an indispensable 
element in the survey preparation. The main objective of the field trip is to ascertain 
that the preliminary plans that have been made above are in line with the situation on 
the ground. In other words, a field trip is still part of the planning exercise but 
researchers at this stage want to make sure that they understand the reality on the 
ground. Even when the researchers come from the same region in which the survey 
will be conducted, an exploratory trip to the study area with keen interest on the 
variables of interest is necessary. The researchers have to get a personal impression of 
the situation. Each study area has its peculiarities concerning ecological, cultural, 
human resource and other conditions, which have to be considered before the 
implementation of the survey. In particular in the case of fishing communities (or 
other similar communities living in remote rural areas), certain villages may be 
inaccessible during some periods in the year due to bad road conditions (Box 2). The 
cultural norms and values may also be a significant factor to consider when designing 
questions or the interview procedure and a clear understanding of these can be 




The issue of the sampling frame can also be clarified at this moment. A sampling 
frame is whatever is being used to identify the elements in each sampling unit. The 
choice of a sample always requires an exhaustive list of all the elements of the 
population, e.g. village or household lists. Such lists and records will always contain 
mistakes, especially in developing countries, where such information is very scarce, 
but they are the only means of finding the sample elements so that the population can 
be surveyed. Particularly for rural areas, such information very often does not exist. 
However, some other studies may have been performed in the same area by other 
organizations or institutions. While contacting them from the home office might often 





Maybe the most important step in planning a survey with regard to quality of data is 
the survey design. While in industrial countries other survey approaches such as mail 
or telephone surveys might be an option, the only reasonable method of data 
collection in developing countries is the face-to-face interview, also referred to as 
Box 2. Experiences from the field trip in Cameroon: 
 
Due to the annual flood cycle, access to the villages in the Logone Floodplain is very restricted 
during several successive weeks in the year, from mid December to end of February. During that 
period no access is possible, neither by vehicle, nor by pirogue. Hence, the placing of the survey 
periods need to be adapted to these conditions. For example, although it would have been more 
reasonable to conduct a follow-up survey at the end of the production cycle in January, thus better 
capturing agricultural production and fishing harvests, this procedure proved to be unfeasible. From 
mid December to end of February access to the sampled villages was absolutely impossible. The 
research team decided for a compromise, collecting data in November /December, even if this falls 
in the midst of the harvesting season. The missed data on yields and income was then recollected 
during the second follow-up. 30 
 
personal interview survey. This is the most expensive method due to the travel costs 
involved, and the amount of time needed to collect the data. It is estimated that only 
about 25-40% of the total time is spent for actually interviewing the sampled 
population. The rest of the time is consumed by travel, editing of responses and other 
tasks (Czaja and Blair 1996). However, despite the greater costs involved, this method 
also implies many advantages. For example, response rates are usually very high as it 
is easier to get the respondent’s cooperation in a face to face interview. Also, the 
response bias is normally low due to a better control of the response situation. 
Another important advantage is related to the questionnaire itself. The questionnaire 
can be more complex, and the interview can take more time, because it is 
administered by a trained enumerator and allows a more relaxed atmosphere. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the high costs and time implicated in personal interview 
surveys, the sampling (i.e. sample size and geographical distribution) s often 
principally determined by the budget and logistical constraints.  
 
A sample is defined as a set of elements (these would refer to households in a 
household survey) selected in some way from a population. Usually, the researchers 
are interested not just in the characteristics of a sample, but in those of the whole 
population from which the sample has been drawn. A representative sample is 
therefore imperative, in order to be able to draw conclusions for a larger population 
(region wide or nationwide) and to extrapolate the research findings. The aim of 
sampling is to save time and effort, at the same time obtaining consistent and 
unbiased estimates of the population status in terms of whatever is being researched 
(Stapsford and Jupp 1998). 
 
The first step in sampling is to define the population of interest. This may seem 
obvious, but it is where survey design can all too easily be defective. With regard to 
the research objectives, the population of interest might be different. The important 
point to note is the restricted meaning of the term population in statistics. A 
population could be all children in a specified age, all urban households in a specified 
region, all rural households engaged in aquaculture production, etc. For the purposes 
of sampling, populations can be thought of as consisting of sampling units, which 
represent elements of research interest that do not overlap and at the same time 
exhaust the entire population. In most studies, sampling involves multistage selection 
of sampling units. In multistage sampling, usually sampling units are ordered 
hierarchically, moving from one level to the next. Thus, the primary sampling units 
are often geographical or administrative districts/provinces. Subdividing the primary 
sampling units then leads to the next sampling level etc. The final sampling units in 
economic or social studies are usually households or individuals. 
 
The selection of the sample, finally, is a decision that can be based on a number of 
methods. The objective is to obtain estimates of population parameters, and some 
methods do this more accurately than others depending on the nature of the 
parameters to be estimated. The choice of the method will be a question of balancing 
accuracy against cost and feasibility. Two main categories can be distinguished: 
probabilistic sampling (simple random sampling, stratified random sampling and 
cluster sampling) and non-probabilistic, or purposive, sampling (quota sampling) 
(Stapsford and Jupp 1998). Probability samples have a considerable advantage over 
all other forms of sampling, which is the accurate estimate of the sampling error. 
Probability sampling procedures are therefore most widely used, because they assure 31 
 
that each element in the sampling frame has a known (and equal in the case of simple 







One problem with simple random sampling is that the sample size may need to be 
large enough to ensure that all subgroups (or strata) in the population are adequately 
represented. If some characteristics of the population of interest are identifiable at the 
time of sampling, there is the possibility of structuring the sampling process. In this 
case a stratified random sampling is applied, where the elements of a population are 
divided into non-overlapping groups. Random samples are then drawn from each of 
these strata. If the proportion of the sample from each stratum is the same as the 
population, then this procedure is called proportionate stratified random sampling, and 
the total sample will match the population. Usually, samples of populations of 
geographic areas are stratified by some regional variable. Lists of employees typically 
are stratified by occupational classification of some sort. Stratification is a desirable 
feature of a sample design, since it increases the precision of estimates of variables to 
which the stratification variables are related without hurting the precision of other 
sample estimates. 
 
When there is no adequate sampling frame of the whole population, multistage 
sampling provides a useful approach. The basic approach is to divide the total target 
area into exhaustive, mutually exclusive sub areas. After drawing a random sample of 
sub areas a list is then made of housing units or other lower sampling units and a 
random sample is then drawn. Usually, proportional (or weighted) sampling is 
applied, where a fixed share of final sampling units is selected, i.e. the sample size is 
proportionate to the population in each primary sampling unit. For example, the 
number of households selected per village must be proportionate to the total number 
of households in the village. Hence, in a larger village, more households will be 
selected than in a very small village (see Box 4 and Box 5)  
 
Box 3. Sampling procedure in Nigeria 
 
Sampling process in the Hadejia-Nguru wetland aimed at identifying a sample of fishing and non-
fishing households that were to be compared in terms of poverty, vulnerability and food security. To 
better understand the role of fishing, it was necessary to have the non-fishing sub-sample of 
households from the same ecological zones so that we should hold ecological conditions constant 
during the analysis. However, it was difficult to define fishing and non-fishing households before the 
survey.  
A multi-stage sampling strategy was adopted. At first a list of 121 villages from the study area was 
compiled (sample frame). The list of the villages in the sampling frame was compiled by 
consolidating lists from state departments of fisheries and wildlife and conservation. From this list, 11 
sample villages were selected randomly. The villages were randomly selected because there are no 
clear stratification factors in the area. 
After identifying sample villages a list of all households in the sampled villages was generated to 
create the sampling frame for individual households. A sample of 300 households was then drawn 
randomly from this frame. Number of households selected in each village was based on the size of the 





Box 5. Sampling procedure in Malawi and Zambia 
 
Household was the sampling unit for the survey. It was defined as a group of individuals continuously 
living in one house and eating from one pot under the overall leadership of the household head. Lists of 
households in each village within the floodplains with potential access to the fishery were obtained 
from agriculture and fisheries offices which were later verified and updated during key informant 
interviews and focus group discussions. All the villages along and far away from the river channels but 
within the floodplains formed the sampling frames. This was necessary to ensure adequate spatial 
spread of the households. In order to maintain a statistically robust sampling strategy, random sampling 
was used to draw the survey households in the villages across the floodplains. Households were 
sampled every month from February 2007 to December 2008 in Lower Shire Floodplain and from June 
2007 to July 2008 in Kafue Floodplain, covering one complete farming and fishing season. For each 
month, new households were randomly drawn and interviewed. About 70 households were randomly 
sampled every month for twenty three months in Lower Shire Floodplain and fourteen months in Kafue 
Floodplain, resulting in 2034 independent households in Lower Shire Floodplain and 980 independent 
households in Kafue Floodplain. 
 
Survey design for collecting longitudinal and repeated cross-sectional data  
Some of the questions that need to be considered when designing longitudinal and 
repeated cross-sectional surveys include duration of the study, number of survey 
rounds, and period of the year when the survey rounds are implemented. Both 
longitudinal surveys and repeated cross section surveys involve more than one survey 
round but they have some slight differences. Longitudinal surveys are the ones where 
the same study units (households or individuals in our case) are interviewed in each 
survey round. In contrast, in repeated cross section surveys different study units are 
sampled each time. Duration of the study refers to the time from the first survey of the 
study to the last survey of the study. On the other hand, number of survey rounds 
refers to the number of times a questionnaire will be administered to the respondent. 
Box 4. Sampling procedure in Cameroon 
 
A stratified multistage random sampling procedure was used in Cameroon. Given the need to survey a 
representative sample of households in the study area with different production conditions (such as 
access to fish resources), the sampling design envisioned a stratification of the study site into different 
zones. It was assumed that under different ecological and production conditions the role of fisheries in 
terms of income generation is different. This procedure allowed capturing the whole continuum of 
fishing intensity (from wholly specialized fishermen to purely agriculture/livestock rearing oriented 
households). Hence, based on the criterion of access to fish resources, three zones were identified in 
the Logone floodplain: the Lake Maga area (zone 1), the Logone and its tributaries (zone 2), and the 
arid, only short-term flooded area (zone 3).  
In a second step, a complete list of villages in the study area (N=88) was compiled, based on 
information from different sources. These villages served as the primary sampling unit. For statistical 
reasons a total sample size of 300 households was assumed to be reasonable, which represents about 
7% of the population in the study area (estimated at ca. 20,000 inhabitants). Several discussions with 
experts resulted in the decision to choose 14 villages and then randomly select about 50 percent of 
households per village (the average village size in the floodplain is about 45 households, but ranges 
from 15 to 100 households). The villages were selected by weighted random sampling, proportional to 
the total number of villages per zone (zone 1: 9 villages; zone 2: 59 villages; zone 3: 20 villages), 
which led to the choice of two villages in zone 1, nine villages in zone 2 and three villages in zone 3.  
All selected villages were visited before commencing the HH level survey with the aim to conduct 
focus group discussions (FGDs) with the village (or quartier) leaders. The objective of the FGDs was 
primarily to create a sampling frame, i.e. complete household lists for every selected village had to be 
compiled, since no such information existed. In the last step, the household lists were then used for a 
weighted random sampling of the 300 sample households.33 
 
The final consideration on period of the year is mainly to consider seasonality of the 
livelihood activities and occurrence of some shocks such as floods in fishing 
communities.  
 
Shocks are by nature unanticipated, and it is pure coincidence that a survey will be 
able to capture information on shocks (particularly if it is a one time shock). This 
means that one cannot make a survey unnecessarily long to wait for a shock because 
the shock you are anticipating may not occur. An alternative approach was taken by 
Dercon and Krishnan (2000) and others where households were asked to state the 
shocks they have experienced in the past, say, 20 years. These can be used with the 
current observations to conduct vulnerability assessments.  
 
In the case of fishing communities, intra-year survey rounds are important because 
fishing and farming, both of which are important livelihood activities, are seasonal. 
The question of how frequent these rounds should be is not an easy one and may 
heavily depend on resources and contexts.  
 
Monthly surveys may be ideal because the respondents are given a short period to 
recall and this can result in the reduction in measurement error. But this has a high 
const in terms of resources. Respondents are also likely to experience survey fatigue 
and this may result in high levels of sample attrition i.e. loss of sampled households. 
One attempt to overcome sample attrition is to randomly sample independent 
households for each monthly survey, also known as repeated cross-sectional surveys 
(see Box 6). However, the data sets collected using this approach may not be efficient 
for assessing long-term dynamics of poverty within the household unless strong 
assumptions about the homogeneity of the stochastic causes of poverty dynamics are 
made.  
 
Box 6. Sample Attrition in Nigeria 
 
Although 300 households were sampled in the HN wetland, the final sample size for the first survey 
was 282 due to different reasons. One of the major problems was that many under aged individuals 
were included in the list of household heads. This was probably done with the anticipation that the 
project will bring some form of direct assistance to the villages and this was to increase the level of 
assistance they may obtain from the project. In order not to disturb much the sampling probabilities, it 
was decided not to replace these households from the village because it was thought this would over 
represent the villages where this problem occurred. We assumed that the distribution of the under-aged 
in the sample was the same across the villages as simple random sampling technique were used to 
obtain sample households from each of the sampled villages. Other households were ‘lost’ due to 
migration or the death of the household head. In case of death of the household head, it was considered 
as a lost case because most of the times, the wife (wives) remarries within a short time such that there 
is discontinuity in the household. Sometimes the wives leave the household to stay with relatives.  
Even after the first survey, the study still experienced sample attrition in subsequent survey rounds. 
After the first survey, the main causes of attrition were refusal to be re-interviewed and missed identity 
of the household. Missed or mixed identity refers to cases that were interviewed up to the last survey 
but their identity did not match that of the case that was interviewed in the first survey. After it was 
suspected that some case identities have been missed or mixed in the course of the study, we decided to 
collect information about household demographic information again in the last survey to reconcile 
household identities. These were compared with the information that was collected in the first survey 
and cases whose demographic information did not match the ones from the baseline survey were 
dropped from the sample. These cases were dropped from the follow up surveys only since the 
information obtained from the baseline survey from households with this identity will still be used for 
static analysis.   34 
 
 
Questionnaire design, pre-testing and enumerator training 
Parallel to the sampling, the development of the questionnaire should be completed at 
the final survey design and planning stage. A questionnaire is a set of questions that 
have been formulated to collect information from study units such as individuals, 
households, communities, etc. A lot of scientific methodological work has been done 
in the past decades by cognitive psychologists and survey methodologists on 
questionnaire design, particularly on the question-response process and the different 
biases that may be introduced by a wrong conceptualization of the questionnaire and 
the interview procedure. Most of the aspects are however well beyond the scope of 
these guidelines. Some issues shall nevertheless be introduced and discussed here, 
since it may be of use to research work in developing countries to consider some 
methods and peculiarities of questionnaire design.  
 
A prerequisite to designing a good questionnaire is deciding what is to be measured. 
This is mainly to be derived from the project’s objectives and the methodology to be 
applied in data analysis. This implies the clarification of questions such as: (1) which 
variables are designed to be dependent variables, (2) which are needed as independent 
variables in order to understand distributions and patterns of association, and (3) 
which variables may be deemed as control or intervening variables to explain patterns 
observed and to check out competing hypotheses (Fowler 1988). This is very 
important since sometimes questionnaires give the impression that their authors tried 
to think of every conceivable question that might be asked with respect to the general 
topic of concern, resulting in very long questionnaires with many questions irrelevant 
to the analysis intended and sometimes valid for only small proportions of the sample.  
The result is annoyance and frustration on the part of many responders (Frey 2001). A 
focus on really required information may hence not only reduce the length of the 
questionnaire, but also improve data quality.  
 
While the specific contents of questions (behaviour, beliefs, attitudes or attributes), 
the wording of questions (negative or positive wording, direct or indirect questions, 
personal or impersonal wording, etc.), as well as the type of question (i.e. open or 
closed format, scaling of answers, ranking formats etc.) may differ significantly 
depending on the research question, some general guidelines can be given concerning 
the questionnaire layout (de Vaus 1990).  
1.  In order not to waste time reading irrelevant questions, contingency questions 
should be used where appropriate. Contingency questions are the ones that 
help to filter respondents to some specific questions. For example: “Do you go 
fishing?” Individuals that would answer “No” to this question will not be 
required to answer the fishing related questions.  
2.  To provide flow, use general instructions, section and question introductions, 
and “go to” instructions. 
3.  Attention should be also paid to the order of questions. A good questionnaire 
is one in which there is a good logical flow to questions. 
a.  Start with easy and interesting questions 
b.  Go from concrete to abstract questions 35 
 
c.  Group questions into sections 
d.  Make use of filter questions 
4.  Since data is usually analyzed by statistical software packages (e.g. EXCEL, 
SPSS, SAS, STATA), it is useful to prepare for this by already allocating 
codes to the responses in the questionnaire. This pre-coding not only saves 
time during the interviews, but also simplifies the data entry and cleaning 
process. In the codes, you should always give room for other responses which 
you may not have considered when developing the questionnaire. This does 
not apply to cases that are already closed such as gender of an individual is 
either male or female but occupation of an individual may be something you 
did not think of. 
 
Every questionnaire should be pre-tested no matter how skilled the researcher is. 
Once the final questionnaires are printed and data collection has begun, changes are 
expensive and very difficult to make. For instance already completed interviews 
should be eliminated from the analysis if question wording has been changed. A pre-
test could however generate very useful feedback on individual questionnaire items, 
such as the structure and wording of the questions, but also on the interview 
procedure, and other issues involved in the survey. Although, the questionnaire can 
already be tested informally in earlier stages on family, friends or other students, this 
stage implies a formal test with real respondents in the survey area. A pre-test usually 
involves a number of interviews, determined by things as the number of subgroups of 
interest, or testing the aptitude of the questionnaire to different settings (e.g. in 
different strata). Usually this results in a need to revise the questionnaire and survey 
procedures. 
 
A common way to implement a pre-test when doing surveys is to combine it with a 
training workshop for enumerators (Box 7). Since the interview in itself poses by far 
the most serious problem in face-to-face surveys, particular attention should therefore 
be paid to the choice and training of enumerators. Each study is particular in that it 
investigates different aspects of the social, economic or ecological settings in the 
study area. Hence, even if the enumerators recruited for the interviews are skilled and 
possess year-long experience in doing surveys, a training workshop is in most cases 
an essential part of survey preparation. Interviewers have two primary roles in the 
collection of survey data: (1) to ensure the cooperation of selected respondents, and to 
motivate them to honestly provide the needed information, and (2) to ensure an 
objective interview, i.e. asking questions in a standardized way and that answers meet 
the question objectives. It is always a good idea to give interviewers a sense of the 
project’s objectives, and also some familiarity with sampling procedures, coding, and 
the kinds of analyses and reports that result from the surveys. Such information may 
be helpful to interviewers in answering respondent questions and may play a positive 
role in motivating the interviewers and helping them to understand the job. This 
information can well be provided in the first phase of the training workshop, then 
moving to the discussion of the questionnaire and other issues, such as: 
-  procedures for contacting respondents and introducing the study 
-  conventions used in the design of the questionnaire with respect to structure, 
wording and skip instructions, so that interviewers can ask the questions in a 
consistent and standardized way 36 
 
-  procedures for recording answers 
-  rules and guidelines for handling the interpersonal aspects of the interview in 
an unbiased way 
The knowledge acquired during the workshop can then be tested during the pre-test. 
The researcher has the possibility to supervise and observe the enumerators’ 
behaviour and give further instructions and advise before the start of the survey, 
where data has to be recorded in an unbiased way. 
 
Box 7. Enumerator choice in Cameroon 
 
The lack of sufficiently educated interviewer personnel in the Far-North Province in Cameroon 
presented a serious constraint. For this study, a team of five MINEPIA staff, who work as government 
officials in the survey area, was recruited as enumerators. While respondents can have reservations to 
provide information to government officers, the more important factor was that the survey team 
represented the two ethnic groups of the study area. Also, enumerators spoke the languages of the local 
population to be surveyed, they were familiar with the local peculiarities, and used to the conditions in 
the field. In addition, respondents’ willingness to provide information was actually encouraged in 
expectations of a follow-up governmental support. 
 
Survey implementation and its challenges 
Once all the planning has been made, all the research tools have been finalised, it is 
time for the research team to implement the survey. Implementation of a survey 
involves administering the questionnaires to the respondents. Prior to the interview, 
the objectives of the research should be clearly explained to the respondents to make 
sure that they do not distort the information. It is good not to promise any form of 
assistance when implementing the survey. It is also good for researchers to pay 
particular attention to the cultural settings and beliefs during the interviews because a 
breach of cultural norms during an interview can distort the whole survey. It may also 
be useful to have a schedule and inform the villages before one starts the interviews. 
This has an advantage of increasing the level of cooperation by the villagers. The 
research team should avoid going to the village the days important activities such as 
market days and praying days are occurring. It is always difficult for the respondents 
to cooperate when they feel that the researchers are denying them a chance of 
attending to some of these activities and this may jeopardize the quality of the data. 
 
While implementing the survey, the supervisor should be checking the completed 
questionnaires straightforward so that the mistakes that are being made are corrected 
while the team is still at the location where the questionnaires have been administered. 
Although enumerators have been involved in rigorous training, most of the times they 
have some sections of the questionnaire which they have not fully understood. This 
can be noted by the way they are filling the questionnaire. Depending on the level of 
mistakes, the whole questionnaire or some sections of the question should be re-
administered.  
 
One of the major challenges in implementing a survey is non-cooperation or refusal of 
the respondents to be interviewed. Of course it still remains a paradox because while 
some of the individuals who are in the sample are not willing to be interviewed, other 
individuals who are not part of the sample mostly ask the question why they were not 37 
 
included in the sample. Other challenges emerge from the time the sampling frame 
was drawn. Villagers may not have full knowledge of all the inhabitants in the village 
such that the sampling frame may include households that are no longer living in the 
village. This may involve re-sampling to replace lost cases or the lost cases may not 
be replaced. 
 
Data Management  
General data handling issues 
Data management involves data cleaning, data entry, and data analysis. Data cleaning 
involves checking all the questionnaires and taking care of all inconsistencies with the 
aim of maintaining the quality of the data. According to Muñoz (2005) the 
questionnaire data need to be subjected to five kinds of checks: range checks, checks 
against reference data, skip checks, consistency checks and typographic checks. The 
nature of these checks and the way they can be implemented under the various 
operational set-ups are here reviewed. Range checks are intended to ensure that every 
variable in the survey contains only data within a limited domain of valid values. 
Categorical variables can have only one of the values predefined for them on the 
questionnaire (for example, gender can be coded only as 1 for males or 2 for females); 
chronological variables should contain valid dates, and numerical variables should lie 
within prescribed minimum and maximum values (such as 0 to 95 years for age.). 
 
Skip checks refers to whether the skip patterns have been followed appropriately. For 
example, a simple check verifies that questions to be asked only of schoolchildren are 
not recorded for a child who answered no to an initial question on school enrolment. 
Another example would be to find that an individual who indicated that he/is not 
involved in fishing has income from fishing. It may be possible that this income 
belongs to a different activity. Consistency checks ensure that answer from one 
question is consistent with answer from another question. A simple check occurs 
when both values are from the same statistical unit, for example, the date of birth and 
age of a given individual. More complicated consistency checks involve comparing 
information from two or more different units of observation. An example is to find 
that an 8 year old child is in secondary school. There is no natural limit imposed on 
the number of consistency checks that can exist. 
 
A typical typographical error consists in the transposition of digits (like entering 14 
rather than 41) in a numerical input. Such a mistake for age might be caught by 
consistency checks with marital status or family relations. For example, the 
questionnaire of a married or widowed adult age 41 whose age is mistakenly entered 
as 14 will show up with an error flag in the check on age against marital status. 
However, the same error in the monthly expenditure on meat may easily pass 
undetected, since either $14 or $41 could be valid amounts.  
 
Data cleaning exercise begins in the field and continues to the time when the data is 
analysed or when the report is being written. It does not matter at which stage the data 
is checked but when a strange figure seem to appear, the researcher is supposed to 
check if a collect figure was corrected and if it was entered correctly in the computer 
program that is being used for analysis.  
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Presently, there are many computer programs that can be used to analyse data. Data 
entry begins with the creation of the data entry template (database) which should be a 
form of the questionnaire in the computer program. The design and formatting of the 
template should be in a form so that figures from the questionnaire should just be 
punched into the program. Any statistical program such as stata, SPSS, excel, access 
can be used to enter data depending on the knowledge of the researcher of the 
statistical program. 
 
Computing welfare measures 
Finally, it becomes important for the researcher to compute the welfare indicators 
(income, consumption expenditure, and others) before relating them to different 
household characteristics. This is a relatively challenging task for the research 
because theoretical definitions of welfare measures need to be matched with practical 
methods.  
 
Box 8. Estimating annual household income in Nigeria 
 
Estimating annual household income from a single cross section survey has always been very difficult. 
In most cases, recalls are used and these are done on different periods such as a day, a week, a month 
and a year with different income sources. In Nigeria, the respondents were given the freedom to state 
the frequency of the flow of income from a given source. Unfortunately, this approach led to some 
measurement errors. The estimated values were suspected to be overestimated mainly on activities the 
respondents indicated that they obtain money from on daily basis such as fishing and hawking/petty 
trading. Some assumptions had to be made to obtain more reasonable estimates of these values. For 
fishing, it was assumed that the fishing pattern shown by the individual/household in the year (during 
the follow up surveys) reflect a perennial fishing pattern of the individual/household (i.e. whether 
seasonal or not) and this was used to judge whether daily meant everyday throughout the year or 
everyday within certain seasons. It was therefore arbitrarily assumed that in a week, there are three 
days when an individual can not go for fishing. Even within the fishing period, an individual will be 
faced with some situations that will not allow him/her to do the activity everyday. While accepting the 
fact that in peak fishing periods individuals fish everyday, individuals may even go fishing for only one 
day or not fish at all in off fishing periods. This was thought to be an appropriate way of dealing with 
the overstatement of fishing frequencies. Prices were corrected manually by replacing prices that were 
suspected to be too high with observed prices reported by a given household during the follow up 
surveys. The assumption here was that the fisher is using the same measuring container (basket or 
basin) for pricing, in which case downward movements in prices were not expected. This meant that 
high prices reported during the baseline survey were mainly due to measurement error. A similar 
process was also followed to estimate incomes from hawking and petty trading. 
Total income from farming was computed by multiplying the total crop output with the average price 
of a crop in a given village. Average village prices were used to take care of outliers and also spatial 
variations of output prices. Total household income from livestock was defined as the sum of the 
monetary value of livestock and livestock products consumed by the household and the revenue from 
livestock and livestock product sales. Own consumption of livestock and livestock products was 
considered as an income since valuing total value of crops also implicitly considers on value of crops 
consumed as an income. 
 
Total household income virtually refers to the sum of monetary income, income in 
kind (including production of the household enterprise and government services), and 
the value imputed to services derived from endowments and assets such as durables, 
housing and time owned by the household (Grootaert, 2005). Practically, estimation 
of household income involves estimation of income from different economic activities 
for a period which is covered by the survey (Box 8). These estimates are then summed 
up to have an estimate of total income. Incomes from different sources are not 
estimated using exactly the same procedure. For example, estimating income from 39 
 
crops involves multiplying total output with the market prices. Since different 
households may sell the crop to different buyers, different prices may be reported by 
the farmers. Use of an average income is therefore recommended to standardize the 
value of the output. The uses of average prices also help to eliminate outliers. The 
average prices of the crop can still be computed at village level and not study area 
level to make sure that we do not overlook/eliminate the spatial differences in prices. 
Although the entire crop yield is valued to determine income from crops, income from 
livestock is computed by estimating total revenue from livestock and livestock 
product sales plus the value of livestock and livestock products own consumed. Own 
consumption is defined as income because it is assumed that they would have sold 
this output and then use the money to by it. Estimating income from fishing involves 
determining the monetary value of the fish catch. On the other hand, consumption 
expenditures estimation typically aggregates expenditure on all goods and services 
consumed, valued at appropriate prices, and including consumption from own 
production. Total household consumption expenditure is practically defined as the 
sum of out of pocket expenditures on consumption goods and services and the value 
of crops, fish and livestock consumed from own production. Valuation of own 
consumption of produced commodities should be done by multiplying quantity of the 
good consumed with the mean village level price.  
 
When either of the two indicators is computed, considerations about differences in 
household size and composition should be made to make the indicators comparable 
and meaningful. An equal amount of income for households with different sizes and 
composition imply different levels of living standards. The household with more 
members has a lower level of living standard because many people are assumed to 
share the same ‘cake’. Individuals of different sex and age also require different levels 
of consumption to meet the minimum required levels. Adult equivalent scales have 
been derived in many countries to take care of this and these are based on daily 
recommended calorie intake. However, the simple way of handling this is just to 
divide the total household income or consumption expenditure with household size to 





The need to determine the value of small scale fisheries in developing countries have 
been raised in many sections of fisheries literature. One of the reasons for the lack of 
valuation studies in developing countries is the lack of capacity in many fisheries 
departments to value the contribution of small scale fisheries to the livelihoods of 
rural households. This handbook has been developed to guide fisheries personnel in 
assessing the contribution of small scale fisheries to household livelihood. The 
document reviews succinctly the conventional economic valuation techniques and 
also shows how poverty and vulnerability assessment can generate additional useful 
information about the value of SSF to rural households.  
 
In determining the value of small scale fisheries, there is a need to recognise the 
difference between the market price of fish and its value. The value fish or a fishery 
captures the amount of money an individual is willing to pay for a commodity while a 
market price is the amount of money an individual is supposed to pay in the market 
for the commodity. In cases where some of the attributes of the commodity can not be 40 
 
traded on the market such as in small scale fisheries, market price presents an 
undervaluation of the commodity.  
 
Most of the conventional economic valuation techniques used in environmental and 
natural resource economics can also be applied to small scale fisheries. These are 
broadly categorised into market based approaches, revealed preference approaches 
and stated preferences approaches. However, these valuation techniques do not show 
the potential of small scale fisheries in poverty reduction. That is why the findings 
from such valuation studies have not been very useful in positioning small scale 
fisheries in poverty reduction strategies. 
 
The more appropriate technique of valuing the contribution of small scale fisheries to 
household welfare and assessing its potential in reducing poverty and vulnerability is 
what is being referred to as the household welfare analysis in this document. This type 
of approach involves the assessment of the impacts that small scale fisheries have on 
different welfare indicators such as income, assets, consumption expenditure, food 
security, health, etc.  
 
The measures in the household welfare analysis can be assessed either at a point in 
time (static assessment) or through changes over time (dynamic assessment). In 
implementing a static analysis, different methods can be used to show the contribution 
of small scale fisheries. Some of these include assessing the contribution of fishing to 
total household income, or comparing the welfare status of fishing and non-fishing 
households. Fishing households can also be compared to externally defined welfare 
groups such as the poor and non-poor groups or percentiles. 
 
The dynamic assessment draws on the empirical observation that household welfare 
level changes over time. Dynamic assessment of welfare includes important 
distinctions in poverty ‘structure’ such as chronic and transient poverty. These can 
further be categorised into structural-chronic, structural-transient and stochastic-
transient. These poverty groups can then be related to fishing identity of a household. 
The dynamic assessment of welfare is also related to the concept of vulnerability 
which measures the probability that a household will be poor at some time in the 
future. This presents some important insights for policy makers. 
 
The collection of such data relies on a rigorous scientific method that includes several 
stages: preliminary planning, field trip, survey design, questionnaire design, pre-
testing, and enumerator training, and finally survey implementation. The exact way 
these stages are implemented needs to be context-specific but also follows general 
rules which are common to any scientific research, in order to ensure the reliability, 
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Glossary of Economic Terms 
Poverty:  the state of living with income below a socially defined 
poverty line 
Vulnerability:  the ex ante risk that an individual or household will fall into 
poverty line in the future 
Consumer surplus:  the difference between the price that a consumer pays and 
the price that he/she is willing to pay 
Producer  surplus:  the difference between the amount that a producer 
receives from the sale of a good and the lowest amount 
that producer is willing to accept for that good 
Equilibrium price:  the price of a good or service at which the demand curve 
crosses the supply curve 
Equilibrium quantity:  the quantity of a good or service the consumers buy and 
producers sell at the equilibrium price 
Demand  curve:  a curve that shows the quantity of goods and services 
consumers are willing to buy at different prices   
Supply  curve:  a curve that shows the quantity of goods and services 
suppliers are willing to supply at different prices 
Economic value:  a measure of what the maximum amount of money an 
individual is willing to forgo in order to obtain some 
good or service 
Total economic value:  economic value of a good or service that considers both use 
and non use values 
Production function:  a mapping from quantities of inputs to quantities of an 
output as generated by a production process. 
Social protection:  a form of support by public, private and/or not-for profit 
organisation to individuals, households or communities in 
their efforts to prevent, manage or overcome vulnerability 
and poverty 
Social  insurance:  regular premiums to secure entitlements to financial 
assistance in the occurrence of specified risks 
Social assistance:  transfers, in cash or kind to the poor to address poverty and 
vulnerability    
Welfare:  economic assistance to individuals, households or 
communities to improve their well-being 
Fall-back:      last resort activity adopted after a loss of main livelihood 
strategy 
Risk  spreading:  cushion against risks that can cause temporary (or 
permanent) shortfalls from a preferred welfare level  
    44 
 
Livelihoods  system:  combination of activities with the aim to satisfy the 
household’s needs 
Poverty alleviation:  policies aiming at a reduction of existing poverty 
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